State News

The end of 2025, beginning of 2026 involved changes in the Indiana Worker’s Compensation administrative law area for Indiana. 

The governor of Indiana has appointed two new judges.  Steve Koers, a former defense attorney from Indianapolis, will serve as the single hearing member for the Indianapolis and Hamilton County area beginning February 2, 2026.  He temporarily served in the Southwest Indiana area taking over Judge Meagher, who retired in late 2025.  He is now serving in the central Indiana area following the retirement of Diane Parsons at the end of January.

The southwest Indiana area is now served by Pat McCrory, a former Indianapolis defense attorney whose experience is primarily defense outside the worker’s compensation field.

We are honored and pleased to announce that Melissa Petersen, who has been a long-term Attorney with Rulis & Bochicchio was appointed to take a position as a Workers’ Compensation Judge for the State of Pennsylvania effective 12/1/2025.

Also, we are pleased to report that Attorneys Vito Bochicchio and Brad Andreen published with the WorkComp College content on PA for the State Education program.

While not specific to Georgia or workers’ compensation, new USPS postmark rules could create potential problems. Effective December 24, 2025, the United States Postal Service (USPS) made changes to the postmark process, shifting the postmark date from when mail is deposited to when it is first processed at a regional facility. While the postmark date was previously entered at local USPS facilities, the mail must now travel to a regional facility, which may result in a delay of a day or more before being postmarked. Local USPS facility clerks can provide same-day postmarks pursuant to an in-person request, if needed. 

This change may impact deadlines imposed for submissions to the State Board of Workers’ Compensation and other courts, as well as payments to claimants and their attorneys. 

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-100(e), “Any claim, notice, or appeal required by this chapter to be filed with the board shall be deemed filed on the earlier of: (1) The date such claim or notice is actually received by the board; or (2) The official postmark date such claim or notice was mailed to the board, properly addressed with postage prepaid, by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery.” 

Regarding weekly income payments, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221 (b) provides, “Such weekly payments shall be considered to be paid when due when mailed from within the State of Georgia to the address specified by the employee or to the address of record according to the board. Such weekly payments shall be considered to be paid when due when mailed from outside the State of Georgia no later than three days prior to the due date to the address specified by the employee or the address of record according to the board. Such weekly payments shall be considered to be paid when due at the time they are made by electronic funds transfer to an account specified by the employee.”  Failure to do so results in a 15% late penalty. Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15 (b) provides payments pursuant to the terms of settlement must be mailed within 20 days (17 days if from out-of-state) of approval to avoid a 20% late penalty. 

To avoid penalties and fees from late filings and payments, additional time may be needed if mailed via regular USPS. We strongly encourage clients to send time-sensitive items via certified mail (if USPS), FedEx, or UPS. Additionally, mailing items well before any deadline will help avoid issues.   

In other news, the Georgia legislature will consider increases in the maximum weekly temporary total disability (TTD) rate to $875.00  and maximum temporary partial disability (TPD) rate to $583.00. This would create a $75.00 increase from the current maximum TTD rate of $800.00 and a $50.00 increase in the current maximum TPD rate of $533.00,  both in place since July 1, 2023. If passed, the rate increases would likely go into effect for dates of accident occurring on and after July 1, 2026. No other significant legislative changes are expected in 2026. Please check back here for updates. 

Kansas statutes specifically set forth the following rule regarding injuries from workplace fights: “Compensation for an injury shall be disallowed if such injury to the employee results from … the employee’s voluntary participation in fighting or horseplay with a co-employee for any reason, work related or otherwise.” K.S.A. 44-501(a)(1)(E).

In Gutierrez-Lujan v. Wright Tree Service, AP-00-0492-288, 2025 WL 3481131 (Kan. Work. Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 13, 2025) the Kansas Workers Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge denial of compensation to claimant Gutierrez-Lujan for an injury received in a workplace fight with a co-employee.

Gutierrez-Lujan and his foreman argued over the claimant’s job performance. After words were exchanged, a physical altercation occurred. The claimant alleged he was struck from behind, knocked to the ground, and kicked. The foreman, by contrast, testified that the claimant pushed him first, prompting the foreman to slap the claimant in the face.

