State News

Jurgenson v. Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc, No. A24-0507 (Minn. June 25, 2025)

The issue in this case was whether a contingent attorney fee above the statutory cap must be approved if the parties do not object to it.

The employee’s attorney requested $30,000 in fees from a $150,000 settlement, $4,000 above the statutory $26,000 cap set under Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022). Although the parties stipulated to the fee, the compensation judge approved only the capped amount, denying the excess fee. On appeal, the WCCA affirmed. The employee’s attorney further appealed, raising multiple arguments including a claim that the statutory cap violated the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.

The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these arguments and fully affirmed the trial court and WCCA, holding that the 2024 amendment increasing the attorney fee cap did not apply retroactively; that judges are not required to approve excess fees, even when unopposed; and that the fee cap does not violate the Contracts Clause.

This decision reinforces judicial discretion in evaluating requests for attorney fees and upholds the constitutionality of Minnesota’s attorney fee statute in workers’ compensation cases.

Simonson v. Douglas Cnty., No. A24-1309, 2025 WL 1185074 (Minn. Apr. 16, 2025)

In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed that employees seeking permanent total disability (PTD) benefits beyond age 67 must rebut the statutory retirement presumption under Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Konneh v. Sundog Enters., LLC, 2025 WL 1657618 (Minn. WCCA May 2025)

The WCCA held that lay testimony and medical records alone may be sufficient to establish causation in cases involving “commoner afflictions,” such as temporary low back injuries. Relying on precedent from Bender v. Dongo Tool Co., 509 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. 1993), and Carroll v. Univ. of Minn., slip op. (W.C.C.A. May 4, 1999), the court allowed the compensation judge to rely on lay expertise absent a formal medical opinion. Employers should be aware that even in the absence of expert testimony, credible lay evidence may support injury claims involving everyday ailments.

Brunner v. Post Consumer Brands, No. WC24-6569 (Minn. WCCA Jan. 15, 2025)
This case reaffirmed that an employee’s right to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses is not extinguished by a provider’s failure to intervene under Minn. Stat. § 176.361, subd. 2. Employers and insurers must be prepared to defend against medical expense claims brought directly by injured workers, even after a provider’s intervention rights have lapsed.

In two recent cases, claimants opposed the employer’s efforts to enforce and/or obtain information relating to credits from third-party claims. Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 2363(e), any amounts received by a claimant from a third party in relation to a work accident are deemed an advance payment by the carrier. The practical result is this becomes a credit against future benefits. The carrier is entitled to both investigate the amount and details of that credit and to assert the right to utilize the credit in the future.

In Maclary v. James Malin Plumbing, the employer sought to enforce a known credit, which it intended to use if the Board found there was liability for additional workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant opposed because, according to him, the issue was premature when there was no order for benefits and there was no signed Agreement. The Board agreed with our argument that nothing in the statute or the case law requires a signed Agreement before a credit is available for use. As for the timing issue, again, there did not need to be any benefits owed at the time to enforce the employer’s right to use a credit in the event benefits are owed in the future. Because of the waxing and waning nature of workers’ compensation claims, it is inevitable there will be periods where nothing is owed, but something may be owed in the future. Further, because it is possible to waive a credit, the Board noted it was wise of us to assert our credit and to litigate the issue, as doing so eliminated any potential claim of waiver. The Board granted the Motion.

In Teletor v. First State Inc. of Delaware, the carrier learned of a third-party settlement at mediation and requested documentation on the amount of the settlement and documentation relating to same. After months of receiving no response, the carrier filed a Motion to Compel. Claimant opposed the Motion, arguing the carrier was not entitled to the information because the carrier had not been found responsible for benefits and was not the employer, as this was a general contractor liability claim. He also argued the information was protected by a confidentiality agreement (an issue only identified the week of the Motion Hearing). The Board again rejected this argument and again noted it was wise of the carrier to file the Motion to avoid any claim of waiver. The Board did acknowledge the carrier may need to enter into a confidentiality agreement, but that did not extinguish the carrier’s right to the information requested. As such, the Motion to Compel was granted.

 Should you have any questions regarding this Decision, please contact Nick Bittner, or any other Attorney in our Workers’ Compensation Department.

Maclary v. James Malin Plumbing, IAB No. 1515598, Jun. 17, 2024

Teletor v. First State Inc. of Delaware, IAB No. 1520638, Jan. 17, 2025

In Ladner v. Hinton Homes LLC, No. 2024-WC-00941-COA (May 6, 2025), the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission’s decision denying and dismissing Ladner’s claim for benefits, where the employee tested positive for marijuana immediately following a workplace injury. The Commission found that Ladner had failed to rebut the presumption raised by Mississippi Code Annotated § 71-3-121(1) by failing to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that intoxication was not a contributing cause of the accident. The Court’s opinion provides valuable insights about the evidence that could be needed to successfully rebut the statutory presumption against compensability.

What happened?

Ladner was employed by a contractor to frame houses for Hinton Homes LLC, which was deemed the statutory employer. One afternoon, following his return from a lunch break, Ladner fell through a hole while nailing plywood decking onto a roof and landed on the concrete foundation below. Ladner requested to be taken to hospital, where he was given medical care. When drug tested at the hospital, Ladner tested positive for THC. Ladner was not a medical marijuana patient at the time of the fall, making his consumption of marijuana illegal.

Following his release from the hospital, Ladner filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits relating to his injuries. Hinton Homes asserting that the claim was barred pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 71-3-7(4) and § 71-3-121(1), because there was a presumption that Ladner’s injury was proximately caused by his use of drugs illegally.

In an attempt to rebut the presumption, Ladner relied on his own personal testimony and the testimony of his coworkers. Ladner contended that he only smoked marijuana once, two weeks prior to the injury, making it impossible for the marijuana to have caused his fall. Ladner also relied on testimony from coworkers, who said that Ladner did not smell like marijuana or look impaired on the day of the injury. Significantly, Ladner did not present any expert medical evidence to challenge the validity of the drug test or to show the levels of THC present in his post-injury drug test.

What was the result?

