State News : South Dakota

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South Dakota

BOYCE LAW FIRM, LLP

  605-334-0618


In connection with the last two weeks of the Boyce Work Comp and Employment Blog Insight, it is my turn to explain the second prong of the five-part rehabilitation test. I am sure that you have been waiting with baited breath to learn more about retraining benefits, so here it goes:

The second prong of the five-part test provides: Rehabilitation must be necessary to restore the claimant to suitable, substantial and gainful employment. What exactly does that mean, you ask?

SDCL 62-4-55 addresses the definition for “suitable, substantial, and gainful employment”, and states that employment is considered to fit this definition if it: (1) Returns the employee to no less than eighty-five percent of the employee’s prior wage earning capacity; or (2) It returns the employee to employment which equals or exceeds the average prevailing wage for the given job classification for the job held by the employee at the time of injury as determined by the Department of Labor.

An analysis of this second prong entails figuring out the employee’s prior wage earning capacity, and then determining what eighty-five percent (85%) of that wage would be. Our Courts have said that, “Before the burden of establishing the existence of suitable employment shifts to the employer, the employee must make a prima facie showing that he is unable to find suitable employment.” Kurtenbach v. Frito-Lay, 1997 SD 66, ¶ 17, 563 N.W.2d 869, 874. “In order to meet this second element of the test, Claimant must show that he is unable to “obtain employment following [his] injury.” Cozine v. Midwest Coast Transport, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 548, 554 (S.D. 1990).

Once a claimant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the claimant would be capable of finding such employment without the need for rehabilitation. South Dakota case law has established that a claimant cannot insist upon rehabilitation benefits if other suitable employment opportunities exist which do not require training. In other words, a claimant cannot simply seek retraining benefits because they no longer believe they can perform their prior job. The use of a vocational expert in retraining cases can be key because the expert may be able to provide a list of positions available to the injured worker that would not require retraining. Keep in mind that failure to make a reasonable search for employment calls into question whether or not the claimant has shown that they are unable to obtain employment, and, without such showing, the claimant has not met the burden of proof sufficient to shift the burden to the Employer and Insurer under the second prong.

Stay tuned, for more riveting information next week, when you will get to hear from TJ Von Wald and his thoughts on the third prong of the five-part rehabilitation test. As always, call us with any questions.

The South Dakota Department of Labor recently held that when a Petition for Hearing is not filed within two (2) years from the date of the denial letter, the claim cannot be reopened for a change in condition pursuant to SDCL 62-7-33. In Palmquist v. Luverne Truck Equipment, Inc. and Travelers Insurance, the Claimant’s medical benefits were denied via letter and no Petition for Hearing was submitted until after two years had passed from the denial. Claimant argued that a letter she filed with the Department prior to the denial letter should be considered a Petition for Hearing (the medical benefits were denied after benefits had been issued for a matter of years). The Department first analyzed the letter that Claimant sent to the Department in prior years to determine whether it included the necessary information to be considered a Petition for Hearing. In determining that the letter was not a Petition for Hearing, the Department relied on Administrative Rule 47:03:01:02 to hold that the letter did not contain the specific information required by the Rule. Since there was no prior Petition for Hearing on file, the Department then analyzed whether SDCL 62-7-33 applied to a claim where the two year statute of limitation applied.

It was undisputed that Claimant’s Petition for Hearing was filed after the two year statute of limitations had run. Claimant argued that her claim should be reopened under the change in condition statute found at SDCL 62-7-33 because she experienced a change in her physical condition after the two year statute of limitations had run. Claimant relied on language from Owens v. F.E.M. Electric Assn., Inc., 2005 SD 35, 694 N.W.2d 274, 280, when arguing that a change in condition after the expiration of the two year statute of limitations allows Claimant to continued workers’ compensation benefits. The Department denied Claimant’s request to reopen her claim and held that Claimant’s assertion flied in the face of the clear language of SDCL 62-7-35, which says all claims which have been denied in writing and for which no petition for hearing has been filed are “forever barred.” The Department also held that allowing a claim to be reopened under SDCL 62-7-33 would be contrary to the Legislature’s intent. Claimant also made equitable arguments to overcome summary judgment and the Department rejected them in their entirety.

This matter has been appealed and is currently set for oral arguments in Spring of 2017.

