The legal landscape in Texas is changing as Texas judges begin to apply the Supreme Court of Texas’ holding in University of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka, which the Court issued in June.

Flashback: In Oteka, the Court addressed the circumstances under which DWC has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a worker was in the course and scope of employment at the time of an injury. The case arose after Rita Oteka, a nursing professor at the university, voluntarily attended a commencement ceremony. Afterward, as she was walking to her car, a vehicle driven by a university police officer struck and injured her.

The university, which is self-insured for purposes of workers’ compensation, reported the injury to its claims administrator which denied the claim asserting, among other things, that Oteka was not in the course and scope of her employment. Oteka did not challenge that denial or file a workers’ compensation claim. Instead, she sued the police officer for negligence.

The university asserted the affirmative defense that recovery of workers’ compensation benefits was Oteka’s exclusive remedy because the injury was related to her work.  Oteka asserted that the injury was not work-related because she voluntarily attended the ceremony and had already left when she was injured.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the exclusive remedy defense, but before the trial judge could rule on the motions the university’s claims administrator reversed course and sent a letter to Oteka explaining that her injury had been accepted as compensable and benefits would be paid. Then the university filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that DWC had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether Oteka was injured in the court and scope of her employment. The trial judge denied the plea to the jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court also affirmed and held that DWC does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury occurred in the course and scope of employment when (1) the issued was raised by the employer’s affirmative remedy defense and (2) the employee’s lawsuit does not hinge on entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.

Where we are now: Now that Texas judges are applying the holding in Oteka, they are reaching some surprising outcomes. One such surprise is a procedural ruling in favor of the injured worker in B & T Dependable Services, LLC v. Santos.
That case arose when Edward Santos, a landscape worker for B & T, finished his work for the day and then jumped into the bed of B & T truck that was towing a trailer carrying B & T equipment.  During the ride, Santos fell out of the truck bed and was run over by the trailer.
 
B & T reported the injury to its workers’ compensation carrier, Texas Mutual Insurance Company, which began paying workers’ compensation income and medical benefits. Santos accepted those benefits, which totaled more than $663, 894. He even applied for eight separate quarters of Supplemental Income Benefits and represented in each application that B & T was his employer. Nevertheless, Sanchez sued B & T for negligence, asserting his district court pleadings that he was not B & T’s employee but was, instead, an independent contractor.

B & T and Texas Mutual filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that the suit was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and the motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, citing Oteka, and held that DWC did not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether Santos’ injury occurred in the course and scope of employment for B & T. It said “although Oteka is factually distinguishable, it is legally guiding . . . in this case, just like Oteka, Santos’ [district court] claims are not based on his entitlement to benefits.”