The Court of  Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision that Ladner had not met his burden under § 71-3-121(1) to prove by a ponderance of the evidence that his use of marijuana was not the proximate cause of the injury and that, as a result, the claim was barred by § 71-3-7(4).

The Court of Appeals discussed that Mississippi Code Annotated §71-3-121(1) gives employers the right to directly or indirectly administer drug tests to any employee that sustains an actual injury at work or claims to have suffered a work-related injury. Under this statute, if the employee tests positive for any illegal drug, then it is initially presumed that the illegal drug was the cause of the injury. The injured worker has a chance to rebut this presumption by affirmatively showing that the illegal drug use was not the proximate cause of the injury. To meet this burden, the injured worker must show that it was more likely than not that the presence of the illegal drug in his system was not a contributing cause of the accident. If the presumption is not successfully rebutted, then the injury is not compensable pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 71-3-7(4).

Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Commission set a bright-line rule for the evidence necessary to rebut the § 71-3-121(1) presumption. However, the Court emphasized the Commission’s reliance on the fact that Ladner failed to introduce any medical testimony about his drug test or the interpretation of the test results and that Ladner instead relied wholly on lay testimony—his own and that of witnesses—to rebut the presumption. The Court agreed with the Commission’s determination that such lay testimony was insufficient to meet Ladner’s burden of proof.

What does this mean?

The decision suggests that claimants will need to present expert medical evidence to meet their burden of proof in rebutting the presumption under § 71-3-121(1). This might include getting secondary/confirmatory urine tests or presenting expert testimony about whether the level of an illicit drug in a claim’s system would have been too low to have been a contributing cause of the injury.

This case also highlights the importance of post-injury drug testing policies for Mississippi employers. Employers with such policies should drug test immediately after an injury is reported, as it is not the amount of the drug in the system that triggers the statutory presumption, but the presence of the drug.

Author

Jennifer Hughes Scott is a shareholder at Wise Carter Child & Caraway and has been practicing with the firm since 2004. She is a graduate of Mississippi College School of Law. Jennifer’s practice includes all aspects of employment law and workers’ compensation. Jennifer acts as a legal advocate and counselor to her clients and brings a forward-thinking perspective that supports her clients in successfully responding to HR and employment law challenges.

Simon Law Group, P.C.

701 Market Street, Suite 340, St. Louis, MO  63101

314-621-2828

MISSOURI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CASE LAW UPDATE

April 2025 – June 2025

Claimant Awarded a Load on Unoperated Bilateral Shoulder Claim

Ferris v. Pajco Inc. d/b/a Rhodes and Zurich American Insurance Co, Injury No: 20-046178

FACTS: On or about June 4, 2020, the claimant sustained an injury to his bilateral shoulders while attempting to pull a 50-foot hose that was full of fuel across the grass. The case was accepted as compensable and the claimant was sent to Dr. Kostman at the employee’s request, who performed prior surgeries to the claimant’s shoulders, on the right in 2005 and on the left in 2009. Dr. Kostman diagnosed bilateral shoulder strains and recommended conservative treatment including physical therapy and a selective injection to each shoulder along with the anti-inflammatories. The doctor placed him at MMI on February 24, 2021and assessed 0% disability to each shoulder.

The claimant’s attorney obtained a report of Dr. Volarich, who assessed 25% disability to each shoulder as a result of the work accident.

The only dispute was the nature and extent of PPD. The judge assessed 10% to each shoulder along with a 10% load. The decision was appealed and the Commission affirmed.  

Amputation Not Compensable as Work Accident Was Only a Triggering or Precipitating Factor in Causing Claimant’s Medical Condition and Disability

Hasselbring v. Macon County Nursing Home District and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, Case No. WD87278 (Mo. App. 2025)

FACTS: In mid-2021, the claimant, who worked at a nursing home, began noticing pain in his left calf when he would walk long distances. In August 2021, after mentioning his pain to his cardiologist, the claimant was sent for a CT scan and a vascular surgeon told him he had a closed popliteal aneurysm in his leg, and because the aneurysm had completely closed off the condition was not acute, and the claimant developed some collateral blood flow to his foot. The doctor recommended that he undergo vein mapping and likely a vein bypass but did not insist that he do so immediately.

Then on November 3, 2021, the claimant was helping a resident out of a vehicle and the resident rolled her electric wheelchair over the claimant’s left foot. He immediately felt sharp pain going all the way down his left leg into his foot. The claimant went home and his wife looked at his foot and kept saying that his foot was white, which meant that he did not have any circulation, and she took him to the emergency room. At the hospital, the doctor noted that the claimant had acute ischemia and performed surgery to do everything possible to save his leg, but his left leg was amputated above the knee two days after the work accident. Thereafter, he was unable to return to work, had to use a wheelchair and was learning to use a prosthesis. The claimant took the matter to a hearing and the ALJ awarded benefits. The employer appealed to the Commission and reversed the Award, finding the employer’s expert credible, stating that the prevailing factor in the claimant’s loss of limb was an occluded left large popliteal artery aneurysm. The Commission found that the work accident was “merely a triggering or precipitating factor in causing employee’s medical condition and disability.” The claimant appealed.

HOLDING: The Court noted that an injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The Court noted that while both the treating physician and the employer’s expert agreed that the wheelchair accident was the prevailing factor of the “crush injury” to the claimant’s left foot, the employer’s expert, whose opinion the Commission found more credible, did not conclude that the crush injury was the prevailing factor in causing the claimant’s disability. The expert testified that absent the claimant’s preexisting popliteal aneurysm, the crush injury or soft tissue damage would have been a benign event which would have been treated with leg elevation, ice and anti-inflammatories. In other words, the soft tissue injury would not have resulted in disability. In light of this, the Commission’s denial of benefits was affirmed.

Occupational Diseases Are Not Compensable Pre-existing Injuries That Trigger Fund Liability

Treasurer of the State of Missouri Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Penney, Case No. SC100693 (S. Ct. 2025)

FACTS: The claimant worked as a pharmacy technician from 1980 to 2019. In June of 2018, the claimant filed an occupational disease claim involving her low back. In February 2019, she filed another occupational disease claim involving her neck and upper back. In March 2019, the claimant filed her final occupational disease claim involving right carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar nerve entrapment at the elbow on the left side. The claimant sought PTD benefits from the Fund. At a hearing, the ALJ concluded the claimant was permanently and totally disabled and determined that the Fund was responsible for benefits. The Fund appealed, arguing that the ALJ improperly considered the claimant’s preexisting occupational diseases as they are not compensable injuries pursuant to the statute. The Commission disagreed and affirmed the ALJ’s award of PTD. The Fund appealed.

