State News : Alabama

In a recent decision, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reaffirmed an important limitation on workers’ compensation benefits for scheduled-member injuries: an employee cannot avoid the statutory schedule simply by proving that the injury has resulted in substantial vocational disability.

In Harris v. Lineage Logistics, 2026 WL 2207386 (Ala. Civ. App. July 31, 2026), Roderick Harris sustained severe cold exposure at work that resulted in the partial amputation of his right index and middle fingers and his left index finger. The trial court found that Harris was permanently and totally disabled but nevertheless limited his compensation to the benefits provided under Alabama’s schedule for injuries to the fingers.

Harris appealed, arguing that because he was permanently and totally disabled, he should receive benefits based on his vocational disability rather than being restricted to the scheduled-member benefits under Ala. Code § 25-5-57(a)(3).

In rejecting Harris’ position, the Court of Civil Appeals emphasized that it was bound by Alabama Supreme Court precedent. Under Leach Manufacturing Co. v. Puckett and Ex parte Drummond Co., when an injury is confined to a scheduled member and does not extend to or interfere with other parts of the body, the statutory schedule controls compensation.

Importantly, the schedule applies without consideration of vocational disability when the injury does not extend beyond the scheduled member. As Puckett explained, the scheduled amount is intended to fully compensate the employee for the injury, including any resulting loss of earning capacity or inability to obtain employment.

The court also relied on Advantage Sales of Alabama, Inc. v. Clemons, which had previously rejected essentially the same argument Harris presented.

One particularly interesting aspect of Harris is how narrowly the issue was presented to the appellate court.

Although Harris's history included allegations of a cervical-spine injury, the Court noted that he ultimately pursued only the argument that his permanent total disability should permit him to recover outside the schedule. The appellate court therefore did not have before it an argument that the finger injuries extended to and interfered with other parts of the body, nor did Harris rely on the recognized pain exception.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

The Exclusivity Doctrine is alive and well in Alabama that to the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Duke v. Walmart, Inc., 2026 WL 785243 (Ala. Mar. 20, 2026), wherein it affirmed summary judgment in favor of Walmart and its employee, Qeon Gray, after an employee attempted to pursue tort claims arising from an accident for which he had already received workers’ compensation benefits.

Phillip Duke was employed by Walmart and was struck by a Walmart tractor-trailer driven by co-employee Qeon Gray in the parking lot of Walmart's distribution center.  Duke claimed that he was “off duty” and jogging in the parking lot when the accident occurred.

Duke received workers’ compensation benefits, including medical and temporary-total-disability benefits.  He nevertheless filed a civil lawsuit against Walmart and Gray asserting negligence, wantonness, negligent hiring and supervision, and other tort theories.

Walmart moved for summary judgment based on the exclusive-remedy provisions of Alabama's Workers’ Compensation Act, Ala. Code §§ 25-5-52 and 25-5-53.  The trial court granted summary judgment, and Duke appealed.

On appeal, Duke argued that workers’ compensation exclusivity did not apply because he was off duty and was not performing work for Walmart when he was injured.  The Supreme Court rejected that argument because, regardless of whether Duke was technically “off duty,” he had accepted workers’ compensation benefits for the injury.

The Court explained that Alabama law has consistently held that acceptance of workers’ compensation payments constitutes an election that prevents an employee from pursuing another remedy for the same injury.  In short, an employee cannot accept workers’ compensation benefits and then attempt to characterize the same injury as outside the Workers’ Compensation Act in order to pursue tort damages against the employer.

The Court also noted that Walmart established through its records that Duke had received medical, temporary-total-disability, and other workers’ compensation benefits.  That shifted the burden to Duke, who failed to present substantial evidence demonstrating that the Act did not apply.

The Court separately addressed Duke's claims against Gray.

Under Ala. Code § 25-5-11, an employee may pursue a claim against a co-employee in certain circumstances involving willful conduct.  The statute imposes a significantly higher standard than ordinary negligence.

The Court found no evidence that Gray intended to injure Duke or that a reasonable person in Gray's position would have known that injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct.  Although Duke alleged that Gray may have been under the influence of illegal drugs, he failed to present substantial evidence supporting his claim of willful conduct at the summary-judgment stage.  As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On July 1, 2026, the maximum weekly workers' compensation benefit became $1,219.00 per week, and the minimum weekly compensation rose to $335.00 per week.

It is important to remember that these updated rates apply only to Alabama claims where injuries occurred on or after July 1, 2026. Claims arising from injuries before this date remain governed by the Average Weekly Wage (AWW) in effect at the time of injury.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

Here is one for the workers’ compensation time capsule.