Another supervisor arrived at the scene and attempted to sort through the resulting “he-said, he-said” situation. Ultimately, both men finished their workday, and neither immediately requested medical treatment. Several days later, however, the claimant sought medical treatment on his own and, after being denied authorization for medical care, pursued a workers compensation claim against the employer.

At the Preliminary Hearing, the parties disagreed as to the nature of the workplace fight. Because K.S.A. 44-501(a)(1)(E) precludes recovery of workers’ compensation benefits for voluntary participation in a workplace fight, regardless of whether the fight is work-related or not, the claimant argued he was attacked, while the respondent contended the claimant was an active participant, if not the instigator.

The Administrative Law Judge focused on the witnesses’ credibility in determining which version of the facts of the fight were more believable. After observing the witnesses testify and reviewing their depositions, the Judge concluded the claimant was not a passive victim but had voluntarily participated in the fight. Accordingly, she denied the claimant’s request for benefits.

The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the denial of benefits, emphasizing that credibility determinations made by the Judge are entitled to deference. Because the employer proved the statutory defense, the claimant was denied workers’ compensation benefits. 

The Gutierrez-Lujan Appeals Board decision evidences an important consideration in workplace fight cases in Kansas: The outcome of cases can ultimately depend on the credibility of the witnesses. The supervisor, while presumably minimizing his involvement, admitted striking the claimant in response to being pushed. By making this admission, he established that a voluntary fight had occurred. The Judge further noted that the supervisor had no history of striking other employees or engaging in abusive behavior. As a result, the Judge concluded there was no evidence that the supervisor suddenly broke character and assaulted the claimant.  The Judge concluded that the supervisor reacted to a provocation. Based on these facts, both the ALJ and the Board determined the altercation under the law, was voluntary on the part of the claimant, precluding him from receiving workers compensation benefits for his alleged injury.

January 2026

Tennessee Supreme Court Clarifies Compensability Standard for Aggravation of Pre-Existing Conditions

On December 22, 2025, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued the Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC. decision which provided much-needed clarification on the proof needed to establish a compensable aggravation of a pre-existing condition. 

In Edwards, the employee was a truck driver who was involved in a motor vehicle accident when one of her tires blew out. She received authorized medical treatment with Dr. Jason Hutchison, who diagnosed her with end-stage tricompartmental arthritis in both knees. Bilateral knee replacement surgeries were recommended. Dr. Hutchison opined that the knee arthritis was pre-existing, but that the accident “may have caused a significant exacerbation of the arthrosis.” However, Dr. Hutchison further opined that the exacerbation of knee symptoms was not compensable under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law. Employer denied responsibility for the knee replacement surgeries under workers’ compensation.

The employee sought a second opinion with Dr. Timothy Sweo. Dr. Sweo agreed that knee replacement surgeries were appropriate, but Dr. Sweo opined that the need for both knee replacements was most likely greater than 51% caused by the work accident.

The trial court convened an expedited hearing and ruled that Ms. Edwards was likely to prevail on the merits. The trial court found that Dr. Hutchison had misapprehended the law by concluding that the exacerbation of a pre-existing condition is not compensable under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law. The trial court agreed with Dr. Sweo’s opinion that the need for knee replacement surgery was primarily caused by the work accident and ordered the Employer to pay for medical benefits, including the knee replacement surgeries.

On the first appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, the Appeals Board affirmed the trial court’s order that the employer should provide medical treatment for any symptoms related to the accident but reversed the trial court’s order for knee replacement surgeries. The Appeals Board remanded the case back to the trial court.

On remand, both parties retained additional medical experts. The employer hired Dr. Christian Claiborne, who opined that “an aggravation is synonymous with an anatomic change” and that Ms. Edwards had not suffered a permanent anatomic change from the accident. Like Dr. Hutchison, Dr. Claiborne testified that the pre-existing arthritis, not the truck accident, necessitated knee surgery. 

The employee hired Dr. Lawrence Schrader, who opined that Ms. Edwards had sustained an aggravation to her knee arthritis that was more likely than not due to the truck accident. Dr. Schrader testified that Ms. Edwards was asymptomatic prior to the accident and became permanently symptomatic after the accident aggravated her pre-existing arthritis.

The trial court convened another hearing and determined that the opinions of Dr. Sweo and Dr. Schrader were supported by the evidence and again ordered the Employer to pay for bilateral knee replacement surgeries. As part of the trial court’s order, it again stated that Dr. Hutchison had misstated Tennessee law by opining that exacerbations of pre-existing conditions were not compensable. The trial court also stated that Dr. Christian was incorrect when he stated that an aggravation injury required an anatomic change.