HOLDING: The claimant alleged that her occupational diseases were a “direct result of the compensable injury as defined in Section 287.020.” The Fund argued that occupational diseases do not qualify under that subsection. The Court noted that there are two types of compensable injuries, injuries by accident and injuries by occupational disease. The Court noted that while occupational diseases are “compensable” under Section 287.067, the legislature chose to limit preexisting injuries that qualify under Category 2 to compensable injuries as defined in Section 287.020, the section pertaining to injuries sustained by accident. Therefore, the Commission’s decision was reversed and the claimant was not entitled to benefits from the Fund.

White vs. Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Case No. ED113099, Mo. App ED 2025

FACTS: In 2020 the claimant injured his chest while working on an overhead load spring on an industrial vacuum truck. He settled his chest injury for 12.5% disability. He had various preexisting conditions but relevant here was his October 2010 occupational disease claim involving his bilateral shoulders. He settled that claim for 23% of each shoulder or 106.72 weeks total. The ALJ determined that the Fund was liable for benefits based on his 2010 shoulder injury and the 2020 chest injury. The Fund appealed arguing that the claimant’s preexisting occupational disease claims did not qualify under the statute as occupational disease claims are not a compensable injury. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s Award. The Fund appealed.

HOLDING: The Court noted that while this case was under appeal, the Supreme Court decided that occupational diseases are not compensable to trigger Fund liability and therefore are not covered by the Second Injury Fund. In light of this decision, the Commission’s decision was remanded for the Commission to consider whether the Fund had any liability as a result of any other qualifying preexisting disabilities.

All Pre-existing Disabilities Must Meet 50-Week Threshold for Fund Liability

Jarvis vs. Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Case No. ED113075 (Mo. App. 2025)

FACTS: The claimant worked as an iron worker and sustained multiple injuries throughout his employment. In 2001 the claimant sustained injuries to his right ankle and both arms and settled his claim for 57.75 weeks for the right elbow, 43.75 weeks for the left wrist, and 46.5 weeks for the right leg. He was awarded a 10% load and 21 weeks of disfigurement. In 2011 he sustained an injury to his right wrist and settled that claim for 20% disability. In 2015 he sustained his primary injury involving his bilateral legs and reached a settlement with the employer and proceeded with a Hearing against the Fund.

The claimant’s attorney obtained a report of Dr. Volarich who assessed disability with respect to the primary and preexisting conditions and opined that he was likely permanently and totally disabled as a result of the 2001 and 2015 injuries. He also obtained a vocational report of Mr. Lalk who ultimately concluded that if the claimant needed to elevate his leg as a result of the primary injury he would PTD as a result of the last injury alone. At a Hearing the ALJ determined that as a result of the 2001 injury the claimant sustained 57.5 weeks disability to the right elbow, 54.25 weeks for the right left and 43.75 weeks for the left wrist. The ALJ found the claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to benefits against the Fund as the left wrist injury did not meet the 50-week threshold. The claimant appealed and the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. The claimant again appealed.

HOLDING: The Court noted that it has been reiterated by the Supreme Court that a claimant may not rely on a non-qualifying preexisting disability to prove that he or she is PTD. The Court went on to note that Dr. Volarich’s PTD determination was based on the claimant’s primary injury combining with all three of his preexisting disabilities and since one of those was not worth 50 weeks, the claimant is not eligible for Fund benefits. The Commission’s decision was affirmed.

All Pre-existing Disabilities Must Meet 50-Week Threshold for Fund Liability; Load Factors Do Not Apply

Eckardt v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Case No. SC100784 (S. Ct. 2025)

FACTS: The claimant worked as an aircraft mechanic in 1976. He sustained multiple injuries over the years, the last or primary injury in October of 2015 which resulted in a spinal fusion. He retired as he could no longer perform his job. The claimant sought disability benefits from the Fund and the ALJ found the following preexisting permanent partial disabilities: right knee, 80 weeks; left knee, 80 weeks; left shoulder, 92.8 weeks; left wrist, 78.75 weeks; right wrist, 70 weeks; and right shoulder, 46.4 weeks. The claimant’s attorney presented three reports and in the last report the doctor stated that the claimant was PTD due to the primary injury in combination with all six of his preexisting disabilities. The ALJ acknowledged that the right shoulder injury did not reach the statutory threshold of 50 weeks, but found the doctor’s reliance on that injury “not significant when considering all of the qualifying preexisting injuries.” The ALJ did believe the claimant was PTD and the Fund was responsible for benefits. The Fund appealed, arguing that occupational diseases do not qualify and that the claimant’s right shoulder injury did not qualify.

The Commission reversed the ALJ’s award and denied the claim. The claimant appealed, arguing that the Commission misconstrued the evidence by finding the doctor relied on a non-qualifying right shoulder injury and in the alternative argued that a load factor should apply to enhance the amount of PPD attributed to his right shoulder injury, pushing it over the 50-week statutory threshold.

HOLDING: The Court disagreed with the claimant’s argument that a load factor is appropriate, as they noted that as of January 1, 2014, the legislature eliminated claims for PPD and in doing so also eliminated the load factor analysis. The Court went on to further note that nothing in the statute permits or even suggests a load factor may be applied to increase the amount of PPD attributed to a preexisting disability. Therefore, the Court rejected the argument that a load factor should apply. Also since the doctor’s opinion with respect to perm total disability included the claimant’s non-qualifying right shoulder injury, the claimant did not meet his burden in establishing Fund liability. The Commission’s decision was affirmed.    