Maine resident Donald Nadeau suffered a job-related injury on April 28, 1985. He lived another 35 years, dying in September 2020 from complications tied to that injury.  By then, however, much had changed.  Nadeau and Carol Brewster divorced in 1997, and she remarried in 2011.  She received no alimony and was not financially dependent on him when he died, yet she sought workers’ compensation death benefits.

That led to a Maine Supreme Judicial Court decision on August 6, 2026 - more than 41 years after the accident.

Brewster’s position was simple: look at the statute.

The Maine law governing the 1985 accident measured dependency “at the time of his injury.”

According to Verrill Dana, LLP attorney, Elizabeth Connellan Smith, “when this provision was originally included, it was designed to address young widows of woods workers, who in rural Maine, often would be left with no resources if the worker was killed in a logging accident, or widows of workers who were exposed to asbestos and developed asbestosis years later. That rarely happens anymore.”

In 1985, Brewster was unquestionably Nadeau’s dependent wife: they lived together, she worked part time, and they shared finances.

The employer argued she had to be dependent both when Nadeau was injured and when he died. By 2020, she was not: they had been divorced 23 years, she had remarried nine years earlier, and she conceded no economic loss from his death.

Brewster responded that the Legislature chose the date of injury as the dependency date, and courts could not add a second requirement simply because the result seemed counterintuitive.

On August 6, 2026, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the award.

The Court held the statute unambiguous: dependency is determined at injury, not again at death. Because the Legislature expressly used the date of death elsewhere, adding that requirement to § 58 would insert language the Legislature omitted.

WWAD

What would Alabama do?  I am pleased to report that, in Alabama, the interesting dependency issue that occupied the Maine courts would have ended much sooner.

Alabama Code § 25-5-62 focuses on dependency status at the time of death.  So, the fact that they were blissfully married at the time of the accident would not be relevant when considering eligibility for death benefits.  In fact, they could still be married at the time of death and, unless the widow can prove that she was financially dependent on the decedent at the time of death and a reasonable amount of time prior to same, she would not be eligible to receive benefits. 

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On February 13, 2026, The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in the matter styled Professional Education Services Group, LLC (“PESG”) v. Richard A. Ford., wherein it affirmed a PTD verdict, in part.  The case revolved around Ford’s claim that he sustained a left shoulder injury during his employment with PESG, which rendered him unable to return to his previous work or find other gainful employment. ​

Ford, a former HVAC mechanic, suffered a shoulder injury in June 2019 after tripping and falling at work. ​ Following surgery and treatment, he was assigned sedentary work restrictions, which were incompatible with his previous career in heavy-duty HVAC work. ​ A vocational expert concluded that Ford had a 100% vocational disability and was incapable of obtaining or maintaining competitive employment. ​ The trial court determined that Ford was permanently and totally disabled due to his shoulder injury, not his unrelated heart condition. ​ The court awarded Ford compensation for the remainder of his natural life. ​

PESG appealed the judgment, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of permanent total disability. ​ PESG claimed that no medical or expert testimony explicitly stated Ford was incapable of gainful employment and that his heart condition, not his shoulder injury, was the cause of his disability. ​

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that Ford was permanently and totally disabled due to his shoulder injury. ​ The court noted that Ford’s testimony about his pain and inability to work, combined with the vocational and medical evidence, constituted substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision. ​ However, the portion of the judgment that awarded Ford PTD for the remainder of his natural life was reversed.  As the Court pointed out, compensation for PTD is limited to the duration of the disability, not the employee’s lifetime. ​

​My Two Cents:

Even with its opinion being release the day before Valentines Day, the Court refused to give much credence to matters of the heart.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

In Ex parte Griffin, the Alabama Supreme Court denied a petition for mandamus filed by co-employees seeking immunity from a civil suit arising out of a workplace injury.  The denial left in place the trial court’s refusal to grant summary judgment based on immunity pursuant to the Exclusivity Doctrine. 

Although the Court issued no majority opinion, Justice Cook’s special concurrence is noteworthy.  He emphasized that the denial was driven by the high mandamus standard and procedural issues and not a determination that the co-employees are liable.

Justice Cook also raised significant concerns about existing Alabama precedent interpreting § 25-5-11(c)(2), particularly:

• Whether an employer can become a “manufacturer” through equipment modifications, and
• Whether courts have expanded “willful and intentional” conduct beyond the statute’s plain language.
•  

My Two Cents:

The concurrence signals that these issues remain unsettled and may be ripe for reconsideration in a future appeal.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

The WC world runs on abbreviations.  Seasoned WC veterans type three letters, hit send, and assume everyone knows exactly what they meant.  Sometimes they do.  Sometimes… not so much.