Sioux Falls, SD.— (November 5, 2016) Awards were presented for outstanding contributions to the workers compensation industry at the 5th Annual Comp Laude Awards and Gala,  Saturday, November 5 in Burbank, CA.

“Our mission with this event is to show what is going right with our industry,” said Yvonne Guibert, Marketing Director. “This event was the vision of WorkCompCentral’s founder, the late David DePaolo. He felt our industry gets so much negative press, he wanted to change the story of our industry. So we’ve designed these awards with rigorous judging protocols in place to identify the best of the best.”

The Attorney Comp Laude Award was presented to Michael S. McKnight, of Boyce Law Firm, LLP for his contributions and leadership in the work comp industry.

The Comp Laude Awards, meaning “with honor” were presented to individuals and companies representing many segments of the workers compensation industry, even injured workers. This year, awards were presented in 13 categories.

Top honor awards were presented to two well-known industry veterans. Mark Pew, Prium received the Magna Comp Laude (with great honor) award, and Richard Victor, Sedgwick, received the Summa Comp Laude (with highest honor) award. WorkCompCentral announced that the Summa Comp Laude award will now be called the David J. DePaolo award, in memory of the company’s founder and CEO who passed away earlier this year.

For a complete list of the nominees and Honor Roll Recipients, visit http://bit.ly/2016Nominees

 

Next year’s Comp Laude Awards and Gala event is scheduled for October 30-November 1 in San Diego, CA. Call 805-484-0333 for details.


About WorkCompCentral

Based in Camarillo, Calif., WorkCompCentral produces daily news, continuing education courses and other live events and can be reached at 805-484-0333 and viawww.workcompcentral.com.

WorkCompCentral contact:

Yvonne Guibert, marketing director
805-484-0333, ext. 140
yguibert@workcompcentral.com

 Bill 1084 went into effect on July 1, 2016.  This legislation abrogates the holding inWheeler, and sets forth the applicable law as it relates to aggregate wages for an employee when calculating an employee’s average weekly wage.  While we suggest reading the entirety of Bill 1084 and, of course, calling us for any questions you may have, keep the following in mind:

Claims Arising Before May 6, 2015: Wages calculated exclusively on wages earned at the place of employment where the injury occurred.

Claims Arising After May 5, 2015: Wages include all wages for those jobs where an employee was concurrently employed at the time of the injury, only if the employee was actively working in the concurrent employment and was prevented from doing so due to the injury.  

To be prudent, you should ask an injured employee if they are employed in any other position and ask that they provide wage information to support the same and note your file accordingly.

 If you have any questions relating to calculating the comp rate, what needs to be included, or general questions on South Dakota law, please contact Charlie Larson atcalarson@boycelaw.com or 605-336-2424.  

The maximum rate changed on July 1, 2016 to $762 a week.  The minimum work comp rate has increased to $381 a week. 

If you have any questions on work comp rates or general questions, please feel free to contact Charlie Larson atcalarson@boycelaw.com or 605-336-2424.   

                                Leonard E. Salway v. Hanson Maves Company and Zurich American Insurance


Claimant was a 76-year old worker who sustained a work-related injury when he broke his right ankle. Approximately 6 months after the injury, Claimant was placed at MMI and returned to work doing the same job as he was prior to the injury. Claimant admitted that he did not feel that he was receiving special treatment and admitted that the only reason he filed his Petition was because he believed someday he would develop arthritis in his ankle. Despite the allegations in the Petition regarding favored work, the Department found that Claimant was not performing "favored" or "light duty" work because he was doing the same job he did before the injury. Rick Ostrander provided a report that Claimant was receiving favored work, but the Department rejected the opinion because it was based on misinformation.

Regarding Claimant’s request that the Department retain jurisdiction, the Department declined to do so, saying that Claimant was employed in the same position as he was before the injury with no restrictions or limitations, and just because he was worried he would someday develop arthritis, that was not enough for the Department to retain jurisdiction, therefore the case was dismissed.

If you have questions on this or any other matter in South Dakota, please contact Charlie Larson atcalarson@boycelaw.com or 605-336-2424 

                            Sarah Sorenson v. Harbor Bar, LLC and Midwest Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2015 SD 88

This matter came before the South Dakota Supreme Court on appeal by the Employer/Insurer. Claimant was injured during her employment in December 2009 when she sustained a head injury, ultimately ending in her having brain surgery. There were three separate surgeries, and the Department found that the first two surgeries were the responsibility of the Employer/Insurer and that the third surgery was not. Employer/Insurer appealed the decision, and the Circuit Court affirmed in part and remanded in part for clarification regarding the amount of the compensable damages.