Pre-existing Condition Must Be Medically Documented but Documentation of Medical Condition and Rating for That Condition Can Come From Different Sources

Wetzel vs. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Case No. WD87372 (Mo. App 2025)

FACTS: The claimant sustained his primary injury on March 23, 2018 which involved a crush injury to both legs which required surgery. Thereafter he never returned to work. He settled his case against the employer for 33.5% PPD to his left and right lower legs at the 160-week level. He proceeded to a Hearing against the Fund for PTD benefits based on a 1989 work injury. At the Hearing he testified that he suffered compression fractures to his spine at L1, L2, and L3 and following that accident he settled his case for 17.5% disability to the body referable to the low back. The Stipulation was admitted into evidence. He testified that he continued to suffer back pain, and he visited an orthopedics practice in September and October of 2017 to seek treatment for his low back. He did admit those records into evidence at the Hearing. The Fund objected to admission of those records, but it was overruled by the ALJ. The records included a summary of the claimant’s description of his 1989 low back workplace injury, the reported lingering effects of that injury, and treatment he reported receiving since that time. Also, it included a physical examination, x-ray, and MRI imaging which showed that the claimant did have chronic vertebral compression fractures along with moderate degenerative disc disease and other degenerative conditions. At these 2017 visits, physical therapy was recommended along with medications. The ALJ concluded that the Second Injury Fund was liable for perm total benefits. The Second Injury Fund appealed arguing that the claimant’s self-reported history communicated to doctors to support the low back disability related to the 1989 prior work injury did not establish that the claimant’s low back disability was “medically documented” as to qualify as a preexisting disability. The Commission agreed and reversed the decision of the ALJ. The claimant appealed.

HOLDING: The claimant argued that the medical records from September and October from 2017 contained much more than unsupported statements of preexisting disability in that it provided clear and undisputed evidence of the claimant’s preexisting back injury, including diagnosis and treatment and the court agreed. The Fund argued that this case was similar to Dubuc, and it was determined in that case that the claimant’s own statements about his prior hernias although recorded by doctors and medical records do not conclusively support that any doctors have medically documented the claimant’s preexisting condition. However, the Court distinguished this case noting that the statute nor Dubuc prohibit a doctor from providing a competent and admissible disability rating for self-reported preexisting disability without having reviewed medical documentation of that disability. Instead, as long as there is medical documentation of a preexisting disability and a disability rating for the same preexisting disability equaling 50 weeks or more, it is immaterial that the evidence comes from different sources. The Court went on to note that the records clearly document the claimant’s report of a prior back injury and there was also medical documentation of fractures including a physical exam and diagnostic testing and therefore the medical records qualify as medical documentation of the claimant’s preexisting low back injury. Therefore, it was determined that the claimant was PTD, and the Fund was liable for benefits.

On May 1, 2025, the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (“AWCC” or the “Commission”) held that the federal Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”) preempts the AWCC’s authority to regulate reimbursement rates for air ambulance services provided to injured workers. Claimant Timothy Johnson, Emp., Respondent Ark. Dept. of Corr., Emp., Respondent Public Employee Claims Div., Carrier, Intervenor Survival Flight, Inc., No. H303158 (Ark. Work. Comp. Com., May 1, 2025). The ruling reversed an Order issued by a former Administrator of the AWCC’s Medical Cost Containment Division (“MCCD”) which compelled the Arkansas Public Employee Claims Division (“PECD”) to pay an air ambulance provider, Survival Flight, nearly double the amount that PECD had initially paid Survival Flight for the air ambulance services they provided to a state employee.  

Pursuant to A.C.A. §11-9-517 and Rule 30, the MCCD was established to implement a medical cost containment program. One of the MCCD’s primary functions is to review and resolve disputes regarding bills between carriers and providers. The AWCC’s Official Fee Schedule lists the maximum allowable payment for the majority of medical services provided to treat injured workers; however, in instances where the AWCC has not specified the maximum allowable fee for a medical service, the MCCD is responsible for determining what constitutes a reasonable reimbursement rate. For administrative review of disputed bills for air ambulance services, which are not addressed in the AWCC’s Official Fee Schedule, the MCCD has historically determined reasonable ambulance rates by conducting annual surveys of the rates charged by Arkansas emergency medical services (“EMS”) providers for individual procedure codes and determining the average charged for each code which constitutes the reasonable allowable amount.

At issue in this case was Survival Flight’s bill for the air ambulance services provided to the claimant after a compensable work accident. Because PECD’s bill review company had advised PECD to only pay 3x the Medicare reimbursement rate for the air ambulance services provided rather than the $44,130.66 that Survival Flight had charged them, Survival Flight asked the MCCD to perform an administrative review of the disputed bill and to determine the reasonable payable amount for the air ambulance services they had provided. After reviewing the amounts charged for each procedure code that was listed in Survival Flight’s bill and comparing those amounts with the average amounts charged by Arkansas EMS providers for the same procedure codes, the MCCD’s Administrator ruled that it was reasonable for PECD to be required to pay an additional $22,188.17 on top of the $21,273.00  they had already paid to Survival Flight for its ambulance services. When PECD filed an appeal of the Administrator’s Order, Judge Fine carefully considered the statutory preemption language in the ADA and opinions filed by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in which they repeatedly found that state laws and state causes of action which attempted to regulate or otherwise impose limitations upon prices charged by air carriers for air transportation services were preempted under the ADA  because they effectively attempted to undo federal deregulation that Congress had enacted to promote efficiency, innovation, and low prices in the airline industry. After reviewing the law and the MCCD Administrator’s Order, Judge Fine ultimately found that the authority of the AWCC and MCCD to regulate the allowable rates for air ambulance services is preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act and therefore reversed the MCCD’s Administrative Review Order that attempted to compel PECD to pay an additional $22,188.17 to Survival Flight. 

NWCDN Ohio State Law Update - July 2025

Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Update

BWC Actions

On February 28, 2025, the Board of the Ohio BWC announced and approved a 6% reduction in private employer premiums, set to take effect on July 1, 2025, saving businesses an expected $60 million. This reduction would be the sixth straight reduction since Governor DeWine took office and the 16^th rate decrease in the last 17 years going back to 2008.  Overall, the average rate levels for the 257,000 private and public Ohio employers are at their lowest in over 60 years.

