State News

NWCDN is a network of law firms dedicated to protecting employers in workers’ compensation claims.


NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.  


Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.


Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.


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The Importance of Perseverance for Student Success - TigerCampus Hong Kong

Say what you will about Macedonio Sanchez Guillen, but the man is determined -- he simply doesn’t give up. In 2023, and then again in 2025, he sued his lawyer, his former employer, and his workers’ compensation insurance carrier for things they allegedly did some two decades earlier.

It all started in 2001 when Guillen suffered a legitimate work injury while operating a backhoe that overturned. His employer carried workers’ compensation insurance, and the insurance carrier accepted his workers’ compensation claim and began paying benefits. A dispute arose, so Guillen retained an accomplished workers’ compensation attorney in 2003. That attorney obtained additional benefits for Guillen through the dispute resolution process at the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers Compensation, but he declined to sue the carrier in district court as Guillen demanded and withdrew from representation in December 2004.

But the attorney had not seen the last of Macedonio Sanchez Guillen. Not by a long shot.

Guillen waited. For nineteen years and four months he waited. And then, in April 2023, just about the time that Texas hill country bluebonnets were at their peak bloom, Guillen slapped a law suit on the attorney, his employer, and the carrier, seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages. In the petition, Guillen alleged that the three had perpetrated a continuous and premeditated conspiracy to violate his human rights for the previous 21 years.  A Travis County district court took no time in dismissing Guillen’s claims for lack of jurisdiction.

Guillen didn’t give up. Instead, he pivoted. He requested a Benefit Review Conference at the Division. But the Division denied his request, noting that he had not identified a violation of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act or Division rules. Guillen then asked the Division to schedule a Contested Case Hearing, but the Division denied that request, too, noting that compensability had not been denied and that Guillen had reached maximum medical improvement and had been assigned an impairment rating. So, Guillen repeated his request for a BRC, but the Division denied his request again. And then he repeated his request for a hearing, but the Division denied that request again too. Four requests, four denials.

At this point, most mortal men would have thrown in the towel. Not Guillen. He simply sued in district court again. This time he sought $480 million dollars, including $150 million dollars in punitive damages, $50 million dollars for medical expenses, and $50 million dollars for “moral damage” (whatever that is).  The district court promptly dismissed Guillen’s claims again. It dismissed his claims against the employer and carrier because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies at the Division, and it dismissed his claims against the attorney because they were too old.

Bloody, but unbowed, Guillen appealed. And in a decision filed March 11, 2026, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. Regarding Guillen’s claims against the employer and the carrier, the appeals court cited In re Crawford & Co. and agreed that Guillen failed to exhaust his administrative remedies at the Division. The court acknowledged that Guillen had requested dispute resolution at the Division four times and had been denied four times, but it concluded that Guillen had not shown that his complaints to the Division overlapped the claims he made in the district court. It also observed that Guillen had not explained “why he did not pursue an appeal and judicial review of those denials.” Regarding Guillen’s claims against the attorney, the appeals court agreed that the period of limitations had run.

But fear not. Guillen is not done. On March 19, 2026, he filed a motion for rehearing in the court of appeals and that motion is pending.
 


 Why did I Receive a SEC Subpoena ...

  
When an Administrative Law Judge at the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation issues a subpoena and the target of the subpoena fails to comply, either the ALJ or the party requesting the subpoena may seek an order compelling compliance from a state district court. But the party resisting issuance of the subpoena may not seek an order quashing the subpoena from the district court. That is the holding of the Fifteenth court of appeals in an opinion by Justice Scott Field in February.

The court was considering a subpoena issued by an ALJ in a claim involving the death of Lauren Smith, a paramedic for Fort Bend County EMS who passed away while at home. Her spouse, Joshua Heiliger, filed a claim for death benefits, contending that Lauren died in the course and scope of her employment because stress from working a 48-hour shift was a factor in her death.

Fort Bend County disputed compensability and sought a subpoena for Lauren’s mental health records from John Marcellus, M.D., the psychiatrist who prescribed Lauren’s ADHD medication. Fort Bend County argued that those records were relevant because Dr. Marcellus might have taken into account Lauren’s hypertension along with her complaints about stress.

The ALJ issued the subpoena over Heiliger’s objection, and Heiliger filed suit seeking a temporary restraining order against the issuance of the subpoena in district court. Fort Bend County and the ALJ filed pleas to the jurisdiction, but the district court granted the request for a TRO and, later, a temporary injunction. Fort Bend County and the ALJ then filed interlocutory appeals of the district court’s temporary injunction order.

The court of appeals found that the temporary injunction order was void because the district court had no jurisdiction to enter it. The court explained that the Texas Government Code expressly permits a party or an ALJ to seek an order compelling compliance with an ALJ’s subpoena from a state district court. Tex. Gov’t. Code §2001.201(a). But, the court said, “conspicuously absent from the remedies the Legislature provided is the ability for the objecting party to seek relief from the subpoena in district court.” In re Fort Bend County, 2026 WL 502194, February 24, 2006.
 


Free CE credit, Anywhere. Anytime. CompCourses.