Every claim begins with a DOI (Date of Injury) or DOA (Date of Accident).  Shortly thereafter comes the FROI (First Report of Injury).  At this point, the ER (Employer) notifies the TPA (Third Party Administrator), who opens a file, and assigns a claim number.

The injured employee, now officially the IW or Clmt, wants to know one thing: “How much am I getting paid?”  The answer depends on the AWW (Average Weekly Wage), a number that will be debated, recalculated, and argued about far longer than anyone expected.  Then the ER wants to know if this is a MO (Medical Only) or LT (Lost Time) claim because it’s EMR (Experience Modification Rating) could be adversely affected.

Now we enter the medical phase.  This is where abbreviations multiply like gremlins after midnight.  The MP (Medical Provider), often an Ortho, prescribes Tx, Rx, PT, OT, and maybe some DME if things get spicy.  The Px provides their Hx where any ROM or LOC is reported.  If the MO orders Sx, you can bet that said request will be referred to UR (Utilization Review).

If treatment continues, the claim gets MM (Medical Management), possibly involving an NCM, FCM, or TCM.  Meanwhile, work status bounces between FD, LD, OW, and RTW, with Mods attached.  Everyone is now holding their breath for MMI (Maximum Medical Improvement) aka the finish line that always seems to move.  Then someone may request an IME or FCE.

Once MMI hits, the doctor assigns an IR. This number decides whether we’re talking PI, PPD, PPI, or the nightmare scenario, PTD which is likely based on a VDR (vocational disability rating).  If PTD, then SSDI offsets become relevant.

Just when everyone finally memorized the acronyms, along came EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) to remind us that things can always get more complicated.  In theory, EDI was supposed to streamline claims reporting.  In practice, it introduced a parallel universe where the claim is “accepted” in real life but “rejected” by the system because someone used the wrong two-letter jurisdiction code, forgot a decimal in the AWW, or dared to list a DOI that offended the EDI gods. 

Next comes the lawyers.  This is where the acronyms start emailing each other.  The DA (Defense Attorney) exchanges pleasantries with OC or PA/CA.  Everyone watches the SOL like a hawk.  In Alabama, for a WC settlement to achieve finality, it must be court approved or an Ombudsman must hold a BRC (Benefit Review Hearing) and sign off on it.  

Oversight comes from the WCB/WCC or IC, depending on the state. In Alabama, it is the ADOWFWD (Alabama Dept of Workforce Workers’ Comp Div).  If Medicare is even remotely involved, MSP compliance becomes a thing, CMS enters the conversation, and suddenly someone asks whether an MSA is needed, usually on a Friday afternoon.

So, the next time you see an email that says: “IW at MMI, IR pending, OW w/ Mods, UR approved Tx, DA evaluating PPD exposure” - Just smile.  You’re fluent now.  You’re welcome!

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com  or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

Thirteen years ago, my friend Bob Wilson asked a deceptively simple question:  What if we stopped calling this system “workers’ compensation” and started calling it “Workers’ Recovery”?

At the time, some dismissed the idea as a cosmetic rebrand without substance. But Bob has never been interested in empty labels. His argument then, and now, is far more meaningful: language shapes behavior, and behavior shapes outcomes.

Workers’ compensation is inherently transactional. It focuses on payments, benefits, settlements, and financial exposure. Workers’ recovery, by contrast, centers on people, healing, restoration of function, dignity, and a return to productive life. One focuses on checks. The other focuses on outcomes.  The distinction matters and the movement is real!

As Bob recently explained in his blog article, “It’s Time to Finish What We Started: The Case for Workers’ Recovery”

(available at: https://www.bobscluttereddesk.com/2026/01/07/its-time-to-finish-what-we-started-the-case-for-workers-recovery/), what once seemed like fringe thinking has steadily moved into the mainstream.  The biopsychosocial model is no longer controversial. Claim advocacy is now part of the professional lexicon. Social Determinants of Health are openly discussed in claims handling and medical management. Across the country, carriers, employers, and institutions have demonstrated that recovery-focused systems produce better outcomes; medically, emotionally, and economically.

Through the Workers’ Recovery Professional (WRP) certification at the WorkCompCollege, Bob has helped train hundreds of professionals to treat injured workers as partners in recovery, not adversaries in a transaction. Washington State’s, “Vocational Recovery Project” and the University of Texas white paper he cites provide something our industry demands: proof that the concept works.