On the second appeal to the Appeals Board, two of the three judges determined that Ms. Edwards’ knee surgeries were not compensable. While the majority found that the preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Ms. Edwards had sustained a compensable aggravation of her pre-existing knee arthritis, the evidence did not support a finding that the need for bilateral knee replacements was more than 50% caused by the truck accident. The majority attributed greater weight to the opinions of Dr. Hutchison and Dr. Christian than to the opinions of Dr. Sweo and Dr. Schrader. The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s conclusion, reasoning that there was sufficient evidence that the truck accident caused new or increased symptoms that led to functional limitations and the need for knee replacement surgery was hastened by the truck accident.

Employee appealed the Appeals Board’s decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the Appeals Board, finding that the post-reform workers’ compensation statute indicated a change from prior case which required a permanent worsening of a condition before an aggravation was compensable. The Supreme Court clarified that under current law, a compensable aggravation does not require proof of a permanent anatomic change or worsening of the condition.  Instead, a compensable aggravation requires: (1) proof establishing that the work accident contributed more than 50% in causing the aggravation, and (2) proof establishing that the aggravation contributed more than 50% in causing disablement or the need for medical treatment. The Supreme Court held that Ms. Edwards’ proof satisfied both elements and therefore determined that the employer was responsible for the knee surgery.

The Edwards decision represented an important clarification (and some would argue, a drastic change) in the analysis of compensability of aggravation injuries. No longer should we be focused on whether the accident caused an anatomic change to the pre-existing condition, since the Supreme Court determined that such a finding was not necessary. Instead, we should be more focused on the more general questions of whether the work accident was the primary cause of the aggravation, and whether the aggravation was the primary cause of the medical treatment at issue.

For any questions, please contact:
Fredrick R. Baker, Member
Wimberly Lawson Wright Daves & Jones, PLLC
1420 Neal Street, Suite 201
P.O. Box 655
Cookeville, TN 38503-0655
Phone: 931-372-9123
Fax: 931-372-9181
fbaker@wimberlylawson.com
www.wimberlylawson.com

In Ex parte Griffin, the Alabama Supreme Court denied a petition for mandamus filed by co-employees seeking immunity from a civil suit arising out of a workplace injury.  The denial left in place the trial court’s refusal to grant summary judgment based on immunity pursuant to the Exclusivity Doctrine. 

Although the Court issued no majority opinion, Justice Cook’s special concurrence is noteworthy.  He emphasized that the denial was driven by the high mandamus standard and procedural issues and not a determination that the co-employees are liable.

Justice Cook also raised significant concerns about existing Alabama precedent interpreting § 25-5-11(c)(2), particularly:

• Whether an employer can become a “manufacturer” through equipment modifications, and
• Whether courts have expanded “willful and intentional” conduct beyond the statute’s plain language.
•  

My Two Cents:

The concurrence signals that these issues remain unsettled and may be ripe for reconsideration in a future appeal.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

The WC world runs on abbreviations.  Seasoned WC veterans type three letters, hit send, and assume everyone knows exactly what they meant.  Sometimes they do.  Sometimes… not so much.

Every claim begins with a DOI (Date of Injury) or DOA (Date of Accident).  Shortly thereafter comes the FROI (First Report of Injury).  At this point, the ER (Employer) notifies the TPA (Third Party Administrator), who opens a file, and assigns a claim number.

The injured employee, now officially the IW or Clmt, wants to know one thing: “How much am I getting paid?”  The answer depends on the AWW (Average Weekly Wage), a number that will be debated, recalculated, and argued about far longer than anyone expected.  Then the ER wants to know if this is a MO (Medical Only) or LT (Lost Time) claim because it’s EMR (Experience Modification Rating) could be adversely affected.

Now we enter the medical phase.  This is where abbreviations multiply like gremlins after midnight.  The MP (Medical Provider), often an Ortho, prescribes Tx, Rx, PT, OT, and maybe some DME if things get spicy.  The Px provides their Hx where any ROM or LOC is reported.  If the MO orders Sx, you can bet that said request will be referred to UR (Utilization Review).