 
Readers of The Compendium may recall DWC’s launching two years ago of CompCourses. These free webinars are designed to benefit workers’ compensation professionals, including adjusters, employers, and healthcare staff, by providing essential education on the workers’ compensation system, delivered in free 1-hour webinars. Not only are participants able to stay informed on current trends and improve their professional skills, they are also able to earn free Continuing Education (CE) credits by watching the webinars and completing a short quiz.
 
DWC announced last month that its CompCourses webinars will now be available in an on-demand, self-study format, allowing participants to learn and earn CE credit whenever it fits their schedule by watching previously recorded CompCourses webinars and completing the short quiz to earn 1 hour of TDI self-study CE credit.
 
Earning on-demand credit could not be easier! Simply visit the CompCourses webpage here and select the course you wish to take. You will fill out a Microsoft form, watch the 1-hour webinar on YouTube, and take the quiz to test your knowledge.
 
Voila…..
 
DWC has announced that it will continue to offer live CompCourses in 2026, affording participants the opportunity to engage directly with subject-matter experts and earn CE credit.
 
CompCourses webinars for 2026 are planned as follows:

  • Navigating the Top 10 Workers’ Compensation Disputes – Spring 2026.
  • Texas Workers’ Compensation Income Benefits 101 – Summer 2026.
  • Medical Fee Dispute Resolution – Fall 2026.
  • Return to Work – Winter 2026.

Copyright 2026, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP 

DWC is considering amending 28 Texas Administrative Code Chapter 152 concerning attorney fees and sought comments through last month on whether changes to the current hourly rate for attorney fees are necessary.
 
We note that when the Act was implemented in 1991, the approved hourly rate for attorney fees was $150. That rate remained in place for 26 years, until 2017, when it was increased to $200.
 
Per the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, $200 in January, 2017, has the same buying power as $266.89 in December, 2025. Further, $200 in December, 2025, has the same buying power as did $149.88 in January, 2017. In other words, due to inflation, it’s as if the rate was never increased.

 

               

By comparison, the maximum weekly temporary income benefit in 1991 was $428, and the minimum was $64. By 2016, the maximum weekly benefit had risen to $895, and the minimum to $134. Today, the maximum weekly benefit is $1,271, and the minimum is $191. So, benefit levels have nearly tripled since 1991, while the attorney hourly rate has increased only once and remains at $200 nearly a decade later.  Meanwhile, that rate must cover the overhead required to operate and maintain an effective law practice which has increased in ways that were inconceivable in 1991.
 
Workers’ compensation now has the second lowest average hourly rate of any practice area at an average of $180, second only to juvenile law at $146, while the average hourly rate for all practice areas is $367. Hourly Rates in Texas. 
 
The overarching concern is that if the rate cap is not raised, the workers’ compensation bar will continue to shrink, as it is doing now, as older, experienced attorneys retire and new attorneys choose other practice areas over workers’ compensation law because it is more difficult to make the numbers work.  At that point, employees, employers, and carriers will no longer be able to obtain effective legal representation in this highly complex area of the law.

Copyright 2026, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP 

by: Kisa P. Sthankiya

On May 31, 2026, the Illinois General Assembly passed HB5228. The bill amends several provisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. The legislation faced significant opposition from employer and business interests during the legislative process.

The most notable changes are the amendments to Sections 12 and 8.7. Governor JB Pritzker has 60 days to approve, sign, or veto the bill. At this time, it appears the bill will be enacted into law.

I. Amendment to Section 12 of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act

  • If an employer chooses to obtain an independent medical examination/opinion regarding the reasonableness and necessity of treatment instead of utilizing the utilization review process, the reviewing medical practitioner must issue the examination report within 90 days.  This does not appear to apply to independent medical examination opinions regarding causation.
  • The 90-day period begins when the employer receives the medical records from the treating provider requesting the treatment.
  • The employer must exercise due diligence in obtaining those records from the treating provider.
  • The reviewing practitioner must be board certified in the same specialty as the employee's treating health care professional.
    • For example, if the treating physician is an orthopedic surgeon, the reviewing physician must also be board certified in orthopedic surgery.
  • The examination report must be provided to:
    • the employee;
    • the employee's representative (such as an attorney); and
    • the treating health care professional.

Consequences for Missing the 90-Day Deadline

If the employer fails to comply with these requirements after receiving the necessary medical records:

  • A rebuttable presumption arises that the employer is responsible for additional penalties and attorney’s fees under Sections 16 and 19(l) of the Act.
  • A rebuttable presumption means the employer is presumed liable unless it can present some evidence to overcome that presumption.

What Conduct Is Covered?

The provision applies to:

  1. Failure to authorize or approve treatment; and
  2. Failure to pay for medical treatment.

II. Utilization Review – Section 8.7

The bill substantially revises utilization review requirements and significantly limits who may conduct reviews and issue adverse determinations.

  • Only licensed health care professionals may determine whether a medical service is medically necessary during utilization review.
  • If the treatment was recommended or provided by a physician, any denial or other adverse determination must be made by a physician.
  • The reviewing physician must:
    1. Hold a current, unrestricted medical license in the United States;
    2. Be board certified in the specialty relevant to the treatment being reviewed; and
    3. Have actual experience treating and managing patients with the same condition or disease involved in the request.
  • A licensed health care professional may deny a request from another provider only if the reviewer is licensed in the same profession as the provider who submitted the request.
    • For example, a treatment request submitted by an orthopedic surgeon must be reviewed by a physician who is board certified in orthopedic surgery.