On appeal, the issues appealed were (1) Whether the Department was clearly erroneous in its finding that the alleged second incident actually happened before the work-place incident, if it happened at all; (2) Whether the Department was clearly erroneous in its determination that the work-related injury was a major contributing cause of Sorensen’s intracranial hemorrhage; and (3) Whether the Department abused its discretion by admitting Dr. Sabow’s undisclosed testimony as rebuttal testimony. As to the first issue, the S.C. held that they would not substitute their judgment for that of the Department, as the Department heard the witnesses live and was able to determine their credibility. As to the second issue, the S.C. held that it was the function of the fact-finder to assess the credibility attributed to the expert opinions and they believe the fact-finder got it right. As to the last issue, the S.C. stated that disclosure of a rebuttal witness has never been required in SD by statute, rule or caselaw. The S.C. went on to say that absent evidence of bad faith on the part of the Claimant, there was no reason to exclude this testimony and would only serve to stifle the Department’s truth-finding process. The Court also stated that even if they were to find that the Department abused its discretion, it would not merit reversal because the Employer/Insurer would have to show that they were prejudiced, and they would not be able to do so because they were able to supplement the record with additional expert testimony of their own.

 If you have questions on this case or generally in South Dakota, please contact Charlie Larson atcalarson@boycelaw.com or at 605-336-2424 

 The SD Supreme Court recently issued a decision in Patricia Wheeler v. Cinna Bakers LLC d/b/a Cinnabon and Hartford Casualty Insurance Company 2015 S.D. 25.   

On May 6, 2015, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the above-referenced matter. The following issue was addressed: When calculating average weekly wage, do you consider wages from other jobs?

In this result-oriented decision, the Court held that a claimant is allowed to include earnings from other jobs when calculating AWW. The Court interpreted the definition of "earnings" used to calculate AWW in Claimant’s favor, finding that "earnings" were the sum of all wages from all of claimant’s employments no matter the type. As you can imagine, the effect of this will likely require an employer to pay higher rates to cover an employee’s other job or lost income-earning ability. The Court acknowledged this fact, but found that it is more appropriate for the employer/insurer to bear this burden rather than the claimant.

The Court did not address two prior cases expressly holding wages could not be combined.  In doing so, the Court called his an issue of first impression instead of overruling the older cases.  This likely means the case will be applied retroactively to all open files. 

 If you questions regarding this case, please contact Charlie Larson at 605-336-2424 orcalarson@boycelaw.com

 

Robert L. Miller v. McLaughlin Electric and Travelers Insurance

Robert Miller/Thomas J. Von Wald

Issue: (1) Whether the Claimant’s choice to move to assisted living over his treating physician’s approval of a "stair-glide" subjected the employer to pay for the assisted living arrangement?

Robert L. Miller ("Claimant") suffered a work related injury in 1982 at age 52. He continued treatment with a chiropractor and had a regular exercise program at the YMCA. In 2006, Claimant aggravated his injury. In 2013, he went to Orthopedic Surgery Specialists and reported that his back had worsened when he used stairs. He wished to go to assisted living and asked his treating physician at Orthopedic Surgery Specialists to write him a medical recommendation. The physician did so, but the Insurer subsequently inquired about whether a "stair-glide" would be an acceptable option. The physician stated in another letter that it would be an acceptable option so long as the Claimant did not use stairs. Claimant moved into an assisted living center in Oak Grove, Minnesota just prior to that letter from the physician to the Insurer. Insurer denied benefits and assisted living care, as a stair-glide in Claimant’s home would have been a more appropriate option. Claimant was also denied his requests for physical therapy to treat knee pain.

Ultimately, summary judgment was granted in favor of Insurer regarding Claimant’s request for payment of assisted living. Additionally, Judge Catherine Duenwald ruled that if Claimant wanted a change in choice of medical practitioner in order to attend physical therapy in Minnesota, it should have first been approved by the employer under SDCL § 62-4-43. Although ultimately prevailing, Insurer was ordered to pay Claimant’s gym membership in Minnesota as it was instructed by his treating physician and medical providers to continue exercising and swimming on a regular basis.

