NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.
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By: Kisa P. Sthankiya
In Panda Express, Inc. v.
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2025 IL App (4th) 240771WC-U, the Workers’ Compensation Division
of the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of
Boone County and reinstated the decision of the Commission.
The claimant on September 25,
2018 was training new workers on how to properly transfer hot oil from the
fryer to the disposal area. The hot oil
spilled onto the claimant’s feet, primarily onto his left foot and ankle. It also splashed onto his right foot.
The claimant was treated for his
burns which were assessed to be at the third degree. The claimant was hospitalized through October
9, 2018. At discharge, his final
diagnoses were a third degree burn of multiple sites of the left ankle and
foot, second degree burn of multiple sites of the right ankle and foot and
cellulitis of the left lower limb.
The claimant treated through May 8,
2019 when he was released to return back to work full duty.
At the time of trial, claimant
was no longer working a second job transporting gutters to local building
sites. The claimant admitted that the
right foot burns were less severe and had “kind of disappeared.” However, the burns to his left foot were
primarily on the top and side of the left foot.
The size of the skin graft was approximately 8” x 4” in size. The skin graft area was markedly different
from the surrounding skin with shiny appearance and no hair growth. The right foot also exhibited circular burn
areas on the top of the foot and ankle.
The burn areas on the feet and left leg were shown to the arbitrator and
counsel. Photographs were also submitted
into evidence of the burns.
The arbitrator found that
claimant had sustained disfiguring injuries to both of his feet and his left
leg, and awarded 58 weeks of disfigurement benefits pursuant to Section 8(c) of
the Act. Specifically, the arbitrator
awarded 10 weeks of disfigurement of the left leg, 3 weeks of disfigurement of
the right foot and 45 weeks of disfigurement of the left foot. The five factors under Section 8.1(b) were
not addressed as the arbitrator noted he was not awarding any permanency under
that provision. The Commission affirmed
and adopted the arbitrator’s decision in its entirety.
The employer appealed the
Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court of Boone County who held that the
claimant was not entitled to benefits for disfigurement under Section 8(c) of
the Act because that section does not authorize benefits for disfiguring
injuries to the feet. The Circuit Court
held that the foot was not covered under the list of body parts under Section
8(c). Relying on the medical dictionary
definition of leg, the Circuit Court could not conclude that the foot would be
considered as part of the leg below the knee.
The Circuit Court instead awarded PPD benefits under Section 8(d)(2) of
the Act.
On appeal to the Appellate Court,
the employer challenged the Commission award for benefits for disfigurement to
the claimant’s feet under Section 8(c) because disfigurement of the foot was
not listed as a compensable injury under the section. The employer further argued that benefits
under Section 8(d)(2) only applied if the claimant had sustained serious and
permanent injury “not covered by either Section 8(c) or 8(e).” The employer further argued that the claimant
failed to present evidence of impairment of his foot which would have entitled
him to benefits under Section 8(e).
The key issue presented to the
court was whether the foot is included within the definition of “leg below the
knee” under Section 8(c) of the statute.
The court had to ascertain and give affect to the intent of the
legislature. The best indicator of the
legislature’s intent was the plain language of the statute itself which would
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
The court reviewed the definition
of the leg under multiple sources including website citations to RxList, Health
Line, Meriam Webster online dictionary, Britannica and Wikipedia. They noted that all of these sources included
the foot as part of the leg. The court rejected
the employer’s argument that the medical textbook definition should be followed
which defines the leg as a part of the body extending from below the knee to
only the ankle. The court noted that words in legislative enactment should be
given their commonly understood meaning as used by the public as opposed to the
meaning ascribed to the word by medical specialists. The various sources that the court had cited
explicitly distinguished the common understanding of the word from the
specialized medical terminology and included the foot as part of the leg.
The court addressed the
employer’s argument that Section 8(e) of the Act showed that the legislature
did not intend to define the foot as part of the leg because it listed them as
separate body parts under that section.
The court distinguished 8(e) from 8(c) as 8(e) covered impairment and
not disfigurement. They noted that
impairment differs according to the body part that is injured. Whereas disfigurement could be equally
harmful wherever it occurs.
The court reversed the judgment
of the Circuit of Boone County and reinstated the Commission’s decision
awarding benefits for disfigurement of the left foot, right leg and left leg
under Section 8(c) of the Act.