The actual premium paid by individual private employers depends on several factors, including the expected future claims costs in their industry, their company’s recent claims history, and their participation in various BWC programs.

House Bill 80, the Industrial Commission and Proposed Ombuds Office Rename, and House Bill 81 for the Ohio BWC, were both approved by the Ohio General Assembly as of June 26, 2025. The Ohio Industrial Commission is responsible for providing a process for fair and impartial resolutions of disputed workers compensation claims, adjudicating 85,000 claims annually. Funded through the Administrative Cost Fund surcharge applied to employers’ workers compensation premiums, their request of $107.4 million over the biennium is the lowest budget since FY 2018-19. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation provides insurance coverage for Ohio business and employees, serving 258,000 public and private employers across the state. Funded by employer premiums, Ohio has the 5th lowest workers' compensation premiums in the nation.

Ohio Judicial Decisions

Violation of a Specific Safety Requirement (VSSR)

State ex rel. Allen Industries Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 2024-Ohio-5992 (December 23, 2024)

On October 30, 2018, Lewis Lands was working as a sign installer for Allen Industries, Inc., at a Meijer store construction site in Fremont, Michigan. Lands and a coworker were installing a large steel sign, which required welding steel uprights to a pole that had been placed in a trench. While kneeling at ground level and welding near the edge of the trench, the soil beneath Lands gave way, causing him to fall headfirst into the seven-foot-deep trench. Lands was momentarily buried upside down and received an electrical shock from the welder lead until his coworker shut off the power and helped him out of the trench using a ladder.

Lands filed a workers’ compensation claim which was allowed for the following injuries: anterior cruciate ligament tear left knee; unspecified sprain of right wrist; strain of muscle, fascia and tendon at neck level; sprain of medial collateral ligament of left knee; contusion of left knee; contusion of left front wall of thorax, left chest; unspecified sprain of left shoulder joint left shoulder; pulmonary embolism bilateral; deep vein thrombosis vein; fracture scaphoid/navicular, right wrist; fracture scaphoid/navicular with non-union, right wrist; sprain left acromioclavicular joint; low back strain; herniated disc C5-C6; L4-5 disc displacement with left radiculopathy; L5-S1 central disc displacement; herniated disc C5-C6; substantial aggravation of pre-existing arthritis, right wrist, left shoulder adhesive capsulitis.

On September 14, 2020, Lands filed an application for additional award for a violation of a specific safety requirement under Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-3-13(D)(1), which mandates trenches over five feet deep must be shored, sloped, or otherwise protected where employees may be exposed to moving ground or cave-ins. The BWC’s Safety Violations Investigations Unit (SVIU) released a report on January 7, 2021, finding the trench was at least seven feet deep and lacked any shoring or bracing. Lands testified that he had raised concerns about the soil conditions but was instructed to continue working.

A Staff Hearing Officer (“SHO”) initially denied the VSSR application. In an order dated December 22, 2021, the SHO found sufficient evidence the soil was unstable but insufficient evidence to show Lands was working in the trench or whether the area where the ground gave way was the exposed face of the trench or an inclined earth surface.

Lands appealed, and on March 29, 2022, an SHO vacated the prior SHO order and set the application for VSSR award for a hearing. After the hearing, an SHO on April 18, 2023, granted the application for VSSR award, finding Ohio Amd. Code 4123:1- 3-13(D) applied and the site where Lands was injured constituted an excavation site because it was a manmade cavity and a trench due to its size. To address Allen Industries argument that Lands was not in the trench, the SHO specified he was reaching in the trench when the ground gave way, and Allen Industries’ not providing safety equipment was the proximate cause of Lands’s injuries.

Allen Industries filed a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals and argued the regulation did not apply because Lands was not working inside the trench, and that Michigan’s safety code (Mich. Amd. Code 408.40901) governed the worksite and only required protections when employees were required to enter a trench.

The Tenth District Court rejected both arguments. It held the plain language of Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-3-13(D)(1) applies to any employee exposed to moving ground or cave-ins, not just those inside a trench. The Court emphasized that other subsections of the rule explicitly refer to employees “working within” trenches, but subsection (D)(1) does not. The rule broadly applies to employees who may be exposed to moving ground or cave-ins and does not distinguish between those working inside the trench or those working at ground level near the trench. The court also found no irreconcilable conflict with Michigan law as Michigan’s rule only apples when employees are required to enter a trench while Ohio’s rule is more broadly applied. Because Lands was not required to enter the trench, both rules could be followed without conflict.

Loss of Use

State ex rel. Kreitzer v. Indus. Comm., 2025-Ohio-281 (January 30, 2025)

Rodney Kreitzer suffered a workplace eye injury in December of 1982 when a metal rod struck his right eye. His workers’ compensation claim was allowed for multiple conditions: contusion, visual loss, traumatic cataract, zonula dialysis, and traumatic mydriasis. In 1983, Kreitzer received a scheduled-loss award based on a finding of 28.5% uncorrected vision loss in the right eye.

In March 2008, Kreitzer filed a C-86 motion seeking an increase in the scheduled-loss award for his right eye. On April 29, 2008, he underwent surgery on his right eye, removing the lens, performed by Michael E. Snyder, M.D. On July 16, 2008, and at the request of the BWC, Kreitzer was examined by Richard Roebuck, M.D., who determined Kreitzer had 99% central vision loss in his right eye, but after adjusting for comparative vision, the injury caused a 34% uncorrected loss of vision. Based on this, the BWC issued an order granting an increased scheduled-loss award after finding a 33% uncorrected loss of vision, which Kreitzer did not appeal.

In 2011, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the issue of whether the surgical removal of an eye lens in the course of treatment for a workplace injury entitles a worker to compensation for a total loss of vision pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) in State ex rel. Baker v. Coast to Coast Manpower, L.L.C., 129 Ohio St.3d 138, 2011-Ohio-2721. The Court declined to adopt a blanket rule that a claimant is automatically entitled to a total loss of vision award under R.C. 4123.57(B) whenever the natural lens or cornea is surgically removed due to workplace injury. Instead, the court held that it is proper to calculate the loss of vision based on the percentage of vision actually lost because of the injury but prior to any corrective surgery. The Court also clarified it was the loss of vision in Autozone and Parsec that formed the basis for the award of compensation for total loss of vision.