If treatment continues, the claim gets MM (Medical Management), possibly involving an NCM, FCM, or TCM.  Meanwhile, work status bounces between FD, LD, OW, and RTW, with Mods attached.  Everyone is now holding their breath for MMI (Maximum Medical Improvement) aka the finish line that always seems to move.  Then someone may request an IME or FCE.

Once MMI hits, the doctor assigns an IR. This number decides whether we’re talking PI, PPD, PPI, or the nightmare scenario, PTD which is likely based on a VDR (vocational disability rating).  If PTD, then SSDI offsets become relevant.

Just when everyone finally memorized the acronyms, along came EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) to remind us that things can always get more complicated.  In theory, EDI was supposed to streamline claims reporting.  In practice, it introduced a parallel universe where the claim is “accepted” in real life but “rejected” by the system because someone used the wrong two-letter jurisdiction code, forgot a decimal in the AWW, or dared to list a DOI that offended the EDI gods. 

Next comes the lawyers.  This is where the acronyms start emailing each other.  The DA (Defense Attorney) exchanges pleasantries with OC or PA/CA.  Everyone watches the SOL like a hawk.  In Alabama, for a WC settlement to achieve finality, it must be court approved or an Ombudsman must hold a BRC (Benefit Review Hearing) and sign off on it.  

Oversight comes from the WCB/WCC or IC, depending on the state. In Alabama, it is the ADOWFWD (Alabama Dept of Workforce Workers’ Comp Div).  If Medicare is even remotely involved, MSP compliance becomes a thing, CMS enters the conversation, and suddenly someone asks whether an MSA is needed, usually on a Friday afternoon.

So, the next time you see an email that says: “IW at MMI, IR pending, OW w/ Mods, UR approved Tx, DA evaluating PPD exposure” - Just smile.  You’re fluent now.  You’re welcome!

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com  or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

Simon Anderson Law P.C.

701 Market Street, Suite 340, St. Louis, MO  63101

314-621-2828

MISSOURI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CASE LAW UPDATE

October 2025 – December 2025

ALJ Could Not Award Permanency Over and Above only Permanency Rating Admitted into Evidence

Barnett vs. Kawasaki Motors Manufacturing Corporation, US, Injury No. 23-040406

FACTS: The claimant sustained an injury to his right shoulder. Dr. Mall performed an arthroscopic right shoulder rotator cuff repair with biceps tenodesis. Thereafter, he underwent physical therapy, and he was placed at MMI. The claimant reported continuing complaints, and he was returned to the doctor and he reported an intervening incident when he fell from a bicycle and now had pain over the AC joint which was not part of the original injury. The doctor did not believe the claimant needed any additional treatment and that any current complaints were related to this intervening bike incident. Dr. Mall provided a rating of 7% disability.

The judge noted that the claimant is not required to submit his own disability rating and he is familiar with Dr. Mall’s ratings having reviewed his reports in hundreds of cases and thereafter awarded 25% disability to the shoulder. He did note the finder of fact consider all evidence in determining the amount of an employee’s PPD and is not obligated to award the same percentages assigned by experts. He noted it was within the province of the fact finder to determine what weight it will accord expert testimony on medical causation. The employer appealed noting that the award was against the weight of the evidence.

HOLDING: The Commission noted that the ALJ determined that the claimant had disability 18% higher than the only medical opinion on permanent disability at the Hearing. The Commission noted that the statute states that permanent partial disability or permanent total disability shall be demonstrated and certified by a physician. The Commission further went on to note the courts have held that the employee has the burden of proving not only that an accident occurred and that it resulted in injury but also that a disability resulted and the extent of the disability. The Commission concluded that the claimant failed to carry his burden of proving the extent of his disability due to the work injury because he produced no credible, persuasive evidence that supported a greater level of disability than assessed by Dr. Mall. The ALJ exceeded his authority by substituting his own lay opinion of treatment records and vaguely alluding to his experience with Dr. Mall in other cases to justify and award 3x greater than Dr. Mall’s opinion. Therefore, the Commission modified the award of the ALJ and awarded 7% of the shoulder.