By: Jigar S. Desai
In Ryba v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U, the Workers’ Compensation Commission Division of the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District reversed the circuit court and reinstated the decision of the Commission.
Mary Catherine Ryba, the claimant, filed two applications for adjustment of claim in 2016 under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq., seeking benefits for work-related back injuries sustained while employed by Libertyville Manor Extended Care. 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U at ¶4. The employer filed several motions for hearing in 2018 and 2019. After several procedural delays, the case was set for a hearing on February 18, 2020. Id. The claimant failed to appear for trial, and the arbitrator dismissed the case for want of prosecution.
On April 29, 2021 — 436 days later — the claimant moved to reinstate the case. 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U at ¶5. The claimant argued she never received notice of the dismissal. Her counsel also cited a lack of receipt of a notice of case dismissal. Her counsel also claimed there were disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as a death in the legal team’s family.
Despite the significant delay, the arbitrator reinstated the case. The arbitrator primarily based the decision to allow reinstatement on the claimant’s counsel’s claim that his office never received a written notice of the dismissal and the fact that the Commission was shut down during the period when the case was dismissed and the date a petition to reinstate was due. 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U at ¶7. The arbitrator also found it significant that the Commission had suspended the mandatory trial “Red Line” from March 2020 to November 2021. Id. The arbitrator then proceeded to hear the case and awarded benefits to Ryba.
The Commission affirmed the arbitrator’s findings in full, including the decision to reinstate. The employer appealed to the circuit court.
The circuit court reversed. The circuit court found the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to vacate the dismissal with prejudice because the statutory 60-day period to file for reinstatement had passed. 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U at ¶8. The circuit court noted that the notice of dismissal was sent to all parties on February 19, 2020, and that caselaw confirms receipt of notice is established upon the date of mailing with confirmation of the sender. Id. See also Talmage v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 315 Ill.App.623, 43 N.E.2d 575 (1st Dist. 1942); Tabor & Co. v. Gorenz, 43 Ill.App.3d 124, 356 N.E.2d 1150, 1 Ill.Dec. 868 (2d Dist. 1976).
The circuit court also found that even if the Commission had jurisdiction, the factual determination of the arbitrator did not support reinstatement, and found that the Commission failed to consider evidence against reinstatement.
On appeal to the appellate court, a number of issues were presented:
1. Did the arbitrator and the Commission have jurisdiction to reinstate a case dismissed for want of prosecution more than 60 days after the dismissal?
2. Did the Commission abuse its discretion in allowing reinstatement based on the claimant’s denial of notice and surrounding circumstances?
3. Were any of the employer’s additional challenges to the merits of the award preserved for appellate review?
The appellate court reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Commission’s decision in full.
The appellate court held that under Illinois law, a party’s denial of receipt of a dismissal notice creates an issue of fact. Therefore, the Commission was within its authority to assess credibility and determine that the 60-day reinstatement clock had not begun to run. 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U at ¶8. The court cited Talmage, supra, in affirming that any determination of whether notice of dismissal was received is a factual issue and therefore the province of the Commission. The appellate court noted the claimant’s denial of receipt of notice rebutted the presumption of mail delivery of notice and created a question of fact for the Commission to decide. The appellate court therefore concluded that the arbitrator and Commission had jurisdiction.
The court found no abuse of discretion in the Commission’s decision to reinstate. The appellate court found the unique combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, procedural confusion regarding the “Red Line,” and personal hardship experienced by the claimant’s counsel supported the Commission’s conclusion that reinstatement was warranted despite the delay. 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U at ¶15. The appellate court was unable to say the Commission’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. The court reiterated that it was not its role to reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commission.
Finally, the appellate court rejected the employer’s arguments that the appellate court review the award of the arbitrator. The employer did not raise these issues before the circuit court. The appellate court found the failure to raise issues as to the award resulted in their forfeiture, citing Fernandes v. Industrial Commission, 246 Ill.App.3d 261, 615 N.E.2d 1191, 1197, 186 Ill.Dec. 134 (4th Dist. 1993).
This case reaffirms the principle that when receipt of notice is denied, the presumption of delivery can be rebutted, and jurisdictional timelines under administrative rules may not bar relief if material factual disputes exist. The court also emphasized the broad discretion afforded to the Commission in managing procedural matters, especially under exceptional circumstances such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
By: Jigar S. Desai:
n Singleton v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2025 IL App (1st) 240120WC-U, the First District Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of a workers’ compensation appeal for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing the strict, jurisdictional nature of statutory deadlines for filing a circuit court review of a Commission decision.