III. Burial Benefit

The bill increases the statutory burial benefit under Section 7(f) from $8,000 to $10,000.

IV. Funding for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission

The bill establishes a pro rata surcharge on insurance carriers to achieve an annual funding target for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission.

V. State Licensure Compliance

The bill requires State-licensed entities to comply with Illinois workers’ compensation insurance requirements.

Employer Considerations and Recommended Next Steps

The amendments to Sections 12 and 8.7 represent some of the most significant changes to Illinois workers’ compensation claims administration in recent years and are likely to have a substantial impact on approval of medical treatment.

Employers should begin evaluating their workers’ compensation programs now to ensure compliance with the new requirements if the bill becomes law. Failure to comply with these provisions may increase exposure to penalties, adverse presumptions, and challenges to treatment denials.

We will continue to monitor HB5228 as it moves to Governor Pritzker for consideration and will provide updates regarding enactment, effective dates, and implementation issues. If you have questions regarding these amendments or their impact on your workers’ compensation program, please contact any attorney in our office. We would be pleased to discuss the practical implications of the legislation and assist with any questions or concerns.

On May 31, 2026, the Illinois General Assembly passed HB5228. The bill amends several provisions of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. The legislation faced significant opposition from employer and business interests during the legislative process.

The most notable changes are the amendments to Sections 12 and 8.7. Governor JB Pritzker has 60 days to approve, sign, or veto the bill. At this time, it appears the bill will be enacted into law.

I. Amendment to Section 12 of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act

  • If an employer chooses to obtain an independent medical examination/opinion regarding the reasonableness and necessity of treatment instead of utilizing the utilization review process, the reviewing medical practitioner must issue the examination report within 90 days.  This does not appear to apply to independent medical examination opinions regarding causation.
  • The 90-day period begins when the employer receives the medical records from the treating provider requesting the treatment.
  • The employer must exercise due diligence in obtaining those records from the treating provider.
  • The reviewing practitioner must be board certified in the same specialty as the employee's treating health care professional.
    • For example, if the treating physician is an orthopedic surgeon, the reviewing physician must also be board certified in orthopedic surgery.
  • The examination report must be provided to:
    • the employee;
    • the employee's representative (such as an attorney); and
    • the treating health care professional.

Consequences for Missing the 90-Day Deadline

If the employer fails to comply with these requirements after receiving the necessary medical records:

  • A rebuttable presumption arises that the employer is responsible for additional penalties and attorney’s fees under Sections 16 and 19(l) of the Act.
  • A rebuttable presumption means the employer is presumed liable unless it can present some evidence to overcome that presumption.

What Conduct Is Covered?

The provision applies to:

  1. Failure to authorize or approve treatment; and
  2. Failure to pay for medical treatment.

II. Utilization Review – Section 8.7

The bill substantially revises utilization review requirements and significantly limits who may conduct reviews and issue adverse determinations.

  • Only licensed health care professionals may determine whether a medical service is medically necessary during utilization review.
  • If the treatment was recommended or provided by a physician, any denial or other adverse determination must be made by a physician.
  • The reviewing physician must:
    1. Hold a current, unrestricted medical license in the United States;
    2. Be board certified in the specialty relevant to the treatment being reviewed; and
    3. Have actual experience treating and managing patients with the same condition or disease involved in the request.
  • A licensed health care professional may deny a request from another provider only if the reviewer is licensed in the same profession as the provider who submitted the request.
    • For example, a treatment request submitted by an orthopedic surgeon must be reviewed by a physician who is board certified in orthopedic surgery.

III. Burial Benefit

The bill increases the statutory burial benefit under Section 7(f) from $8,000 to $10,000.

IV. Funding for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission

The bill establishes a pro rata surcharge on insurance carriers to achieve an annual funding target for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission.

V. State Licensure Compliance

The bill requires State-licensed entities to comply with Illinois workers’ compensation insurance requirements.

Employer Considerations and Recommended Next Steps

The amendments to Sections 12 and 8.7 represent some of the most significant changes to Illinois workers’ compensation claims administration in recent years and are likely to have a substantial impact on approval of medical treatment.

Employers should begin evaluating their workers’ compensation programs now to ensure compliance with the new requirements if the bill becomes law. Failure to comply with these provisions may increase exposure to penalties, adverse presumptions, and challenges to treatment denials.

We will continue to monitor HB5228 as it moves to Governor Pritzker for consideration and will provide updates regarding enactment, effective dates, and implementation issues. If you have questions regarding these amendments or their impact on your workers’ compensation program, please feel free to contact us. 