 

Charles Dockter v. Ron’s Equipment Painting, Inc. and Farmer’s Mutual Insurance Group

Lonald L. Gellhaus/J.G. Shultz

Issue: (1) Whether an injury sustained by Claimant arose out of and in the course of his employment with Employer?

Charles Dockter ("Claimant") was employed in July 2013 by Ron’s Equipment Painting, Inc. ("Employer"). His job duties primarily included power washing trucks, waxing, and cleaning. Prior to this employment, Claimant was fired and re-hired numerous times by Employer. Claimant’s alleged injury occurred on July 17, 2013, while he was washing a truck, but he did not report it to anyone. Claimant went to the Emergency Room in Ortonville, Minnesota on July 20, 2013, and afterwards he called his supervisor to notify him that he hurt his neck while working on July 17, 2013.

Multiple employees of Employer testified that Claimant had not told them anything about his alleged injury. Additionally, Claimant had requested July 18, 2013, off from work so that he could see his attorney. At hearing, Claimant provided inconsistent testimony regarding the pain and the circumstances surrounding the injury. Furthermore, in an unrelated event, the Department noted that Claimant had a co-worker who was injured when he closed his finger in the door of his house. Claimant advised the co-worker that he should tell the supervisor so that he could collect workers’ compensation for that injury.

Judge Hageman determined that the only evidence produced by Claimant was his testimony, which he did not find credible. Further, Claimant had a reputation for dishonesty which was further diminished by his suggestion to his co-worker to file a false workers’ compensation claim. Judge Hageman ultimately determined that Claimant fell "far short of carrying his burden of proof."

 

Catherine Guadagnino Wang v. Mileage Plus, Inc.

Dennis Finch and Jeffrey Maks/Kristi Geisler Holm

Issue: (1) Whether Claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her work-related incident was a major contributing cause of her past and current condition and need for treatment?

Catherine Guadagnino Wang ("Claimant") started working for Mileage Plus, Inc. ("Employer") in 1998. She worked as a customer service representative, which was a sedentary job involving sitting for long periods of time at a desk with a computer station and a phone. In March 2000, she was referred to The Spine Center where she saw Dr. Larry Teuber for neck, shoulder, and face pain as well as pain in her mid and low back. Claimant underwent a lumbar microdisectomy and returned to work on light duty with lifting restrictions. She was discharged without restrictions in March 2002.

In March 2005, a doctor with The Spine Center had a "frank talk" with Claimant, as he felt she was "blowing her symptoms out of proportion" and that she should return to work in the near future. Her primary care physician also noted that her pain symptoms were of "questionable etiology and significance." In June 2005, Dr. Wayne Anderson conducted a review of the Claimant’s records at the request of the Employer and Insurer, concluding that the slip at work was just another incident that aggravated a low back condition

Ultimately, there were records noting that the Claimant had a complex pain disorder, but causation was an issue because multiple doctors questioned the etiology of the Claimant’s back pain. Claimant’s lower back pain was present and actively being treated just prior to her slip at work. She was not able to show by a preponderance of the evidence that her slip was a major contributing cause of her treatment and need for surgery. Despite the opinion that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled, there was no indication that it was due to any work-related injury or condition.

 

Todd Barber v. MWP Construction, Inc., and Acuity Mutual Insurance Company

Brad J. Lee/Rebecca L. Mann

Issue: (1) Whether Employer/Insurer is required to prove a change of condition after a settlement agreement was signed which provided an obligation of Employer/Insurer to pay future medical benefits, except when the Employer/Insurer approves a Medicare Set-Aside?

The Department of Labor had previously approved a settlement agreement between Claimant and Employer, which encompassed all medical benefits relating to the Claimant’s back injury for past, present, and future. Indemnity benefits were not included in the settlement, and were essentially waived by the Claimant. The settlement agreement provided that there was an obligation on the part of the Employer to pay future medical benefits, with the exception that future benefits would not be covered if the Claimant obtained an approved Medicare Set-Aside at the Employer’s expense.

Both parties agreed that neither party was permitted to reopen the matter upon a change of condition, which Judge Catherine Duenwald found to be unambiguous. Relying on the Department’s decision inStanton v. United Parcel Service and Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, Judge Duenwald concluded that after an award is final, the Employer is required to establish a change in condition before they can deny medical benefits, fail to pay medical bills, or not authorize treatments, and until such time, the settlement agreement is considered to be an Order of the Department.