Rashun Singleton filed two applications for adjustment of a claim in 2016 and 2018, alleging a work-related injury from Singleton’s employment with Amita Health/Advent Health. The cases were consolidated. In July 2019, both claims were dismissed for want of prosecution. Singleton filed multiple motions to reinstate, all of which were denied by the arbitrator. The Commission affirmed the arbitrator’s denial on January 31, 2023. 2025 IL App (1st) 240120WC-U at ¶¶5 – 6.
That same day, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission sent notice of its decision to both parties via its CompFile system. Singleton, representing herself, did not file a petition for judicial review in the circuit court until March 1, 2023 — well outside the 20-day statutory deadline.
Amita moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under §2-619(a)(1) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1). The circuit court agreed and dismissed the petition. Singleton’s subsequent motions to vacate and reconsider were denied.
The issues before the appellate court included the following:
1. whether the 20-day period to seek judicial review under §19(f)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq., began on January 31, 2023, when electronic notice was sent via CompFile;
2. whether the method of notice (email) complied with the statutory requirement for notice; and
3. whether Singleton’s late filing could be excused on equitable grounds.
The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held:
The Singleton decision is a reminder that while the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission may exercise discretion in certain procedural matters, the statutory deadlines for initiating judicial review in circuit court are strictly jurisdictional. The appellate court reinforced the following:
1. Receipt of electronic notice via CompFile satisfies the statutory requirement for notice if the party has registered for the system.
2. The statutory 20-day window to seek circuit court review under 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) begins on the date notice was issued, not on the date of receipt of the decision itself or a party’s actual knowledge.
3. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by equitable arguments, such as misunderstanding or inadvertent delay.
Comparison to Ryba: Different Rules at Different Levels
In May’s FLASHPOINTS, we analyzed the appellate court’s decision in Ryba v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U. In Ryba, the appellate court affirmed the Commission’s reinstatement of a claim when the motion to reinstate was filed well after the 60-day period provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
The Ryba and Singleton decisions present a clear contrast in how timing issues are treated, depending on whether the matter remains before the Commission or has moved into the judicial review phase.
In Ryba, the appellate court allowed reinstatement of a claim long after the 60-day reinstatement period had passed. The court emphasized that when factual disputes exist — such as denial of notice — the Commission retains discretion to resolve those facts and, when appropriate, toll deadlines. The decision acknowledged the Commission’s broader procedural discretion, particularly during unusual periods like the COVID-19 pandemic.
By contrast, Singleton confirms that once a case moves into the judicial review phase, the jurisdictional lines are strictly drawn. The 20-day filing period under §19(f)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act is not a discretionary deadline — it is a jurisdictional bar. Unlike in Ryba, factual disputes such as whether an email went to a spam folder are irrelevant if notice was properly issued and the statutory clock began.
The key distinction lies in statutory discretion vs. jurisdictional mandates:
1. The Commission has discretion to determine factual disputes regarding notice and may permit reinstatement based on equitable considerations (Ryba).
2. The circuit court’s jurisdiction under §19(f)(1) is strictly limited by statute, and equitable considerations cannot extend the deadline (Singleton).
Practitioners must understand the procedural posture of a workers’ compensation case and the implications it has on applicable deadlines. Before the Commission, factual disputes over notice and good cause may allow some leeway. But once a decision is final and the case moves into judicial review, strict compliance with statutory deadlines is essential. Electronic notice is deemed sufficient, and failure to act within 20 days will likely prove fatal to the appeal, as it did in Singleton.
By: Kisa P. Sthankiya
The Illinois Supreme Court issued in Bitner v. City of Pekin 2025 IL 131039 on September 18, 2025 finding that the
Illinois Public Employee Disability Act (PEDA), does not prohibit a city from
withholding employment taxes from PEDA benefits.
The plaintiffs in the case were both police officers working
for the City of Pekin and injured in the line of duty in separate accidents.