Medical Provider Met Burden of Proof that Fees Were Reasonable and Employer Required to Pay Additional Monies

S & B Hauling and Construction & Utah Business Insurance Company of America vs. Center for Surgical Specialties P.C., Case No. WD88030 (Mo. App. WD 2025) 

FACTS: A claimant sustained a compensable work-related injury, and surgery was authorized with Surgical Specialties who billed the employer/insurer in the amount of $19,763.00 and the employer/insurer paid $11,566.52 but refused to pay the remaining balance of $8,196.48. Surgical Specialties filed an Application for Reimbursement of Additional Medical Fees, and the employer/insurer filed an Answer arguing that the amount already paid to Surgical Specialties represented the usual and customary rate for the medical services provided. The only issue at the Hearing was whether the medical bills submitted by Surgical Specialties were fair and reasonable.

At the time of the Hearing, Surgical Specialties’ business manager testified that 99% of the doctor’s practice is comprised of workers’ compensation referrals. The claimant was referred to Surgical Specialties by a nurse case manager who directed and authorized the surgery. The business manager testified that the bill issued to the employer/insurer reflected the charges and fees that Surgical Specialties routinely billed for that particular surgery performed regardless of who is billed for the procedure.

There was testimony on behalf of the employer/insurer, specifically a doctor with WellRithms, a company that contracts with workers’ compensation insurers to assume legal and financial exposure in exchange for payment based on a percentage of liability assumed. That doctor testified that based on his review of the bill Surgical Specialties should have been paid the $11,566.52 based on standard billing and reimbursement practices. The ALJ found that Surgical Specialties had the burden of proof regarding reasonableness of its medical charges and the evidence and testimony submitted sustained this burden and awarded the facility the additional charges. The employer/insurer appealed, stating that the charges were unreasonable and unfair.

HOLDING: The Commission affirmed and adopted the Award of the ALJ. The Court looked to prior case law and determined that Surgical Specialties sustained its burden of proof and persuasion as the Award of the ALJ and the Commission found that the business manager’s testimony was credible and persuasive and they are bound by the Commission’s credibility determination. Therefore, the employer/insurer was ordered to pay the outstanding $8,196.48.   

Claimant’s Claim Against Mo. Dept. of Social Services Barred Based on Sovereign Immunity

Woodrum vs. Missouri Department of Social Services, Case No. SD38940 (Mo. App. SD 2025)

FACTS: The claimant alleged that the Missouri Department of Social Services retaliated against him by constructively terminating his employment soon after he began seeking workers’ compensation benefits after a work injury. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Social Services on the grounds that the claimant’s retaliation claim is barred by sovereign immunity. The claimant appealed contending that the applicable provisions of the Missouri workers’ compensation law expressly waives sovereign immunity for retaliation claims involving the state.

HOLDING: The Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment noting that the state has expressed an affirmative intent to preserve its sovereign immunity by way of a separate and controlling statutory provision which is outside of the workers’ compensation law.

Hicks vs. Commercial Metals Company, et al, Case No. WD87598 consolidated with WD87627 (Mo. App. WD 2025) 

FACTS: The claimant began working for CMC as a rebar bender operator on January 17, 2017. From the time she started, one of the objectives of management was “no recordables and no lost time”. The claimant’s interpretation of that objective was “you don’t want to get hurt or, if you do, you suck it up and keep going.” She sustained an injury on January 15, 2018 and was knocked unconscious. The shop superintendent did not call an ambulance, but took her to the emergency room, and stayed with her. After leaving the ER he took the claimant to the company clinic to be drug-tested. The next day, he picked her up from home and took her back to the company clinic to be evaluated. She was to return to work with restrictions and he drove her to the plant and placed her in a darkened room for her eight-hour shift. Although the safety manager testified that the claimant was given job duties, the claimant testified that she did nothing but sit in a chair or lie on the floor in the room during her entire shift. She was again seen by a doctor and for the next three weeks sat alone in a dark room or took vacation, sick days or PTO. Other than breaks, she was not allowed to have access to her cell phone and the claimant testified that this work-around was created so that her time off would not count in the company records as “lost time and a recordable.”

The shop superintendent testified that once Hicks went on full medical leave, she also went on short-term disability. However, the claimant never applied for short-term disability. She was in fact told that she could not receive both benefits. Although the claimant did not know it, the employer initiated FMLA and short-term disability on Hicks’ behalf in March of 2018. The claimant continued to receive workers’ compensation benefits and she received a termination letter from the employer on August 31, 2018. Before and after her termination, she continued to receive treatment and her nurse case manager presented to her appointments and provided the employer updates. The claimant was released from all work restrictions on September 13, 2018.