 

Catherine Tobin v. Care Concepts, LLC, and First Dakota Indemnity Company

Margo Tschetter Julius/Charles Larson

Issue: (1) Whether Claimant’s injury arose out of her employment with Employer?

Catherine Tobin ("Claimant") was a 68 year old woman at the time of her hearing. She worked with Care Concepts, LLC ("Employer"), where she worked as a medication aide. On May 30, 2014, Claimant fell while she was at work, stating that she "fell over my own two feet." Employer denied worker’s compensation benefits on the grounds that the injury did not arise out of her employment, as the injury did not arise out of a risk that could be associated with her employment.

In the Department’s decision, Judge Hageman first reviewed the "Positional Risk Doctrine." Under that doctrine, a person who is injured when he or she is required to be in a particular place at a particular time during his or her employment is able to collect workers’ compensation, even if the employment-related activities were not a major cause of the injury. Judge Hageman determined that Claimant’s employment placed her in the room in which she fell, and therefore the Positional Risk doctrine did apply.

Further, the Department addressed the "Unexplained Fall Doctrine." This doctrine makes an injury compensable when the employee proves that an injury occurred by accident in the course of employment from a neutral risk that is neither attributable to the claimant personally nor the employer. Judge Hageman found that the Unexplained Fall Doctrine applied, holding that it was apparent that Claimant did not know what caused her to fall, therefore that the fall was "unexplained." Accordingly, it was determined that Claimant’s injury arose out of and in the course of her employment with Employer.

 

Tammy Lagler v. Menard’s, Inc., and Zurich American Insurance Company

Ronald Parsons/J. G. Shultz

Issue: (1) Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to SDCL § 58-12-3? (2) Whether Claimant is entitled to a lump sum payment of benefits? (3) Whether Claimant is entitled to costs?

Tammy Lagler ("Claimant") was injured during the course of her employment with Menards, Inc. ("Employer") in April 2007. In February 2008, Dr. Watts of Core Orthopedics performed surgery on Claimant’s ankle. Zurich American Insurance Company ("Insurer") assumed responsibility of the injury and initially paid all medical expenses including the surgery. Claimant continued treatment with Dr. Watts. In August 2008, Dr. Watts recommended surgery Claimant’s ankle as a result of her work injury.

While the surgery request was pending, the Insurer scheduled an independent medical exam for September 2008. In late August 2008, Claimant filed a Petition for Hearing alleging that Insurer has "veraciously and unreasonably refused payment." The IME was subsequently cancelled and not rescheduled for unknown reasons. The Insurer reached Claimant’s attorney in early September 2008, stating that additional information was needed from Dr. Watts before surgery could be approved, but that Insurer had not yet denied Claimant’s requested treatment. Claimant’s attorney stated that he would not withdraw the Petition for Hearing until it was confirmed that surgery was being paid for.

Surgery was denied after the Insurer found out from Dr. Watts’ nurse that Claimant’s condition can be caused by wearing heels. Insurer concluded that the injury was not due to the original work injury. Each of Dr. Watts’ assistants denied having any conversations with Insurer in which they indicated that Claimant’s injury was not related to the workplace. An adjuster from Insurer stated that the assistant that gave her this information was named "Angie Roberts" but nobody by that name had ever worked for Dr. Watts. There is a record of a five minute telephone call between Dr. Watts’ office and Insurer on that day.

In October 2008, Dr. Eric Watson conducted an examination of Claimant’s ankle and concluded that surgery would be beneficial, but did not say whether it was related to the work injury. Again in November 2008, Dr. Watts stated that she had changed her gait pattern since the injury, which he believed was the biggest contributing factor to her need for surgery. Surgery was performed in February 2009, and Claimant was able to return to work part time in April 2009. In February 2010, a Dr. Richard Farnham opined that Claimant’s work injury did not require surgery.

For the issue of whether Claimant could collect attorney’s fees pursuant to SDCL § 58-12-3, Judge Hageman concluded that Insurer had diligently investigated the claim and sought an answer from the treating doctor. The phone records indicating that someone from Insurer’s office did have a conversation with someone at Core Orthopedics and that Insurer had the right to ascertain why the surgery was needed. The Department found that Claimant could not collect attorney’s fees because she was unable to prove that Insurer’s denial of the second surgery was vexatious or without reasonable cause.