Both employees received PEDA benefits pursuant to Section 1(b) of PEDA. Section 1(b) provides:
Whenever an eligible employee suffers
any injury in the line of duty which causes him to be unable to perform his
duties, he shall continue to be paid by the employing public entity on the same
basis as he was paid before the injury, with no deduction from his sick
leave credits, compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation, or
service credits in a public employee pension fund during the time he is unable
to perform his duties due to the result of the injury, but not longer than one
year in relation to the same injury. (5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2018)
During the time that the
plaintiffs received PEDA benefits, the City continued to pay the plaintiffs in
the same manner as they were paid prior to their injury and withheld employment
taxes (Federal, State, Social Security and Medicare). The plaintiffs filed a suit in circuit court
of Tazewell County alleging that by withholding the employment taxes, the City
violated the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS
115/1 et seq. (West 2018).
Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment were filed. The circuit court ruled in favor the plaintiff and entered
a judgment to recoup the withheld taxes from the City. The ruling was appealed
to the appellate court. The appellate court determined that based on the plain
language of Section 1(b) did not prohibit the City from withholding
unemployment taxes. They did not reach a conclusion on whether the only remedy
was to seek a refund of the improperly withheld taxes from the IRS. The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case.
The Supreme Court allowed leave
to appeal. There were multiple issues decided at the circuit court and
appellate level. However, the only issue before the Illinois Supreme Court in
the case was whether the Appellate Court erred in its interpretation of Section
1(b).
Relying on language from prior
appellate decisions, including Gibbs v. Madison County Sheriff’s Department,
326 Ill. App. 3d 473 (2001), the plaintiffs argued that section 1(b) provides
for the “continuation of full pay” and that “full pay” should be interpreted to
mean gross pay without employment tax deductions. The Court noted, however,
that the phrase “full pay” appears nowhere in Section 1(b). The proper starting
point for statutory interpretation, it emphasized, is the plain language of the
statute itself. Section 1(b) expressly provides that an eligible employee,
“shall continue to be paid by the employing public entity on the same basis as
he was paid before the injury, with no deduction from his sick leave credits,
compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation.” 5 ILCS 345/1(b).
The Court concluded that the
phrase “on the same basis” was unambiguous and required disability payments be
processed in the same manner as the employee’s pre-injury wages. Thus, if the
employer routinely withheld employment taxes before the injury, those same
deductions must continue post-injury in order to comply with section 1(b).
The statutory language in section
1(b) also lists specific items that cannot be deducted—sick leave, compensatory
time, and vacation credits—but does not mention employment taxes. Applying the interpretive
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court held that the
legislature’s express inclusion of certain prohibited deductions impliedly
excludes others. Accordingly, the omission of employment tax withholding from the
list indicates that such withholdings are permissible.
Plaintiffs argued that this
reading produced an absurd or unjust result because, in their view, PEDA
benefits are exempt from federal income tax, and therefore the withholding of
employment taxes unlawfully reduces the benefit. The Court was unpersuaded by
their argument. It observed that plaintiffs had provided no authority—no IRS
ruling, federal statute, or regulation—establishing that section 1(b) payments
are tax-exempt. Even if such payments were ultimately non-taxable, the Court
reasoned, any excess withholding would not deprive the employee of funds owed
under the Act. Rather, the proper remedy would be for the employee to claim a
tax refund from the IRS or adjust his W-4 withholding status.
Additionally, the Court
underscored the administrative practicality of its interpretation. They noted
that public employers often face operational challenges in administering pay
for police officers and firefighters who move in and out of PEDA status,
sometimes for short periods. Requiring employers to continually assess
taxability and alter withholding practices would create unnecessary complexity
and potential compliance issues. Section 1(b), by directing that pay continue
“on the same basis” as before the injury, actually simplifies administration
and ensures uniformity. The Court noted that other jurisdictions, such as
Massachusetts and North Carolina, have adopted similar frameworks requiring
payment of “in the same manner” as regular compensation for disability
payments.
The Court held that nothing in
section 1(b) prohibits public employers from withholding employment taxes from
disability payments. The employer, therefore, did not violate the statute by
continuing to process payroll in the same manner as pre-injury compensation.
The appellate court’s judgment reversing the circuit court was affirmed.
This decision reinforces that
PEDA does not create an enhanced or tax-exempt benefit beyond continuation of
ordinary salary. Payments should be issued from the regular payroll system and
subject to the same withholdings as the employee’s pre-injury compensation.