Stephanie Ringbloom, Esq.:



The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an unpublished opinion in the case of Yoder v. McCarthy Construction, Inc., et. al., No. 43 EAP 2024, 2025 WL 2981889 (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025). In this decision, the Court confirmed the applicability of the McDonald test for coverage of a subcontractor. The Court noted that “Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), as  interpreted  by  this  Court  for decades, a general contractor that hires a subcontractor to perform work on a jobsite is deemed  an  “employer”  that  is  secondarily  liable  to  the  injured  employee  of  the subcontractor  for  the  payment  of  compensation  under  the  Act, provided  that  the subcontractor—the  one primarily  liable—fails  to  make  payment.” They cited to Section  302(b)  of  the Act, 77 P.S. § 462. A general contractor can thereby avail itself of the same tort immunity afforded to the subcontractor by way of this secondary liability.

 

There are five elements that must be met under the McDonald test for a general contractor to qualify as a statutory employer: (1) the existence of a contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner; (2) occupancy and/or control of the premises upon which the work is being performed; (3) the existence of a subcontract with the general contractor; (4) entrustment of part of the general contractor’s regular business to the subcontractor; and (5) the claimant is an employee of that subcontractor. The Supreme Court determined that McCarthy Construction had demonstrated all five elements in the claim filed by Yoder, thereby granting it statutory immunity for the civil claim that the injured worker had tried to file against McCarthy.

    On December 3, 2025, an Arkansas Court of Appeals issued an opinion that further bolstered the supreme reign of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (more commonly referred to as the “Full Commission”) as the deferential trier of fact and arbiter of credibility. One of the most noteworthy quirks of Arkansas workers’ compensation law is that Arkansas appellate courts and the Arkansas Supreme Court afford near-complete deference to the Full Commission’s credibility assessment of witnesses while completely disregarding the credibility determinations rendered by Administrative Law Judges that have had the opportunity to personally observe witnesses and their demeanor while testifying on the stand. The Full Commission is tasked with reviewing the decisions rendered by ALJs along with the evidentiary record of a claim once an ALJ’s decision has been appealed, but their review of the record is limited to transcripts of testimony, evidentiary exhibits, and briefs submitted by legal counsel for both parties. However, despite never getting to personally observe witnesses and their demeanor as they testify, it is well settled in Arkansas workers’ compensation law that the reviewing Court of Appeals or Arkansas Supreme Court will “give no weight to the ALJ’s findings whatsoever” and will instead defer to the credibility assessments and findings of facts rendered by the Full Commission even though it is the ALJ that presides over a claim for months (potentially even years), makes rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and personally observes claimants and other witnesses as they testify under direct and cross-examination. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. v. Ewton, 2025 Ark. App. 575, at 7, 728 S.W.3d 401, 405 (citing Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979)). 

    In the case in point, Claimant Andrea Ewton was employed as a substitute custodian for Dardanelle Intermediate School and was on the clock when she walked from the school’s office to her car and injured her knee and ankle when she stepped down from a curb in the parking lot. At issue was whether she was performing employment services when she went to her car or whether she had gone to her car for a personal errand (specifically to retrieve her water bottle). Mere hours after Ewton’s fall, she spoke on the phone with a claim supervisor and reported that she had gone to her car that morning to retrieve a water bottle when she slipped off a curb injuring her knee and ankle. In the recorded transcript of that call, Ewton was specifically asked if she had gone to her car for any purpose other than retrieving her water bottle, and she responded, “No ma’am”. The school nurse that iced Claimant’s injuries immediately after the accident also testified that Ewton told her she had been walking to her car to get a drink when she slipped off the curb. These reports made by Claimant immediately after her accident are noteworthy because she eventually changed her story and testified at the hearing in front of the ALJ that she had gone to her car to retrieve a set of keys that she needed to open school buildings. Ewton had also testified during her deposition that she went to her car to retrieve a set of keys; however, during her deposition, she testified that the school nurse had given her the wrong set of keys earlier that morning. In contrast, she testified in front of the ALJ that the school’s secretary had given her the wrong set of keys that morning (perhaps after she and her attorney realized that the school nurse only had keys that could open the nurse’s office rather than the various school buildings that Ewton needed to access that day). 

    After observing the demeanor of Ewton, the school nurse and the secretary while they testified, in addition to reviewing the Claimant’s deposition transcript and the transcript of her recorded statement made on the same day of her accident, the ALJ ruled that Ewton had failed to prove she suffered a compensable injury to her knee and ankle because she was not performing employment services at the time of her fall. In his opinion, the ALJ specifically found that Ewton did not provide credible testimony when she testified that she had gone to her car that morning to retrieve a set of keys to one of the school’s buildings. His credibility determination was based on Ewton’s inconsistent narratives regarding why she went to her car that morning as well as other instances of doubtful credibility in the record such as her testimony at the hearing that she hadn’t worked since her accident which was contradicted by Claimant’s unemployment application wherein she reported working for a nursing and rehabilitation facility for a period of four months after her accident at the school. 