There was testimony that a meeting was held with corporate employees to discuss the claimant’s employment and it was agreed upon that a letter would be sent to the claimant to reach back out to the employer in order to discuss her employment and she needed to respond immediately. However, the claimant testified that she did not receive any communication from the employer before her actual termination letter. There was testimony that the claimant lived less than two miles from the plant and the shop superintendent had picked her up from her home to take her to work following the accident and no one from the company tried to reach her at her home. The employer claimed that the basis for the claimant’s termination was failure to communicate and provide proof of disability.

After the claimant’s termination, she remained unemployed for the remainder of 2018 and 2019 and in 2020, she had multiple short-term jobs. There was testimony that her demeanor changed, she lost confidence and had become withdrawn. The claimant filed a suit alleging employment retaliation.

After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hicks and awarded her $90,000 for back pay and $300,000 for noneconomic damages. The employer moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial or modification of the judgement, and the trial court overruled all of the motions. CMC again moved for a new trial alleging jury misconduct. The employer’s attorney advised that he had learned of the alleged misconduct a few days after the conclusion of the trial but failed to explain why these issues were not addressed in the prior motion for a new trial. It was alleged that the claimant’s attorney’s father spoke with two jurors outside the courthouse during the trial. The employer had sworn affidavits of two of their employees confirming the same. The claimant’s attorney requested video surveillance which  contradicted the employees’ allegations. At a hearing on a motion for sanctions, the two employees testified that they “misremembered” all of the events but neither came forward until the surveillance surfaced. The trial court sanctioned the employer, finding that they acted in bad faith and committed fraud on the court. The trial court awarded sanctions in the amount of $312,450 which equated to the full amount of Hicks’ hourly attorney’s fees for the trial. The employer appealed, arguing that the claimant offered no evidence that her receipt of workers’ compensation benefits was a motivating factor in her termination.

HOLDING: The Court noted that in order to prevail on her retaliation claim, she needed to prove that she was employed by the employer before the injury, she exercised her rights by filing a claim for workers’ compensation, the employer terminated the claimant and there was a causal relationship between the claimant filing her claim and termination. The employer only argued that the claimant did not meet the fourth element, that she proved a causal relationship between her workers’ compensation claim and her termination. The Court noted that the claimant proved a causal relationship by showing that her workers’ compensation claim was a motivating factor in her discharge and it actually played a role in the discharge or termination and had a determinative influence on the discharge or termination. Essentially, the employer’s evidence focused on the claimant’s alleged lack of communication about her health status and timing for returning to work, but the claimant presented evidence that the employer was aware of the same as the nurse case manager was sending updates to the employer. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant, there was sufficient evidence to submit the claimant’s retaliatory discharge claim to the jury. Also, the Appellate Court found no abuse of discretion in the amount of sanctions imposed. The court also affirmed the jury’s back pay award and non-economic damages award, noting that they could not say the jury’s verdict was excessive nor that the trial court abused its discretion.

Dismissal Set Aside as No Evidence Claimant Received Actual Notice

Tippit vs. State of Missouri, Second Injury Fund, Case No. ED113466 (Mo. App. ED 2025)  

FACTS: The claimant sustained an injury on September 25, 2015 and filed a claim against the employer and the Fund in January of 2016. The claimant and the employer reached a settlement in December of 2016 and his case against the Fund remained open. The claimant’s attorney died in December of 2020 and in June of 2021 the claimant hired a new attorney, but the Division records did not show that he entered his appearance with the Division. The Division sent the claimant a Notice to Show Cause Why the Claim Should not be Dismissed which was set on September 14, 2022. It was sent certified and showed that someone at the claimant’s residence received the same. The claimant did not contact the ALJ on the date of the show cause setting and the ALJ dismissed the case. The Order of Dismissal was sent certified and again delivered to an individual at the claimant’s residence.

A week later the claimant’s attorney filed a second Entry of Appearance on the claimant’s behalf on September 27, 2022. Then on May 20, 2023 the claimant filed an Application for Review with the Commission requesting that the Order be set aside as neither he nor his attorney received the Order of Dismissal until May 10, 2023. He also alleged that he never received the notice of show cause setting. The Commission reinstated the  claim against the Fund for the sole purpose of remanding the matter to the Division for a Hearing before an ALJ to allow the claimant to present evidence on his allegations that he did not receive the Order of Dismissal or show cause notice.