The decision also reiterates that
questions regarding whether disability payments are taxable, or whether
withholdings were appropriate, are matters between the employee and the
Internal Revenue Service. Per the decision, ff an employee believes the
payments are exempt from taxation, the appropriate recourse is to adjust tax
withholding by submitting a new W-4 form or to seek a refund directly from the
IRS. This clarification protects municipalities from unwarranted demands for
reimbursement and reinforces that PEDA’s purpose is to ensure income
continuity, not to provide a tax-exempt benefit.
By: Kisa P. Sthankiya
n Card Dynamix, LLC v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2024 IL App (3d) 240319WC-U, the Workers’ Compensation Commission Division of the Illinois Appellate Court addressed a significant question concerning the scope and applicability of §12 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq., in the context of post-award proceedings. Specifically, the court was asked to determine whether an employer retains the statutory right to compel an independent medical examination (IME) after an award granting the claimant ongoing prospective medical rights has been entered, particularly when the claimant seeks additional medical expenses that may not fall squarely within the original award.
The claimant, a 56-year-old quality sample inspector for a plastic manufacturing company, suffered a significant lower back injury in 2013 while pushing a heavily loaded cart. MRI imaging revealed a lumbar disc bulge, and subsequent treatment included a laminectomy and spinal fusion at L5-S1. The treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Mark Sokolowski, oversaw the claimaint’s care over several years, prescribing pain medications and recommending follow-up MRIs.
After conservative treatments proved ineffective, the claimant underwent surgery and continued to require ongoing care and prescriptions. In 2017, an arbitrator awarded her 35 percent permanent partial disability under §8(d)(2) of the Act, ordered the employer to cover prospective medical care under §8(a), and left medical rights “open.” 2024 IL App (3d) 240319WC-U at ¶3.
After the arbitration award, the claimant returned to Dr. Sokolowski for at least eight follow-up visits between December 2017 and February 2021, during which he continued prescribing pain medication, including hydrocodone. On August 10, 2018, due to the claimant’s persistent lumbar pain and radiculopathy, Dr. Sokolowski referred her to Dr. Kalina, a pain management specialist, for long-term pain management. The claimant began treatment with Dr. Kalina on August 20, 2018, and continued through at least June 2021. Dr. Kalina’s care included addressing conditions such as neck pain and the aftermath of a stroke — ailments not clearly addressed by the original award or directly linked to the claimant’s work injury. All related medical bills were submitted to Travelers Insurance Company.
Travelers initiated a utilization review to assess whether the pain management medications prescribed by Dr. Sokolowski after the arbitration were appropriate and consistent with evidence-based standards. However, Travelers failed to provide the reviewing doctors with complete information, including the arbitration award granting the claimant prospective medical care. As a result, some reviewers denied medications that Dr. Sokolowski had already prescribed and that the arbitrator had approved. Despite Dr. Sokolowski’s repeated requests for a peer-to-peer review, a right guaranteed under the Act, neither Travelers nor the reviewing physician responded. Additionally, Travelers failed to pay for a prescribed drug even after approval by its own reviewing physician. Drs. Sokolowski and Kalina also documented the claimant’s ongoing need for a new MRI of her lumbar fusion site, which Travelers did not authorize. The MRI was eventually performed over four years after it was first recommended, paid for by the claimant’s group insurance carrier in January 2021.
The employer’s insurer, Travelers, declined to pay for these treatments without first conducting an IME to determine causation and medical necessity. The claimant refused to submit to the IME, contending that §12 does not authorize an employer to demand an IME in a post-award enforcement proceeding.
The claimant filed a petition under §8(a) to compel payment of medical expenses and sought penalties and attorneys’ fees under §§19(k) and 16, respectively. The Commission partially granted the petition, ordering Travelers to pay for follow-ups and prescriptions by Dr. Sokolowski, as well as the MRI. The Commission focused on other language in the arbitrator’s decision, stating that the employer was liable for prospective medical treatment and expenses, “specifically, continuing follow-up visits with Dr. Sokolowski, a new lumbar MRI (but only if Dr. Sokolowski continues to order one) and continuing prescription medication, as required.” [Emphasis added by the court.] 2024 IL App (3d) 240319WC-U at ¶30. The Commission found that this statement limited the prospective medical care award to those particular treatments.
However, the Commission narrowly construed the scope of the original arbitrator’s award, concluding that it did not encompass Dr. Kalina’s treatments and found that Travelers had a right to conduct another IME under §12. Penalties and fees were awarded.
