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Significant debate and litigation have continued to stem
from the Iowa legislature’s 2017 amendment to Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(v) and
its impact on an injured worker’s entitlement to a traditional industrial
disability analysis. Attorneys Lee Hook, Michael Roling, Christopher Spencer,
and Morgan Todd Borron of Peddicord Lillis recently had the opportunity to
bring a case before the Iowa Supreme Court to clarify just that.
An injury is unscheduled if it is an injury “other than
those . . . described or referred to in paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u’” of §
85.34(2). See Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). Prior to the 2017 amendment, all
unscheduled injuries were considered a “whole person” or “body as a whole”
injury, which result in industrial disability analysis.
When the legislature amended § 85.34(2)(v) in 2017, it
retained the only existing sentence and added three new sentences to the end of
the subsection; the statute is now comprised of a total of four sentences. The
first two sentences of § 85.34(2)(v) provide a default rule for compensating
nonscheduled injuries—that is, such injuries are to be compensated based on the
reduction in the employee’s earning capacity (i.e., industrial disability).
Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v). This was the default rule prior to the 2017 amendment
of this statute. Central to the ongoing debate and litigation were the
legislature’s addition of the third and fourth sentences to Iowa Code §
85.34(2)(v) as a part of the 2017 amendments. Together, the third and fourth
sentences provide:
[3] If an employee who is eligible for compensation
under this paragraph returns to work or is offered work for which the employee
receives or would receive the same or greater salary, wages, or earnings than
the employee received at the time of the injury, the employee shall be
compensated based only upon the employee's functional impairment resulting from
the injury, and not in relation to the employee's earning capacity. [4] Notwithstanding section
85.26, subsection 2, if an employee who is eligible for compensation under this
paragraph returns to work with the same employer and is compensated based only
upon the employee's functional impairment resulting from the injury as provided
in this paragraph and is terminated from employment by that employer, the award
or agreement for settlement for benefits under this chapter shall be reviewed
upon commencement of reopening proceedings by the employee for a determination
of any reduction in the employee's earning capacity caused by the employee's
permanent partial disability.
Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v) (numerical designations identified
in bolded brackets added).
In Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan, the Iowa
Supreme Court reversed the Commissioner’s finding (which was affirmed by the
District Court and Iowa Court of Appeals in a 2-1 split decision) that Claimant
Dungan was entitled to an award of industrial disability under Iowa Code §
85.34(2)(v), based on earning capacity rather than functional impairment. In
applying section 85.34(2)(v) in a straightforward manner, the Court stated:
Under sentences 1 and 2, Dungan’s back injury would
ordinarily be compensated according to the industrial method, based on “the
reduction in the employee’s earning capacity caused by the disability.” Iowa
Code § 85.34(2)(v). However, Dungan “return[ed] to work . . . for which [he]
receive[d] or would receive the same or greater salary, wages, or earnings than
[he] received at the time of the injury.” Id. Therefore, under sentence
3, he should be compensated “based only upon [his] functional impairment resulting
from the injury, and not in relation to [his] earning capacity.” Id. Finally,
Dungan was not “terminated from employment” by Den Hartog, so sentence 4
doesn’t apply, and there is no review-reopening. Id. In other words,
when all is said and done, Dungan should be compensated based on his functional
impairment, as dictated by sentence 3, not loss of earning capacity.
Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan, No. 23-1402 at *8, __ N.W.3d __ (Iowa 2025). The Supreme Court then vacated the Court of Appeals Decision, District Court Decision, and remanded the case to the Commissioner with instructions to calculate Claimant Dungan’s entitlement to benefits based on his functional impairment. Dungan, No. 23-1402 at *12, __ N.W.3d __ (Iowa 2025).