On the issue of whether Claimant could receive a lump sum payment of her benefits, Judge Hageman determined that would be appropriate because of Claimant’s "exceptional financial need that arose as a result of reduced income due to the injury," as required by SDCL § 62-7-3. Additionally, on the third issue, the Department concluded that Claimant was not entitled to costs.

 

Sharleen Grimlie v. Larson Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Zurich North America

David J. King and Bram Weidenaar/Justin G. Smith

Issue: (1) Whether the incident that Claimant experienced while working for Employer is and remains a major contributing cause of Claimant’s current condition and need for treatment? (2) Whether Claimant’s medical treatment was medically necessary and reasonable? (3) What is the extent of Claimant’s current condition and is Claimant entitled to Permanent Partial Disability Benefits? (4) Whether Claimant is permanently and totally disabled due to a work-related injury or condition and falls under the Odd-Lot Doctrine? (5) Whether Employer/Insurer is required to reimburse Claimant and Claimant’s medical insurer for medical bills paid, and if so, in what amount?

Sharleen Grimlie ("Claimant") was hired in 1993 as a door assembler at Larson Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("Employer"). Claimant injured her back in January 2011 while working, which she initially attributed to overwork. She reported the injury that day and filled out an injury report the next day when her back did not feel any better. The day after the injury occurred, she also went to a chiropractor who advised her not to return to work. Claimant had treated with this chiropractor in the past but had not previous history of back problems.

An MRI was taken in April 2011, which showed degenerative spondylotlisthesis, spinal stenosis, a bulging disc and protruding disc, as well as other levels of degenerative disc change. Dr. Mitchell Johnson of Orthopedic Institute recommended a back brace and physical therapy and allowed her to return to work with restrictions for a short period of time. In June 2011, however, Dr. Paul Cederberg performed an IME of Claimant. Dr. Cederberg stated that Claimant had chronic, long term, and degenerative preexisting conditions. Accordingly, he opined that her injury was not related to the employment. As a result, Employer issued a denial.

Dr. Johnson performed fusion surgery in August 2011, and Claimant returned to physical therapy until December 2011 when she began a home-based program. The surgery was paid for by Employer’s health insurance coverage, not workers’ compensation.

In March 2012, Dr. Johnson ordered Claimant completely off work. She was subsequently terminated by Employer and lost insurance coverage. In June 2013, Dr. Johnson wrote to Claimant, in a response to her attorney, saying that there may be some other work she could perform with restrictions, and that his previous recommendation was only relating to her current job duties. In July 2014, Dr. Cederberg performed a follow-up IME and came to the same conclusion as he had previously.

In reviewing the causation of the injury, Judge Duenwald determined that Dr. Cederberg’s conclusion was flawed in a number of ways, and ultimately did not find him credible. As to the extent of Claimant’s condition, Judge Duenwald found that under SDCL § 62-4-53, the employee has the burden of proof to make a prima facie showing of permanent total disability. Because Claimant had not attended a Functional Capacities Examination or been evaluated recently by a treating physician to establish the extent of her disability, Judge Duenwald looked to Dr. Cederberg’s opinion from August 2012 in which he said that she could perform sedentary work, thereby finding that she was not permanently and totally disabled. As to the issue of whether Employer was required to reimburse Claimant for medical bills, Judge Duenwald determined that because the medical claim was deemed to be compensable, any medical bills that have been incurred by Claimant and have been paid out by any other party are to be reimbursed by Employer.

 

Anthony J. Shulte v. Rural Manufacturing Co., Inc., and First Dakota Indemnity Company

Michael E. Unke/Michael McKnight

Issue: (1) Was Claimant’s work for Employer a major contributing cause of Claimant’s injury or condition and need for treatment?

Anthony Shulte ("Claimant") worked for Rural Manufacturing Co., Inc. ("Employer") for over 20 years as a shop foreman doing fabrication, installation work, service work, repair work, and some design work. On May 1, 2012, Claimant injured his shoulder while building a steel scale pan for some equipment they were building. He felt a pop and a sharp pain in his shoulder, which he claimed he did not realize he injured at the time.