A partial dissent by Commissioner Doerries disagreed with the majority’s penalty calculation, arguing it should be based on the fee schedule, not the billed amounts.
The matter was appealed to the Will County Circuit Court, which reversed the Commission in part, finding that Travelers had no valid basis for denying treatment and expressing frustration over systemic barriers faced by claimants seeking enforcement of open medical rights. The court remanded for a recalculation of penalties and fees based on the full amount of unpaid medical bills.
On remand, the Commission complied with the circuit court’s order and issued a new decision. The employer’s subsequent appeal to the circuit court was rejected, and the Commission’s award was affirmed.
The appellate court rejected the claimant’s argument that the employer was not entitled to an IME post-arbitration award. Applying a de novo standard of review, it emphasized that the plain language of the §12 permits an employer to request an IME at “any time” to determine both “the nature, extent and probable duration of the injury” and “the amount of compensation which may be due the employee from time to time.” 2024 IL App (3d) 240319WC-U at ¶¶41 – 42. The court reasoned that the phrase “from time to time” reflects the legislature’s intent to extend the applicability of §12 beyond the initial adjudication of benefits, thereby encompassing ongoing disputes concerning medical treatment sought pursuant to an open medical award. 2024 IL App (3d) 240319WC-U at ¶42.
The court further noted that prospective medical expenses awarded under §8(a) may properly be viewed as a form of “compensation” within the meaning of §12 when they pertain to the treatment of disabling conditions causally connected to the work-related injury. Accordingly, the court concluded that Travelers was entitled to request an IME in this post-award context to evaluate whether the care provided by Dr. Kalina was necessary to cure or relieve the effects of the compensable injury and whether such care was within the scope of the prior award.
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished precedent that limited post-award IME rights to scenarios involving a potential change in disability status. It observed that while cases such as King v. Industrial Commission, 189 Ill.2d 167, 724 N.E.2d 896, 244 Ill.Dec. 8 (2000), addressed such circumstances, they nevertheless affirmed the broader proposition that the right to an IME does not terminate upon entry of a final award. The court thus rejected the claimant’s argument that §12 is inapplicable to proceedings aimed at enforcing prospective medical rights.
The claimant also contended that Travelers forfeited its right to an IME by failing to comply with §12’s procedural prerequisites, including reimbursing travel expenses and lost wages. The appellate court declined to reach the merits of this contention, finding that the claimant had forfeited the argument by failing to raise it before the Commission. In any event, the court deemed the argument unpersuasive, noting that even assuming Travelers had initially failed to meet its statutory obligations, such failure would not irrevocably bar it from obtaining an IME at a later time upon full compliance.
Turning to the issue of penalties under §19(k), the court held that Travelers’ refusal to pay for the disputed treatment rendered by Dr. Kalina was not unreasonable or vexatious. Given that some of the treatment involved conditions not clearly within the scope of the arbitration award or demonstrably related to the original injury, the insurer had a good-faith basis for withholding payment pending the IME.
However, the court agreed with the Commission that Travelers’ failure to pay for certain undisputed medical expenses — specifically, follow-up visits with Dr. Sokolowski, the treating orthopedic surgeon; a lumbar MRI; and continued prescriptions — was unreasonable and without justification. These services were plainly included within the scope of the arbitration award. As a result, the court affirmed the imposition of penalties and attorneys’ fees pursuant to §19(k) with respect to those expenses.
Finally, the court addressed the methodology for calculating penalties. While the Commission initially calculated penalties based on the full amount of the medical providers’ charges, the court held that the statutory fee schedule established under §8.2 governs the appropriate penalty base. The court found that Travelers preserved its right to have the penalties calculated using the fee schedule by introducing the relevant evidence into the record, and that it was not required to affirmatively request such calculation during the administrative proceedings.
The court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to assess penalties against Travelers based on the fee schedule outlined in §8.2 of the Act. Additionally, the Commission was directed to determine whether to award the claimant’s attorneys’ fees and costs against Travelers, as permitted by §16 of the Act. The court reinstated the Commission’s initial decision in all other respects, including its finding that Travelers was entitled to an IME and its penalty award limited to Travelers’ refusal to pay only for Dr. Sokolowski’s treatments, the prescribed medications, and the lumbar MRI.