    In spite of the ALJ’s personal observations of the witnesses throughout their testimony as well as his thorough opinion which cited to numerous inconsistencies in the evidentiary record in support of his credibility assessments, the Full Commission reversed his denial of the claim and found that Ewton had met her burden of proof in establishing that she was performing employment services at the time of her fall. The Full Commission noted in its decision that it specifically found Ewton’s testimony to be credible when she testified at the hearing that she had gone to her car to retrieve a set of keys rather than only going to her car for a bottle of water. Respondents appealed the Full Commission’s decision to the Court of Appeals arguing that Claimant had failed to prove she sustained a compensable injury within the scope of her employment because she provided inconsistent statements regarding her purpose for going to her car. However, the Court of Appeals abided by long-standing precedent in deferring to the Full Commission’s credibility determination and stating that Arkansas courts will affirm the Commission’s decisions when the issue on appeal comes down to the Commission’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses.  

    Given that the Court of Appeals is bound by the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act and decades of case law which designate the Commission as the ultimate factfinder, the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the Full Commission is certainly not surprising to those who are familiar with workers’ compensation law in the natural state. Ultimately, it is up to the Arkansas legislature to amend the law if they believe that the ALJs who have the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of witnesses and to comb through extensive evidence should be given deference when making credibility determinations and other valuable findings of fact over the administrative and judicial bodies who are charged with reviewing the evidentiary record from transcripts and records alone. 

The burial benefit under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act will increase to $12,200.00 effective July 1, 2026. This benefit applies upon the death of an employee, resulting through personal injuries as defined in NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151.

By: Jigar S. Desai

In a February 26, 2026, opinion, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division, addressed a question of first impression under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Compensation Act), 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq.: whether a claimant who sustains a single injury to one body part may receive concurrent awards under both the scheduled loss provisions of §8(e) and the person-as-a-whole provisions of §8(d)(2). Azcon Metals v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, 2026 IL App (5th) 250301WC. The court held that a claimant must elect one remedy or the other for the same injury, and that an employer who made a voluntary payment under §8(e) is entitled to a credit against a subsequent award under §8(d)(2).

The court affirmed the Commission’s award of permanent partial disability benefits under §8(d)(2) but reversed the Commission’s denial of credit to the employer for benefits previously paid under §8(e).

The decision provides important guidance on the interplay between §§8(e) and 8(d)(2), the election-of-remedies doctrine in workers’ compensation, and the credit principles that apply when employers make prompt voluntary payments under the Compensation Act.

Factual Background

Tom Snyder sustained an injury to his right foot and leg while working for Azcon Metals on March 19, 2020. His right foot was crushed between two rail cars. Snyder initially underwent surgery that resulted in the amputation of four toes on his right foot. However, the following day, he underwent a second surgery that resulted in the amputation of his right leg at the mid-tibia, below the knee.

Following the surgeries, Snyder was fitted for a transtibial prosthetic and participated in physical therapy, work hardening, and a functional capacity evaluation. The evaluation indicated that he could perform work at the heavy physical demand level but had decreased tolerance for prolonged standing and walking on uneven surfaces. Snyder participated in vocational rehabilitation and expressed his intent to pursue employment in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning or in the construction industry, acknowledging that those fields may require traversing uneven ground but believing he could manage the slower pace of such work.

Following the work injury, the employer promptly paid Snyder $97,010.30 in permanent partial disability benefits for the scheduled loss of his right foot pursuant to §8(e)(11) of the Compensation Act. The payment was made in two installments: $60,716.19 on April 20, 2020, and $36,294.11 on April 28, 2022, calculated at 167 weeks using a stipulated minimum statutory amputation rate of $580.90.

Procedural History

On April 17, 2020, Snyder filed an application for adjustment of claim. The matter proceeded to an arbitration hearing on January 27, 2023. At the outset of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the employer had paid, and was entitled to credit for, $17,438.31 in temporary total disability benefits and $42,822.94 in maintenance benefits. The parties further stipulated that the employer had paid $97,010.30 in permanent partial disability benefits for the scheduled loss of Snyder’s right foot under §8(e)(11), but they disagreed as to whether the employer was entitled to a credit for that payment against any additional permanent partial disability award.

Snyder waived his right to a wage differential award under §8(d)(1). The arbitrator awarded all requested medical expenses and, after considering the factors set forth in §8.1b(b)(v) of the Compensation Act, found that Snyder sustained permanent partial disability to the extent of 65 percent loss of use of the person as a whole under §8(d)(2). The arbitrator denied the employer’s request for a credit for the §8(e)(11) payment against the §8(d)(2) award.

On review, the Commission unanimously reduced the §8(d)(2) award from 65 percent to 45 percent loss of use of the person as a whole, finding that Snyder was young and remained capable of physically demanding work. The Commission, however, agreed with the arbitrator that the employer was not entitled to a credit. The Commission characterized the credit issue as one of first impression, concluded that §8(d)(2) did not permit an offset for previously paid amputation benefits, and noted that the employer had paid benefits under the incorrect section — §8(e)(11) (loss of foot, 167 weeks) rather than §8(e)(12) (amputation below the knee, compensated as loss of a leg at 215 weeks).

The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision in its entirety. The employer appealed to the appellate court.

The Appellate Court’s Analysis

Framing the Issue

As a threshold matter, the appellate court corrected the framing of the employer’s first argument on appeal. The employer had argued that the Commission erred by awarding benefits under both §§8(e) and 8(d)(2). The court clarified that the Commission did not “award” benefits under §8(e); rather, the employer had made a voluntary payment under that section prior to arbitration. The Commission only awarded benefits under §8(d)(2) and separately considered whether the employer was entitled to a credit. Accordingly, the court reframed the central issue as whether the Commission erred by denying the employer a credit for its voluntary §8(e) payment against the §8(d)(2) award.