On March 15, 2022, Kreitzer filed another C-86 motion requesting an additional increase in his scheduled-loss award to reflect a total loss of vision in the right eye based on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decisions in Autozone and Parsec. In support of his motion, Kreitzer did not submit a new medical report but relied on the same 2008 surgical report from Dr. Snyder. The BWC referred the motion to the Industrial Commission and recommended denial, noting the lack of medical evidence of new and changed circumstances. On June 10, 2022, a District Hearing Officer (“DHO”) denied the motion, concluding it was barred because the issue had already been adjudicated in 2008. Kreitzer appealed.

Kreitzer’s appeal of the June 10, 2022 denial from the DHO proceeded to a hearing before a Staff Hearing Officer (“SHO”), who issued an order on August 3, 2022, vacating the DHO’s order and denying Kreitzer’s C-86 motion filed on March 15. The SHO found Kreitzer failed to meet his burden of proof because he did not submit any new medical evidence supporting an increase in the degree of vision loss. The SHO noted the doctor’s report from 2008 already considered the 2008 surgical findings, including the lens removal, and the previously awarded 33% vision loss remained appropriate.

Kreitzer filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus with the Tenth District Court of Appeals, arguing the Industrial Commission should have granted his motion for total loss based on the legal significance of the lens removal surgery and the 2008 order was legally incorrect under State ex rel. Autozone, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2008-Ohio-541, and State ex rel. Parsec v. Agin, 155 Ohio App.3d 303, 2003-Ohio-6186 (10^th Dist.).

The court rejected Kreitzer’s argument and denied the writ. The court found Kreitzer’s March 2022 motion, which was the only decision properly before the Commission and the court, did not raise any claims about legal error or request continuing jurisdiction. The court emphasized the Industrial Commission is not required to reopen old awards without new and changed medical evidence, and here, Kreitzer relied entirely on a report from 2008 that had already been considered. The court explained that Autozone and Parsec do not create a blanket rule that surgical removal of a lens requires a finding of total vision loss. Rather, such determinations depend on medical evidence showing the extent of vision loss attributable to the injury, measured before corrective surgery. The Court distinguished these cases from Kreitzer’s situation by clarifying the court in Parsec relied on a finding that the claimant had sustained a total loss of vision prior to surgery. In Autozone, the court specifically held a physician’s finding that claimant was legally blind supported a determination for total loss.

To establish a claim for award under RC. 4123.57 (B), Kreitzer needed to submit medical evidence showing the amount of vision loss. Because Kreitzer submitted no new evidence to demonstrate an increase in loss, he was not entitled to an increase in scheduled-loss compensation for total loss of vision. The Industrial Commission’s denial was supported and the court overruled Kreitzer's objections.

Temporary Total Compensation

State ex rel. Camp v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 2025-Ohio-464 (February 13, 2025)

On June 13, 2017, Adam Camp sustained a work-related injury while lifting a propane cylinder during his employment. His workers’ compensation claim was initially allowed for the following physical conditions: bilateral inguinal hernia without obstruction or gangrene, not current; post op seroma inguinal area; and mononeuropathy ilioinguinal left lower extremity. Camp was awarded temporary total disability compensation (“TTD”) starting on June 14, 2017, and underwent hernia surgery in July.

In May 2019, Gururau Sudarshan, M.D., filed two MEDCO-14 forms indicating Camp could return to work part-time with restrictions and was a candidate for vocational rehabilitation. On August 7, 2019, Paul T. Hogya, M.D., issued a report finding Camp had reached maximum medical improvement for the allowed conditions and could perform light-duty work with restrictions. Following this report, Camp’s employer filed a C-86 motion to terminate TTD which was heard before the Industrial Commission. A District Hearing Officer (“DHO”) issued an order terminating TTD, effective October 8, 2019. Camp did not return to work or participate in vocational rehabilitation following this determination.

On November 12, 2020, Camp filed a motion to amend his claim to include the psychological conditions of unspecified depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, following a report by Jennifer Stoeckel, Ph.D., who found Camp suffered from these conditions as a result of accident. The Commission allowed the additional conditions in October 2021. Dr. Stoeckel completed additional MEDCO-14 forms, certifying Camp’s inability to work due to the newly allowed conditions from November 2, 2020, through April 6, 2022. Camp subsequently filed a motion requesting TTD compensation for this period.

A DHO granted the request, finding the Camp was unable to work and suffering a wage loss as a direct result of the allowed psychological conditions. The DHO awarded TTD compensation from November 2, 2020, through March 23, 2022, and continuing with the submission of proof. Ferrellgas, Inc., appealed the decision, arguing Camp was not eligible for TTD because he had not been working prior to the onset of the psychological conditions and had failed to seek work or vocational rehabilitation after being found at MMI in 2019.

A Staff Hearing Officer (“SHO”) vacated the DHO’s order and denied TTD compensation. The SHO emphasized that Camp had not worked in any capacity since being found at MMI in 2019 and had not demonstrated that his failure to return to work or seek rehabilitation was due to the allowed conditions. The SHO concluded Camp’s wage loss beginning November 2, 2020, was due to his failure to return to the workforce, not the newly allowed conditions. The Commission refused further appeal and denied Camp’s request for reconsideration.

Camp filed a mandamus action, seeking an order compelling the Commission to award TTD compensation. He argued that under R.C. 4123.56(F), as amended in 2020, the Commission improperly applied the voluntary abandonment doctrine by focusing on his employment status prior to the onset of the psychological conditions. Camp relied on the Tenth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Autozone Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2023-Ohio-633, which held that R.C. 4123.56(F) focuses on whether the claimant is unable to work due to the allowed conditions during the claimed period, without regard to prior employment status.

The magistrate, relying on Autozone, focused on whether Camp was unable to work during the requested period of TTD compensation due to his allowed psychological conditions. The magistrate emphasized once Camp became medically unable to work due to those conditions, the reasons he had not been working prior to that point, such as his return to work after reaching MMI for his allowed physical conditions, were irrelevant. The magistrate concluded Camp’s inability to work was directly caused by his psychological conditions and recommended granting writ of mandamus to award TTD.