By: Kisa P. Sthaniya
On January 24, 2025, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Martin v. Goodrich Corp., 2025 IL 130509, upholding the constitutionality of a 2019 amendment to the Illinois Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (OD Act), 820 ILCS 310/1, et seq. This case required the Illinois Supreme Court to construe §§1(f) and 1.1 of the OD Act in the context of a wrongful-death and survival action. The court was called on to answer three key questions:
Factual and Procedural Background
The claimant, Rodney Martin, worked for BF Goodrich from 1966 to 2012. During his employment, he was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer and related chemical products — compounds known to cause sarcoma of the liver. His exposure to vinyl chloride ended in 1974. Decades later, in 2019, he was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver and died in July 2020. His widow, Candice Martin, filed a civil suit in November 2021 under the Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/0.01, et seq., and the survival statute, 755 ILCS 5/27-6, alleging that her husband’s occupational exposure caused his illness and death.
She named Goodrich and its successor, PolyOne, as defendants, seeking to proceed outside the workers’ compensation system by invoking §1.1 of the OD Act, 820 ILCS 310/1.1. That provision, added in 2019, allows a plaintiff to pursue a civil action if compensation is barred under the OD Act by the statute of repose.
The defendants moved to dismiss. PolyOne asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction. Goodrich argued that §1.1 was inapplicable because §1(f) constituted a statute of repose and that, in any event, the new provision could not retroactively revive a time-barred claim without violating constitutional due-process rights.
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act and the Exclusivity Doctrine
The court reiterated that the OD Act was enacted to provide no-fault compensation for occupational diseases that are disabling as a result of workplace exposures (820 ILCS 310/1(d)). Like the Workers’ Compensation Act, the OD Act was intended to replace common-law remedies with a more efficient, administrative process. The exclusivity provisions under §5(a) of the OD Act bar civil actions for work-related injuries in most circumstances.
However, this exclusivity is not absolute. The Martin court noted that employees can pursue civil claims when their condition (1) was not accidental, (2) did not arise from the employment, (3) was not received during the course of employment, or (4) as in Martin, supra, is not compensable under the OD Act. 2025 IL 130509 at ¶20. This exception was squarely addressed in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070, 43 N.E.3d 108, 397 Ill.Dec. 781, in which the Supreme Court upheld the exclusivity bar despite the claim being time-barred under the OD Act, concluding that the absence of a remedy due to the statute of repose did not render the injury noncompensable.
Folta led to widespread criticism due to its harsh result: the employee was left without any remedy. In response, the legislature enacted §1.1 in 2019, which explicitly allows civil actions when claims are barred under the OD Act by a statute of repose.
Section 1(f) is a Statute of Repose
The first issue was whether §1(f), which bars compensation unless disablement occurs within a specified period after last exposure, constitutes a statute of repose. 820 ILCS 301/1(f). The court held that it does. Like §6(c) — previously identified in Folta as a statute of repose — §1(f) operates to extinguish claims after a defined period, regardless of when the injury manifests or whether it has yet accrued.
The Martin court emphasized that both §§1(f) and 6(c) are conditions precedent to recovery. Compliance with both is necessary for a valid claim under the OD Act. Failure to meet these time limitations results not just in a procedural bar but a substantive extinguishment of the right to compensation. Thus, the protections of the OD Act, including the exclusivity bar, are no longer available to employers when §1.1 applies.
Section 1.1 Applies Prospectively
The court next turned to the temporal reach of 820 ILCS 301/1.1. Because the statute does not expressly provide whether it is retroactive or prospective, the court applied §4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4), which states that substantive amendments apply prospectively unless otherwise provided.
Section 1.1 was deemed substantive, as it created a new right of action outside the administrative system for certain claimants barred from relief under the OD Act. As such, it may not be applied retroactively to revive previously extinguished claims. However, when an occupational disease was discovered after the statute’s enactment, the court concluded that civil remedy under §1.1 is available.
Section 1.1 Does Not Violate Due Process
The final issue was whether applying 820 ILCS 301/1.1 to exposures that occurred decades earlier would violate employers’ due-process rights under the Illinois Constitution. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that employers do not have a vested right in the exclusivity defense until the cause of action accrues. This occurs when all elements of the tort claim are present — namely, the diagnosis or discovery of injury.