Standard of Review

The court noted that while the Commission’s determination of whether an employer is entitled to a credit is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion, the Commission in this case interpreted statutory provisions and concluded that §8(d)(2) did not permit an offset. Because the dispute involved statutory interpretation, the court applied de novo review.

Election of Remedies: Section 8(e) Versus Section 8(d)(2) for a Single Injury

The core of the court’s analysis addressed the interplay between §§8(e) and 8(d)(2). The court acknowledged the tension between the two provisions. Section 8(e) provides that a claimant who receives a scheduled loss “shall not receive any compensation under any other provisions of this Act.” 820 ILCS 305/8(e). Section 8(d)(2), on the other hand, states that compensation awarded under that subsection “shall not take into consideration injuries covered under paragraphs (c) and (e)” and that such compensation “shall not affect the employee’s right to compensation payable under paragraphs (b), (c) and (e) . . . for the disabilities therein covered.” 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2).

The Commission had relied on the language of §8(d)(2) to conclude that recovery under §8(e) should have no effect on an award under §8(d)(2), and vice versa, effectively permitting concurrent awards and denying the employer any credit. The circuit court agreed, adding that any ambiguity should be resolved in the claimant’s favor under the principle of liberal construction.

The appellate court disagreed. In its view, the language of §8(e) clearly precluded a claimant from recovering under both sections for the same injury to one body part. The court interpreted the language of §8(d)(2) as permitting an election — not a concurrent award — for a single injury. Specifically, the court concluded that §8(d)(2) permits a claimant to elect an award under either §8(e) or §8(d)(2) for an injury to a single body part, while also permitting recovery under both sections when a claimant sustains injuries to multiple, separate body parts in the same work accident.

Consistency with Prior Caselaw

The court grounded its conclusion in several lines of precedent. First, the court analogized to established caselaw holding that a claimant who sustains a scheduled loss may elect between a scheduled loss award under §8(e) and a wage differential award under §8(d)(1), but may not receive both. Citing Payetta v. Industrial Commission, 339 Ill.App.3d 718, 791 N.E.2d 682, 274 Ill.Dec. 590 (2d Dist. 2003), and General Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 89 Ill.2d 432, 433 N.E.2d 671, 60 Ill.Dec. 629 (1982), the court noted that this election principle reflects the understanding that an injured party will choose the award most likely to approximate the earnings loss the Compensation Act is designed to compensate. The Commission had distinguished those cases on the basis that §8(d)(1) contains an explicit exclusion for §8(e) claims, whereas §8(d)(2) does not. The appellate court acknowledged the difference in statutory language but concluded that the exclusionary language in §8(e) itself — prohibiting compensation under “any other provisions of this Act” (820 ILCS 305/8(e)) — resolved the issue.

Second, the court observed that both wage differential awards under §8(d)(1) and person-as-a-whole awards under §8(d)(2) serve to compensate injured workers for reduced earning capacity under certain circumstances. Given this functional similarity, the court concluded that the rationale prohibiting dual recovery under §§8(e) and 8(d)(1) applies equally to §§8(e) and 8(d)(2) when a single injury to one body part is at issue.

Third, the court distinguished its prior decisions in Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 233 Ill.2d 364, 909 N.E.2d 818, 330 Ill.Dec. 796 (2009), and American Coal Co. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2024 IL App (5th) 230815WC, 248 N.E.3d 493, 478 Ill.Dec. 868. In those cases, the claimants had sustained injuries to multiple body parts during a single work accident, warranting additional compensation under the Compensation Act. In Beelman Trucking, the supreme court permitted concurrent awards under §§8(e)(18) (loss of legs) and 8(e)(10) (loss of arm), reasoning that denying compensation beyond two members would leave additional losses uncompensated. In American Coal, this court extended that reasoning to permit concurrent awards under §§8(e)(18) and 8(d)(2) for nonscheduled injuries sustained in addition to the scheduled losses. The appellate court found those decisions consistent with its holding in Azcon Metals, noting that the present case involved only a single injury to one body part, and that allowing concurrent awards would result in impermissible double recovery.

Employer Entitled to Credit for Voluntary Payment

Having concluded that the claimant was entitled to compensation under only one statutory provision for his single injury, the court turned to the credit issue. The court held that the Commission erred by denying the employer’s credit request. The employer had promptly and voluntarily paid benefits under §8(e) following the work accident, providing the claimant with immediate financial relief. When the claimant subsequently elected to receive benefits under §8(d)(2), the Commission should have credited the employer for its prior voluntary payments.

The court cited World Color Press v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 125 Ill.App.3d 469, 466 N.E.2d 270, 80 Ill.Dec. 818 (5th Dist. 1984), for the proposition that an employer may receive credit for overpayments absent a statutory bar, and Salisbury v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2017 IL App (3d) 160138WC, 78 N.E.3d 979, 413 Ill.Dec. 703, for the policy principle that encouraging prompt and voluntary payments of benefits furthers the purpose of the Compensation Act. The court emphasized that denying credit for good-faith payments would encourage administrative delays as employers attempt to resolve every ambiguity before paying benefits — a result inconsistent with the Compensation Act’s primary purpose of providing employees with prompt and definite compensation.