After the Remand Hearing, the Commission found that the Division sent the September 19, 2022 Order of Dismissal to the claimant via certified mail but the claimant did not file his Application until eight months later which was untimely. Since it was untimely, the Commission did not have any jurisdiction over the case and dismissed the Application for Review. The claimant appealed.

HOLDING: The Court found the basis for the Commission’s dismissal was that the Division properly mailed the September 19, 2022 Order of Dismissal to the claimant by certified mail but noted that this was not supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record. The court noted that the certified mail tracking number showed that the document was placed in the mail on September 15, 2022 but the ALJ did not sign and enter the order until September 19, 2022 and therefore, the document mailed could not have been the Order of Dismissal as it did not exist at the time. The Court noted that while the ALJ signed and entered the “Dismissal Memorandum” on September 14, 2022 this document merely stated that the ALJ “moved for the issuance of an Order of Dismissal” and on it’s face was not the Order of Dismissal. The Court went on to note that there was no testimony at the Hearing that could clarify this inconsistency in the Division records. The Court noted there was no evidence in the record that the claimant received an actual notice of the Order of Dismissal until May 10, 2023. Therefore, the Commission erred in dismissing the Application as it was not supported by sufficient competent evidence. Therefore, the Commission’s decision was reversed.

Kell vs. Walker Recycling Company, LLC, Case No. ED113338 (Mo. App. ED 2025) 

FACTS: Kell sustained an injury while working at Walker Recycling. The employer was represented by Attorney Roberts until he withdrew on January 28, 2022 citing another attorney had entered his appearance for the employer. The ALJ granted Attorney Roberts’ leave to withdraw. On February 22, 2022, the other attorney entered his appearance on behalf of the employer but misnamed the employer as Walker Recycling, LLC. That same day, the ALJ approved the settlement in which Walker Recycling agreed to pay Kell a lump sum of $50,079.53. Again, the employer was misnamed as Walker Recycling, LLC. The settlement was signed by Kell and his attorney, Walker Recycling’s attorney, and the ALJ.

In November of 2023, Kell filed an amended petition in circuit court requesting that the court correct the clerical mistake in the settlement. Walker Recycling, once again represented by Attorney Roberts, responded it had received the settlement prior to approval, was aware the settlement named “Walker Recycling LLC” and approved its attorney entering into the settlement based on that information. Walker Recycling argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to correct an administrative agency order, or the stipulation.

A bench trial was held and Kell offered a certified copy of the workers’ compensation case as an exhibit. Walker Recycling moved for a directed verdict. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Kell and modified the employer’s name in the settlement stipulation to “Walker Recycling Co., LLC”, and entered a judgment against Walker Recycling in the sum of $50,079.53 plus costs in accordance with the settlement. Walker Recycling filed the motion to set aside the judgment which the court denied and Walker Recycling again appealed.

HOLDING: The Court noted that before discussing the merit of Walker Recycling’s appeal, it is pertinent to note that Walker Recycling argues it should not be bound by the settlement to which it agreed because of a clerical error. The court noted its arguments are meritless at best and at worst they allude to fraud and ethical violations and are easily refuted by the record. The court noted that the judgement was supported by substantial evidence. Walker Recycling appears to argue that it noticed the clerical error and authorized its attorney to enter into the settlement because it was against a different entity. The court noted that even if Walker Recycling LLC was a real entity, the Division would not have had the authority to bind it to the terms of settlement because it was not a party to the workers’ compensation case. Walker Recycling was the only employer involved. Aside from the clerical error in Walker Recycling’s name, the settlement contained the same injury,  the same injury date and the same claim number to which Walker Recycling had been a party all along. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed.

Thirteen years ago, my friend Bob Wilson asked a deceptively simple question:  What if we stopped calling this system “workers’ compensation” and started calling it “Workers’ Recovery”?

At the time, some dismissed the idea as a cosmetic rebrand without substance. But Bob has never been interested in empty labels. His argument then, and now, is far more meaningful: language shapes behavior, and behavior shapes outcomes.