In this case, the court noted that the injury (angiosarcoma) was discovered in 2019, and the civil complaint was filed in 2021 — after the enactment of §1.1. Therefore, no vested right was disturbed. The exclusivity defense had not accrued before the legislative change, and the employer’s reliance on repose or exclusivity defenses did not carry constitutional weight under these facts.
This decision reverses the harsh outcomes resulting from Folta, supra, and signals the court’s continued deference to legislative corrections in the complex field of occupational diseases law. Practitioners should carefully evaluate exposure timelines, diagnosis dates, and procedural posture when assessing case viability, particularly in toxic exposure claims arising outside the traditional temporal scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act or the OD Act.
In the case of Tazewell County v. Illinois Workers'
Compensation Commission, the Illinois Appellate Court addressed the issue
of whether repetitive trauma resulting in pain from a pre-existing condition is
compensable under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. The claimant, Dora
Potts, worked as a dental hygienist for Tazewell County, performing duties that
involved repetitive arm movements. In 2019, she began experiencing left
shoulder pain while performing her work duties. Medical examinations revealed
that she had a pre-existing rotator cuff tear, impingement syndrome, and
arthritis, which were not caused by her work but were aggravated by it. All
experts agreed that there was no structural change to the MRI or her condition.
The only change was an increase in pain while doing her work related
activities.
The court held that when a pre-existing asymptomatic condition becomes painful
due to work-related repetitive trauma, and not due to the natural progression
of the condition, the resulting pain is considered an aggravation of the
pre-existing condition and is compensable under the Illinois Workers'
Compensation Act. The court found that
the evidence in the record satisfied the claimant's burden of proving that her
repetitive trauma and resulting left shoulder pain arose out of and in the
course of her employment with Tazewell County.
The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court, which had
confirmed the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission's award of benefits to
the claimant. The court's rationale was that the symptomatic condition
resulting from work-related activities is an aggravation of the pre-existing
condition, even in the absence of an organic or structural change to the
underlying condition.
Kisa P. Sthankiya
In Town of Cicero v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 2024 IL App (1st) 230609WC, the Illinois Appellate Court expanded the traveling employee doctrine to apply to employees who are injured leaving their worksite on their way to their employer-provided vehicle.
The court noted that determining whether an injury to a traveling employee arises out of and in the course of his employment is governed by different rules that other employees. The test for whether an injury to a traveling employee arises out of his employment is if he was injured while engaging in conduct that is “reasonable and foreseeable” by his employer.”
There was no dispute that the employee was a travelling employee while performing his inspection duties in the Town of Cicero. The question was whether he was a travelling employee at the time he was leaving the worksite after obtaining his work phone, downloading his assignments, and attempting to make his way down a flight of stairs to his employer-provided vehicle. The court concluded that after he obtained his assignments and phone, he was performing actions incidental to his employment and a travelling employee.
Kisa Sthankiya
ksthankiya@rusinlaw.com
312-454-5127
In Illinois, we are seeing a trend with the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission awarding benefits under multiple provisions of the statute for conditions arising from the same date of injury. These awards are increasing the overall value of cases and creating a growing body of caselaw to support multiple avenues of recovery from the same injury.
In American Coal Company v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission et al. 2024 IL App (5th) 230815WC, the Illinois Appellate Court found that an employee could receive permanent total disability benefits under 8(e)(18) and was also entitled to benefits under 8(d)(2), 8(c) and 8(e) for injuries resulting from the same date of accident. The employer stipulated that the employee was entitled to permanent total disability benefits for the loss of use of both eyes. Permanent total disability benefits are one of the maximum recoveries under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act entitling an employee to a substantial weekly benefit for life. The employee argued that he should also receive additional benefits under for losses under Section 8(d)(2), 8(a) and 8(e). Under Section 8(d) they award benefits for spinous fractures, 100% loss of use each eye under Section 8(c) and 60% loss of use of MAW under Section 8(d)(2). The court held that the employee was entitled to recover additional benefits under Section 8(d)(2), 8(c) and 8(e) for injuries to claimant’s hip, spine, abdomen, and psychological issues in addition to permanent total disability. They relied on a prior case, Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 364 (2009), where the supreme court held that the claimant could recover under two sections of the Act also. (8(e)(18) and 8(e)(10)) They found that an award for the additional benefits would address his further diminished earning capacity as a result of the injury and adequately address the full scope of his injuries.
Kisa Sthankiya
ksthankiya@rusinlaw.com
312-454-5127