Practical Implications

This decision establishes several important principles for practitioners on both sides of the bar.

For employers and carriers, the decision confirms that when a single injury to one body part is involved, a claimant must elect between a scheduled loss award under §8(e) and a person-as-a-whole award under §8(d)(2). The employer who promptly and voluntarily pays benefits under §8(e) will be entitled to a credit against a subsequent §8(d)(2) award. This holding should encourage prompt payment of scheduled benefits, as employers need not fear that early payments will go uncredited if the claimant later elects a different form of permanent disability compensation. Practitioners should carefully document voluntary payments, including the statutory section under which they are made, the calculation methodology, and the dates of payment.

For claimants, the decision preserves the right to elect the more favorable remedy — but it forecloses the possibility of receiving both a scheduled loss award and a person-as-a-whole award for the same injury. Claimants and their counsel should carefully evaluate which remedy produces the greater benefit before making an election, particularly in cases involving amputations or other injuries that may qualify under both sections. The decision also reaffirms that concurrent awards remain permissible when a claimant sustains injuries to multiple, separate body parts in a single work accident, consistent with the rationale of Beelman Trucking, supra, and American Coal, supra.

Finally, the employer’s miscalculation of the scheduled loss payment in this case — paying 167 weeks for loss of a foot under §8(e)(11) when the below-knee amputation should have been compensated as a loss of a leg at 215 weeks under §8(e)(12) — serves as a reminder that correct classification of the injury under the appropriate subsection of §8(e) is critical. An incorrect classification may result in an underpayment that could affect the credit calculation or expose the employer to additional proceedings.

By: Jigar S. Desai

In a January 27, 2026, Rule 23 order, the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division, addressed the compensability of injuries sustained by a traveling employee who was assaulted by third parties while making deliveries. Avila v. Illinois Workers Compensation Commission, 2026 IL App (2d) 250093WC-U. The court reversed the Commission’s denial of benefits and reinstated the arbitrator’s compensability findings, holding that the Commission’s application of the aggressor defense and its causation analysis were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court further remanded the case for the Commission to consider whether penalties and attorneys’ fees should be imposed.

Although the decision is nonprecedential, it provides a detailed illustration of how courts analyze street-risk exposures, the aggressor defense, and intervening acts in the context of traveling employees.

Factual Background

Jose Avila worked as a delivery driver for Amazon. On August 1, 2023, while performing his delivery route in Aurora, Avila was driving his truck on a residential street when a black SUV abruptly cut in front of him at close range. The maneuver was sufficiently sharp that Avila had to brake suddenly. Avila testified that the SUV nearly struck a woman who was unloading groceries on the side of the road.

After the near-collision, Avila honked his horn and gestured toward the driver of the SUV. He then stopped his delivery truck and momentarily remained in the area. According to Avila, his purpose in stopping was not to pursue a confrontation with the driver of the SUV but to check on the woman who had nearly been struck and to ensure that she was not injured. The dash camera footage showed Avila stopping his vehicle while a pedestrian remained in the parkway near the truck.

While Avila was stopped, individuals associated with the SUV began yelling at him. The driver of the SUV exited his vehicle and walked toward Avila. Avila testified that he felt threatened because he was still seated and buckled in his truck with the door open, and the approaching individual was on the side of the open door. Avila unbuckled his seat belt and exited the truck. The video footage showed Avila and the SUV driver meeting briefly near the truck, at which point the driver of the SUV punched Avila. Others joined in the scuffle. The physical altercation was brief and partially out of camera view. The woman who was almost struck intervened and calmed the initial confrontation.

After the initial confrontation, Avila returned to his truck and drove away. As he was leaving, he yelled words and made nonverbal gestures to the individuals who had attacked him. Avila stated that he did this out of frustration, but not in a threatening manner.

The dash camera footage showed him continuing along his delivery route through a residential neighborhood for several minutes. Approximately four to five minutes later, and two to three blocks away from the location of the initial encounter, Avila parked his truck to make another delivery. As he walked toward the delivery location, a maroon sedan pulled up near the truck. Several individuals exited the vehicle, including the driver of the SUV from the earlier incident. Avila was attacked from behind, knocked to the ground, and beaten and kicked by multiple assailants. During the assault, one of the attackers took a chain from Avila’s neck.

Avila reentered his truck after the second assault. Dash camera footage showed visible blood on his face and head. He appeared to photograph the fleeing assailants and then stumbled near the passenger side of the vehicle. Emergency medical services transported him to the hospital, where he was treated for facial fractures, dental injuries, head trauma, and related symptoms. He later received follow-up dental treatment and medical care for headaches and psychological symptoms related to the assault.

Procedural History

The case proceeded to arbitration. The employer argued that Avila was the aggressor and his recovery was therefore barred. The arbitrator disagreed and found that Avila’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment as a traveling employee and were causally related to the assaults. The arbitrator concluded that the risks of street encounters were incidental to his job duties and that, in any event, the second assault occurred while he was actively making a delivery. The arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits, medical benefits, prospective care, penalties, and attorneys’ fees.