However, while Camp’s case was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Tenth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Autozone, clarifying that R.C. 4123.56(F) requires a claimant to show the inability to work is not only caused by the allowed conditions but also not due to reasons unrelated to the injury. The Court stated the inability to work must be directly caused by an impairment arising from an injury and not caused by reasons unrelated to the allowed injury. If an injured worker is not employed for reasons unrelated to their approved injury, the worker is not entitled to wage loss compensation, even if the injury later causes a new or additional disability.

Applying the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the Tenth District found that although Camp’s psychological conditions rendered him unable to work starting November, 2020, he had already been out of the workforce for over a year due to reasons unrelated to those conditions. The court concluded Camp’s wage loss was not a direct result of the allowed psychological conditions but rather his failure to return to work after reaching MMI for his physical injuries. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus, holding Camp was not entitled to TTD compensation because his wage loss stemmed from reasons unrelated to the allowed conditions in the claim.

© Copyright 2025 by Christopher Ward and Raymond Tarasuck Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

Judge Julie A. Martin Elected Presiding Judge of Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court

The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court recently announced that Judge Julie A. Martin has been elected by her fellow judges to serve as the Court’s next presiding judge. Her two-year term will begin on July 1, 2025, and run through June 30, 2027, pending official approval by the Nebraska Supreme Court.

Judge Martin has served on the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court since 2015 and was most recently retained by Nebraska voters in the November 2024 election. The presiding judge is elected every two years by the court’s six judges, each of whom is initially appointed by the governor and then stands for retention by the electorate in six-year terms.

As presiding judge, Judge Martin will oversee the administrative functions of the court and help ensure the effective operation of Nebraska’s workers’ compensation system — which provides crucial protections and benefits for employees who suffer work-related injuries or illnesses.

For more information about the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court or to learn more about workers’ compensation in Nebraska, visit www.wcc.ne.gov or call the court’s Information Line at 402-471-6468 or 800-599-5155 (toll free).

LEGISLATIVE AND CASE LAW UPDATE

Senate Bill 190 is a workers compensation bill passed this 2025 session. It allows the Utah Labor Cimmission to establish a fee schedule for hospitals which may charge for services based on Medicare reimbursement rates if the commission so determines. This bill also prohibits balance billing by Hospitals.

House Bill 301 is another workers compensation bill that passed. It provides for a maximum base rate at which ground ambulances can charge workers compensation and health insurers for ambulance services and provides that mileage rates will be set by rule. This bill also prohibits balance billing.

Darden Restaurant v. Chinyu James Sun v. Labor Commission, 2024 UT App 153 (Issued Oct. 24, 2024)

                Chinyu James Sun suffered injuries in July of 2020 to his neck and right shoulder when he slipped and fell while carrying a tub of ice, causing him to hit his head on a wall and right shoulder on an ice machine. Although his whole upper body was hurting, his right shoulder injury was the worst. Sun did not file a formal accident report but alleged that he informed the Darden Restaurant management in a voicemail the day of the accident. Following an evidentiary hearing in which the Darden director denied getting a voicemail about the accident, the Utah Labor Commission Administrative Law Judge determined that Sun failed to give timely notice within 180 days of his injury as required under Utah Code. Ann. §34A-2-407. On Motion for Review, the Labor Commission Appeals Board concluded that because Sun was not aware his cervical injury was likely caused by the accident until February 2021, there was no prejudice to Darden, and the neck claim was not time barred. However, the Board affirmed the ALJ decision as to the right shoulder claim. Darden appealed the determination that the neck claim was not time barred. Sun filed a cross-petition arguing that the shoulder claim should not have been dismissed because of untimely notice. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s decision to dismiss the shoulder claim but set aside the Board’s decision to allow the neck claim. The Court reasoned that, under rules of statutory construction of the provision of the reporting statute, that a claim is barred if the injured worker fails to notify the employee within 180 days of the day on which the injury occurs. Sun’s reliance upon earlier case law interpreting an earlier statute was rejected because the legislature had removed the language allowing full benefits if there was no prejudice to the employer.

C.R. England Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2024 UT App 170 (Issued Nov. 15, 2024)

                Jeziah Johnson (Johnson) was resting in a sleeper berth traveling down the road when his co-driver had to swerve to miss another vehicle. The rollover caused Johnson to sustain both low back pain and an unspecified head injury. Respondents medical evaluation concluded that Johnson sustained only a concussion, an eyebrow laceration, and a low back strain/sprain as a result of the accident. Johson’s neurologist concluded that, in addition to injuries noted above, Johnson suffered headaches, anxiety and depression because of the accident. 

                The Utah Labor Commission’s Administrative Law Judge referred the issues of causation to a medical panel. The medical panel concluded the accident caused headaches and permanently aggravated psychological injuries. The panel also mentioned that Johnson smoked cannabis which also could be contributing to his conditions. The Respondents objected to the report which suggested two reasons for the psychological injuries: namely, both the accident and the cannabis use. The ALJ agreed and requested that the medical panel clarify the report. The medical panel agreed that the cannabis use did indeed worsen Johson’s conditions but that it only worsened those conditions already caused by the accident. The ALJ ultimately awarded benefits, and, on Motion for Review, the Labor Commission affirmed. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that there was substantial evidence supporting the decisions of the Labor Commission and that Johnson could prevail on the issue of causation simply by showing that the accident was a cause, and not necessarily the only cause, of Johnson’s injuries.

Waxies Enterprises inc. v. Thomas Halladay, 2025 UT App 7 (Issued Jan. 16, 2025)

                Thomas Halladay and Waxies Enterprises entered into a settlement agreement that included a Medicare Set Aside Allocation (MSA). After the settlement agreement was approved by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Waxies asked Halladay to sign two additional documents that would allow Waxies to assign its ongoing obligations under the MSA to a third party and to provide payments that would last 14 years, but only if Halladay was still living. Halladay refused to sign these documents. Halliday’s view was that the settlement agreement specifically provided for payments to be made so long as he lived which could be longer than 14 years. Waxies asked the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) to either compel Halladay to sign the additional documents or, in the alternative to set aside the settlement agreement entirely and for Halladay to reimburse the funds already paid under the settlement agreement. The ALJ assigned to the case rejected these options. On a Motion for Review the Commission’s Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision. On judicial review, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that because there was not a meeting of the minds on how long the yearly benefits were to be paid under the MSA, the Commission had authority under its continuing jurisdiction to set aside the settlement agreement due to a lack of a meeting of the minds on a material provision. The Court also instructed the Commission to “revisit” the issue of whether there was a meeting of the minds.