Workers’ compensation is inherently transactional. It focuses on payments, benefits, settlements, and financial exposure. Workers’ recovery, by contrast, centers on people, healing, restoration of function, dignity, and a return to productive life. One focuses on checks. The other focuses on outcomes.  The distinction matters and the movement is real!

As Bob recently explained in his blog article, “It’s Time to Finish What We Started: The Case for Workers’ Recovery”

(available at: https://www.bobscluttereddesk.com/2026/01/07/its-time-to-finish-what-we-started-the-case-for-workers-recovery/), what once seemed like fringe thinking has steadily moved into the mainstream.  The biopsychosocial model is no longer controversial. Claim advocacy is now part of the professional lexicon. Social Determinants of Health are openly discussed in claims handling and medical management. Across the country, carriers, employers, and institutions have demonstrated that recovery-focused systems produce better outcomes; medically, emotionally, and economically.

Through the Workers’ Recovery Professional (WRP) certification at the WorkCompCollege, Bob has helped train hundreds of professionals to treat injured workers as partners in recovery, not adversaries in a transaction. Washington State’s, “Vocational Recovery Project” and the University of Texas white paper he cites provide something our industry demands: proof that the concept works.

As long as our statutes, agencies, regulations, and forms still say, “workers’ compensation,” this remains a movement, not a transformation.  Legislative language sets expectations. It defines the framework in which every stakeholder operates whether it be workers, employers, adjusters, lawyers, judges, physicians, and regulators. If the law frames the system as compensation-driven, participants will behave accordingly, regardless of good intentions.

Real change requires official adoption, and that change must start at the state level.  Workers’ compensation is state based and so individual states will have to lead the evolution of this system.

All it takes is one state.  One jurisdiction willing to step forward as the proverbial first kid on the block.  The others will follow. That’s how good ideas spread.  So, the real question isn’t whether Workers’ Recovery will happen.  The question is: who goes first?  Will it be Alabama?  Why Not Alabama?

Alabama is already at an inflection point. Recent and ongoing constitutional challenges to the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act make one thing clear: change is coming. It’s not a matter of if.  It's a matter of when and how sweeping that change will be.  That creates an extraordinary opportunity.  Rather than simply patching an aging statutory framework, Alabama could do something bold. Something modern. Something forward-looking.

Imagine replacing an outdated act with a new, constitutional Workers’ Recovery Act.  One that reflects current science, modern understanding of recovery, and a benevolent purpose aligned with today’s workforce.

A new name wouldn’t be merely symbolic. It would be declarative.  It would tell injured workers, from the moment they enter the system, that the goal is not to process their claim, but to restore their function. It would tell employers that outcomes matter more than transactions. It would tell professionals that their role is to support recovery, not simply manage exposure.

Yes, it would still be a legal system. Rights, obligations, defenses, and procedures would remain. But the lens would change.  And lenses matter

Bob Wilson has spent more than a decade laying the groundwork by educating professionals, proving the concept, and persistently advocating for a better system. His call for change is not radical. It is practical. It is achievable. And it is overdue.

Alabama has an opportunity.  It can be the state others point to and say, “That’s where it changed.”  An opportunity to become a true part of workers’ compensation, or rather, Workers’ Recovery, history.

Some ideas are worth being persistent about.  Like Bob, I believe this is one of them.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

Effective January 1, 2026, the mileage reimbursement rate will increase to 72.5 cents per mile for travel related to medical treatment or participation in an approved vocational rehabilitation plan. Additional information is available in the related news release on the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court website.

Historical mileage reimbursement rates can be found in the Tables of Maximum/Minimum Compensation Benefits, Burial Benefits, and Mileage Reimbursement Rates located on the Court’s “Benefits” webpage.

Recently Adopted Rule Amendments

At its public meeting on December 30, 2025, the Court adopted amendments to Rules 9, 10, 12, 14, 21, 26, 32, 47, and Addendum 2, along with a revised Schedule of Fees for Medical Services.

• Amendments to non-adjudicatory Rules 32 and 47 became effective December 30, 2025.

• Amendments to non-adjudicatory Rule 26 and the Schedule of Fees for Medical Services will take effect January 1, 2026.

• Amendments to adjudicatory Rules 9, 10, 12, 14, and 21 will take effect upon review and approval by the Nebraska Supreme Court.

A link to the adopted non-adjudicatory rules is available on the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court website.