On review, the Commission unanimously reversed. The Commission found that Avila was the aggressor in the first incident based on his gestures, conduct, and decision to exit his truck. The Commission further concluded that the second assault would not have occurred but for Avila’s conduct during the first encounter, thereby negating the causal connection to employment.

The circuit court reversed the Commission, finding that the aggressor determination as to the first incident, and the conclusion that the second assault was merely a continuation of the first, were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The employer appealed to the appellate court.

The Appellate Court’s Analysis

The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court began by reaffirming that an injury must arise out of and in the course of employment in order to be compensable. The “in the course of” element concerns the time, place, and circumstances of the injury, while the “arising out of” element requires a causal connection between the employment and the injury. The court noted that injuries sustained by traveling employees are analyzed under more liberal standards because such employees are exposed to the risks of the street as an inherent aspect of their work.

In the Course of Employment

With respect to the “in the course of” requirement, the court had little difficulty concluding that Avila satisfied this element. At the time of the second assault, Avila had resumed his delivery route and was actively engaged in making a delivery. The evidence showed that he had disengaged from the earlier confrontation, driven away, and returned to his work duties. Accordingly, the court found that Avila was within the time and space boundaries of his employment when the injury occurred.

Arising Out of Employment

The court then turned to the “arising out of” element. The Commission had concluded that Avila’s injuries did not arise out of his employment because the assaults stemmed from a personal dispute initiated by his conduct during the traffic encounter.

The appellate court rejected that characterization. It emphasized that Avila’s job as a delivery driver required him to travel public roadways and interact with traffic and members of the public. The risks inherent in street travel, including the possibility of confrontations with other motorists, are risks to which Avila was exposed by virtue of his employment. The court cited established precedent recognizing that assaults on traveling employees by third parties may be compensable when the employment places the employee in a position of increased exposure to such risks.

The Aggressor Defense

The appellate court devoted significant attention to the Commission’s application of the aggressor defense. The court reiterated that an employee who becomes the aggressor in a physical altercation may be found to have departed from the course of employment, thereby breaking the causal connection between employment and injury.

However, the court emphasized that aggressor status is a fact-intensive determination that must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. The mere fact that an employee exchanges words, gestures angrily, or exits a vehicle does not, by itself, establish that the employee became the aggressor in a subsequent physical confrontation.

Reviewing the dash camera footage and testimony, the court found that the Commission’s conclusion that Avila was the aggressor in the first encounter was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The video did not show Avila initiating physical violence, and the evidence showed that the other driver approached Avila’s truck and struck the first blow. While Avila’s conduct may have contributed to a tense encounter, the court concluded that the record did not support a finding that he escalated the encounter into a physical fight so as to forfeit the protections of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Compensation Act), 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq.

Causation and the Second Assault

The court further rejected the Commission’s conclusion that the second assault was merely a continuation of the first encounter and therefore remained personal in nature. The appellate court emphasized that there was a meaningful temporal and spatial break between the two incidents. Avila had left the scene of the initial confrontation, driven several blocks, and resumed performing his delivery duties. The second attack occurred at a different location, several minutes later, and involved assailants who pursued Avila and initiated a new, unprovoked assault while he was making a delivery.

In addressing causation, the court explained that the Compensation Act does not require that employment be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that the employment be a contributing cause. The court rejected the Commission’s “but for” reasoning that the second assault would not have occurred but for Avila’s earlier conduct. The court noted that such a broad conception of causation would improperly transform many workplace injuries into noncompensable events whenever a claimant’s prior conduct could be traced as part of the chain of events. Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the injury can fairly be traced to a risk of employment, as opposed to a purely personal risk. Here, Avila’s exposure to public street risks as a delivery driver, combined with the fact that he was engaged in work duties at the time of the second assault, supported compensability.

Standard of Review

Finally, the appellate court underscored the standard of review applicable to Commission findings. While the Commission’s factual determinations are entitled to deference, they will be reversed when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent from the record. The court concluded that the Commission’s findings regarding aggressor status and causation were contrary to the clear weight of the evidence presented.

This decision highlights the importance of carefully separating multiple incidents when analyzing causation. When an employee disengages from an initial confrontation and later sustains injuries in a separate encounter, the later event may be deemed an independent intervening act rather than a continuation of the earlier dispute. Practitioners should analyze temporal separation, geographic separation, and whether the claimant had resumed job duties at the time of injury.

For employers and carriers, the aggressor defense remains viable, but it requires a close examination of the totality of the circumstances. Evidence of verbal provocation or angry gestures may be insufficient, standing alone, to establish that a claimant was the aggressor when the other party initiates physical violence. Video evidence should be reviewed carefully, and the absence of audio may limit the ability to draw firm conclusions about verbal threats or provocations.

For claimants, the case underscores the significance of the traveling employee doctrine and the street-risk doctrine. Employees whose jobs place them in public settings are exposed to risks that may be deemed incidental to employment, including assaults by third parties. Demonstrating that the employee was engaged in job duties at the time of injury remains central to compensability.