© Copyright 2025 by Ford G. Scalley, Scalley Reading Bates Hansen & Rasmussen, P.C.

NEW WORKERS' COMPENSATION RATE EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2025

The state of Delaware, Department of Labor, Secretary of Labor, LaKresha Moultrie, has announced that the average weekly wage (AWW) in Delaware for the calendar year 2025 is $1,386.46. This wage figure was derived from data from employers participating in the State’s unemployment insurance system.

Based on this weekly wage figure, the maximum weekly worker’s compensation rate will be $924.31. The minimum workers’ compensation rate will be $308.11. The daily rates are as follows:

Effective July 1, 2025

Wage of $1,386.46 and over:

Maximum $924.31

Day 1: $132.05

Day 2: $264.09

Day 3: $396.14

Day 4: $528.18

Day 5: $660.23

Day 6: $792.27

Day 7: $924.31

Minimum $308.11

STATE OF DELAWARE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RATE CHART HISTORY

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2025

AWW $1,386.46 Maximum $924.31 Minimum $308.11

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2024

AWW $1,328.01 Maximum $885.34 Minimum $295.12

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2023

AWW $1,301.27 Maximum $867.52 Minimum $289.18

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2022

AWW $1,234.04 Maximum $822.70 Minimum $274.24

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2021

AWW $1,196.64 Maximum $797.96 Minimum $265.99

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2020

AWW $1,121.49 Maximum $747.66 Minimum $249.22

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2019

AWW $1,088.84 Maximum $725.89 Minimum $241.96

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2018

AWW $1,070.48 Maximum $713.65 Minimum $237.88

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2017

AWW $1,030.49 Maximum $686.99 Minimum $229.00

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2016

AWW $1,034.18 Maximum $689.45 Minimum $229.82

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2015

AWW $1,019.44 Maximum $679.63 Minimum $226.54

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2014

AWW $998.35 Maximum $665.57 Minimum $221.86

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2013

AWW $991.19 Maximum $660.79 Minimum $220.26

EFFECTIVE JULY 2, 2012

AWW $967.52 Maximum $645.01 Minimum $215.00

EFFECTIVE JUNE 13,2011

AWW $933.08 Maximum $622.05 Minimum $207.35

EFFECTIVE JUNE 22,2010

AWW $914.73 Maximum $609.82 Minimum $203.27

EFFECTIVE JUNE 16,2009

AWW $916.00 Maximum $610.67 Minimum $203.55

EFFECTIVE JUNE 3, 2008

AWW $907.73 Maximum $605.15 Minimum $201.72

EFFECTIVE JUNE 7, 2007

AWW $888.38 Maximum $592.25 Minimum $197.42

EFFECTIVE JUNE 7, 2006

AWW $857.46 Maximum $571.64 Minimum $190.55

EFFECTIVE JUNE 6, 2005

AWW $815.29 Maximum $543.53 Minimum $181.18

EFFECTIVE MAY 21, 2004

AWW $785.75 Maximum $523.83 Minimum $174.61

EFFECTIVE JUNE 4, 2003

AWW $760.21 Maximum $506.81 Minimum $168.94

EFFECTIVE JUNE 14, 2002

AWW $737.35 Maximum $491.57 Minimum $163.86

EFFECTIVE JUNE 20, 2001

AWW $703.65 Maximum $469.10 Minimum $156.37

EFFECTIVE JUNE 12, 2000

AWW $674.40 Maximum $449.60 Minimum $149.87

EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1999

AWW $652.02 Maximum $434.68 Minimum $144.89

EFFECTIVE JUNE 11, 1998

AWW $616.67 Maximum $411.11 Minimum $137.04

EFFECTIVE JUNE 18, 1997

AWW $588.69 Maximum $392.46 Minimum $130.82

EFFECTIVE JUNE 3, 1996

AWW $558.35 Maximum $372.23 Minimum $124.08

EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1995

AWW $535.79 Maximum $357.10 Minimum $119.06

EFFECTIVE JUNE 14, 1994

AWW $519.25 Maximum $346.17 Minimum $115.39

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1993

AWW $508.94 Maximum $339.29 Minimum $113.10

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1992

AWW $491.75 Maximum $327.83 Minimum $109.28

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1991

AWW $468.58 Maximum $312.39 Minimum $104.13

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1990

AWW $445.81 Maximum $297.21 Minimum $ 99.07

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1989

AWW $420.96 Maximum $280.64 Minimum $ 93.55

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1988

AWW $397.71 Maximum $265.14 Minimum $ 88.38

EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1987

AWW $375.79 Maximum $250.53 Minimum $ 83.51

EFFECTIVE JUNE 5, 1986

AWW $366.33 Maximum $244.22 Minimum $ 81.41

EFFECTIVE JUNE 3, 1985

AWW $353.53 Maximum $235.69 Minimum $ 78.56

EFFECTIVE JUNE 15, 1984

AWW $347.45 Maximum $231.64 Minimum $ 77.22

EFFECTIVE JUNE 7, 1983

AWW $335.66 Maximum $223.78 Minimum $ 74.59

EFFECTIVE JUNE 1, 1982

AWW $312.66 $208.45 Minimum $ 69.47

A routine annual adjustment to workers’ compensation rates goes into effect on July 1, 2025. These changes—as required by Alabama Code § 25‑5‑68—are based on statewide average weekly wage data as determined by the Alabama Department of Workforce.

• Maximum weekly compensation rate: $1,172

• Minimum weekly compensation rate: $322

These updated figures reflect increases of $42 and $11, respectively, from the previous rates of $1,130 and $311 set on July 1, 2024.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.