Claimant treated regularly with a local chiropractor since 1989 for a variety of injuries and symptoms including neck, back, ankle, wrist, knew, and toe pains. In April 2012, just prior to the injury, Claimant saw the chiropractor for his cervical spine and left shoulder. Claimant did not return to the chiropractor until June 2, 2012, reporting a left shoulder pain at 8 out of 10. On June 11, 2012, Claimant returned again with the same complaints, and further testing revealed a possible rotator cuff tear.

Dr. Hurd provided an opinion that the MRI showed AC joint arthrosis, a possible superior labral tear, as well as a low grade rotator cuff tear. The degree of muscular atrophy and retraction of the muscle indicated to Dr. Hurd that the rotator cuff was injured in an acute manner. Eventually, symptoms became worse, and Dr. Hurd recommended rotator cuff surgery.

In October 2012, an IME was performed by Dr. Gary Wyard, who was of the opinion that Claimant had not suffered a rotator cuff tear, as it would have shown up on an MRI. He believed Claimant was magnifying his symptoms, and continued to have that belief even after the rotator cuff surgery by Dr. Hurd, which Dr. Wyard deemed unnecessary.

Judge Duenwald ultimately found in favor of Claimant as to causation, Although Dr. Wyard’s reasoning regarding age and tearing of muscles appeared to be "textbook," Judge Duenwald concluded that not every injury is textbook and that Dr. Hurd was the doctor who actually had the opportunity to see the muscle and the tear during the surgery. Accordingly, Judge Duenwald found the treating physician’s opinion more credible than the IME, thereby awarding benefits.

 If you have any questions regarding these decisions, please contact Charlie Larson at 605-336-2424 orcalarson@boycelaw.com.   

 

Supreme Court of South Dakota

Jason Petrik v. J.J. Concrete, Inc. and EMC Insurance Company, 2015 S.D. 39

Michael Bornitz and Joseph Dylla/Charles Larson

Issues: (1) Whether the Circuit Court erred in holding that Petrik’s injury "arose out of" his employment but did not occur "in the course of" his employment?

 

Jason Petrik ("Claimant") was an employee J.J. Concrete ("Employer") when he was injured running away from a co-worker on a job-site. The Department ruled that Claimant’s injury "arose out of" his employment, but did not occur "in the course of" the employment, thereby denying benefits. The Circuit Court approved the Department’s holding, and Claimant appealed to the Supreme Court who reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded to the Department to establish benefits.

Claimant was a concrete laborer with Employer since 2011. His employment sometimes involved idle times when he and his co-workers were required to sit and wait for other work to be completed before they could continue with their own. During the idle times, the testimony established that Claimant and his co-workers were expected to clean up the job-site, put away tools, and other like-activities. Testimony also established that Petrik and his co-workers liked to play jokes on each other during the work day. On the date of injury it was very hot outside and Petrik tricked a co-worker into getting out of the air-conditioned truck. After about 5 minutes, Petrik got out of the truck and the co-worker he tricked started chasing him through the construction site and Petrick tried to jump across a trench. Petrik fell into the trench, ultimately breaking his ankle.

Employer and Insurer denied the claim, stating that Claimant was engaging in horseplay. Claimant argued that his horseplay was insubstantial and that the injury did arise out of and in the course of his employment. In reviewing the "arising out of" portion of the arguments, the Supreme Court found that the activity in which Claimant was engaged – playing a prank on a co-worker during an idle period – was on in which employees might reasonable engage. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed then Department finding that the injury did arise out of the employment.

The Supreme Court then addressed the "in the course of the employment" standard. In doing so, the court first addressed the extent and seriousness of the deviation from the employment activities. The Court stated that "however misguided, the extent of Petrik’s momentary impulsive deviation during a lull in work was insubstantial." The Court then addressed the completeness of the deviation to determine whether the act was commingled with the performance of a duty or whether it involved a complete abandonment of job duties. The Court found that although he engaged in prohibited horseplay, "the act was accomplished while [he] was waiting for the concrete truck," therefore finding he did not abandon his job duties.

The Court went on to find that it is expected that in the nature of the employment that certain horseplay would occur, and that a moment’s deviation from work should be expected. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that although Claimant’s actions were misguided, that his act did not come from a deliberate or conscious excursion and did not require him to abandon any job duties.

If you have questions about this decision, please contact Charlie Larson at 605-336-2424 orcalarson@boycelaw.com. Thanks!