As long as our statutes, agencies, regulations, and forms still say, “workers’ compensation,” this remains a movement, not a transformation.  Legislative language sets expectations. It defines the framework in which every stakeholder operates whether it be workers, employers, adjusters, lawyers, judges, physicians, and regulators. If the law frames the system as compensation-driven, participants will behave accordingly, regardless of good intentions.

Real change requires official adoption, and that change must start at the state level.  Workers’ compensation is state based and so individual states will have to lead the evolution of this system.

All it takes is one state.  One jurisdiction willing to step forward as the proverbial first kid on the block.  The others will follow. That’s how good ideas spread.  So, the real question isn’t whether Workers’ Recovery will happen.  The question is: who goes first?  Will it be Alabama?  Why Not Alabama?

Alabama is already at an inflection point. Recent and ongoing constitutional challenges to the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act make one thing clear: change is coming. It’s not a matter of if.  It's a matter of when and how sweeping that change will be.  That creates an extraordinary opportunity.  Rather than simply patching an aging statutory framework, Alabama could do something bold. Something modern. Something forward-looking.

Imagine replacing an outdated act with a new, constitutional Workers’ Recovery Act.  One that reflects current science, modern understanding of recovery, and a benevolent purpose aligned with today’s workforce.

A new name wouldn’t be merely symbolic. It would be declarative.  It would tell injured workers, from the moment they enter the system, that the goal is not to process their claim, but to restore their function. It would tell employers that outcomes matter more than transactions. It would tell professionals that their role is to support recovery, not simply manage exposure.

Yes, it would still be a legal system. Rights, obligations, defenses, and procedures would remain. But the lens would change.  And lenses matter

Bob Wilson has spent more than a decade laying the groundwork by educating professionals, proving the concept, and persistently advocating for a better system. His call for change is not radical. It is practical. It is achievable. And it is overdue.

Alabama has an opportunity.  It can be the state others point to and say, “That’s where it changed.”  An opportunity to become a true part of workers’ compensation, or rather, Workers’ Recovery, history.

Some ideas are worth being persistent about.  Like Bob, I believe this is one of them.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On October 24, 2025, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in the matter styled MMR Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor.  The employee put forth evidence at trial suggesting that he sustained severe injuries after losing consciousness and crashing a buggy at a construction site.  The employer argued that employee’s preexisting medical conditions, such as bronchitis and a heart condition, were solely responsible for the accident.  However, the trial court determined that workplace conditions, including operating an unenclosed buggy in a hazardous construction zone, increased the risk of injury and contributed to the severity of the accident.  The court applied the "increased-risk test," concluding that employee’s employment conditions heightened the risk of injury compared to the general public.

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, agreeing that workplace conditions need only contribute to the risk or severity of an injury for it to be compensable under Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act.  The majority opinion emphasized that the "increased-risk test" was appropriately applied and that employment conditions do not need to be the sole cause of an injury, as long as they contribute to the risk or severity of the accident.

In his well-reasoned dissenting opinion, Judge Bowden stated that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether the employee’s injuries were compensable.  He emphasized that the "increased-risk test" is not applicable to all workplace accidents.  Instead, the proper standard for accidental injuries is the "set-in-motion" test, which requires a definite causal connection between employment and the injury.  Bowden contended that the trial court failed to determine whether the employee’s injuries were caused by an accident or were nonaccidental in nature, which is crucial for applying the correct legal standard.

Even if the increased-risk test were applicable, Bowden noted that the trial court misstated and misapplied it.  The court incorrectly used a "but-for" causation standard, which was previously held to be the incorrect standard by the Alabama Supreme Court.  According to Bowden, the increased-risk test requires a claimant to prove that their employment exposed them to a danger or risk materially greater than what the general public faces in everyday life and not merely that the employment was a contributing factor.

Bowden highlighted that the trial court did not clearly determine the cause of employee’s coughing spell, which led to his loss of consciousness and subsequent accident.  Without a clear finding on whether the injuries were accidental or nonaccidental, the application of the increased-risk test was premature and potentially incorrect.

My Two Cents:

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bowden indicated that Alabama caselaw likely supported the trial court’s conclusion that the employee's injuries were compensable regardless of which causation test was applied.  While that may be the case (certainly not conceding that point), caselaw would also support a defense verdict had the trial court applied the set-in-motion test and determined that the employee’s idiopathic condition set the chain of events leading to the accident in motion.  While the employee was at increased risk of injury because he was behind the wheel of a moving vehicle at the time of the idiopathic event, that, alone, should not be enough to satisfy the increased risk standard according to the Street Risk Doctrine which also requires evidence that the employee’s job requires him/her to continually be on the streets.