State News : Iowa

Steven J. Bell Jr. v. 3E a/k/a Electrical & Engineering Co., and Travelers Indemnity/CT, Court of Appeals of Iowa, No. 14-0044

On March 19, 2010, Claimant, Steven Bell Jr., was working as an “inside sales” representative for Electrical & Engineering Co. (3E) when he slipped and fell in the 3E lobby. The fall resulted in a left wrist sprain, a trauma-induced ganglion cyst, lower back strain, and a contusion to the left shoulder and elbow. Claimant underwent surgery to remove the cyst from his wrist in early May and continued physical therapy for his wrist and shoulder. After leaving physical therapy in mid-May 2010, Claimant returned at the end of the month complaining of increased back pain. An MRI done on Claimant’s back revealed no problems or “abnormalities of the lumbar spine.” On June 24, 2010, Claimant was released to work without restrictions. 

On June 4, 2010, Claimant filed a petition with the workers’ compensation commission. The deputy found Claimant’s accident left him with a five percent industrial disability. On October 15, 2012, the commissioner adopted the findings of the deputy. Claimant sought judicial review, and on July 9, 2013, the district court affirmed the commissioner on all grounds. Claimant now appeals.

Claimant argues the commissioner erred in not considering his possible career as a firefighter in determining his lost earning capacity. Claimant received a degree in fire and science technology in 1997 and passed the examinations required to serve as a firefighter, but had not applied for any firefighter positions since 1997. He claims the workers’ compensation statute does not require an employee to have pursued a particular position to establish he or she has the capacity to perform it. The Court of Appeals agrees with the district court’s analysis in finding that the commissioner “properly considered the fact of [Claimant]’s minimal work experience as a firefighter when he chose not to include any lost earning capacity from employment as a firefighter.”

Claimant also claims the commissioner failed to make the credibility findings required by Iowa Code section 17A.16 (2011). The Court of Appeals finds the agency complied with section 17A.16, noting, “We do not hold the commissioner to technical compliance with this provision as long as we can determine where finding of facts end and conclusions of law begin or otherwise can track the commissioner’s analytical process.” The agency decision is divided into a finding-of-fact section and a conclusion-of-law section. The decision logically sets forth the commissioner’s thought process. The decision gives specific findings on Claimant’s credibility and while other credibility findings are not explicit, they can be discerned from the direction of the analysis.

Claimant also argues the issue of permanent disability was not ripe for adjudication because the doctors did not find he had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) for his back injury. The Court of Appeals finds the commissioner’s decision that Claimant had reached MMI was supported by substantial evidence. In an independent medical examination, a doctor opined the Claimant had reached MMI for his back in June 2010 and only suggested future treatment for pain management; ongoing pain does not extend the healing period if it does not decrease the industrial disability.

Douglas Moad, By his Wife Sharon Moad, v. Gary Jensen Trucking, Inc., Court of Appeals of Iowa, No. 14-0164

Claimant, Douglas Moad, worked as a truck driver for Gary Jensen Trucking, Inc. On December 1, 2008, Claimant was driving his truck within the course of his employment when an SUV driver drove his SUV across the median and struck Claimant’s truck head-on. The other driver died at the scene. Claimant died roughly three months later. Thereafter, Claimant’s wife Sharon filed a claim for workers’ compensation death benefits on Claimant’s behalf, asserting the injuries from his December accident were the cause of his eventual death. Defendant admitted Claimant suffered injuries in his accident, but it denied that those injuries caused or contributed to Claimant’s death.

A hearing was held before a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner in September 2012. Several conflicting expert opinions were offered on the cause of Claimant’s death. Dr. Bruce, the cardiologist who treated Claimant the day of his demise, testified it was his opinion that Claimant’s probable cause of death was a massive pulmonary embolus, though it was also possible he died from a massive myocardial infarction. Dr. Watt testified that the consequences from Claimant’s accident could lead to the tendency to have a pulmonary embolus. The employer’s expert, Dr. Ronald Vessey, opined it was “most probable” that Claimant “died of the sudden death syndrome secondary to having developed an acute event.” Sharon’s expert, Dr. Dan Fintel, a cardiologist, concluded that “a cardiac etiology was the most likely cause of [Claimant’s] persistent chest discomfort, and was a direct consequence of the motor vehicle accident.”

In November 2012, the deputy commissioner entered his decision denying Sharon’s claim. The deputy noted the opinions of Drs. Vessey and Fintel and stated that the “opinions of both doctors are possible scenarios, and perhaps equally persuasive (reading Dr. Fintel’s opinions in the best light). However, the claimant has the burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Sharon appealed the deputy’s decision, and the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner affirmed the decision. Sharon then filed a petition for judicial review of the commissioner’s decision, challenging the agency’s factual findings, its legal conclusions, and its application of facts to the law. Following a contested hearing, the district court entered its judicial review ruling reluctantly affirming the agency decision.

The Court of Appeals affirms the district court’s ruling, finding substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Sharon did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Claimant’s accident was a cause of his tragic death. The commissioner relied upon Dr. Vessey’s opinion that Claimant was simply “one of the 250,000-300,000 Americans who die every year of cardiovascular collapse.” Consequently, the agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and the Court of Appeals cannot conclude the agency’s decision to accept Dr. Vessey’s opinion over the other experts was irrational.

Sharon Moad, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Douglas Moad, et al., v. Richard Libby, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Matthew Libby, et al., and Dakota Truck Underwriters, et al., Court of Appeals of Iowa, No. 14-0290

Douglas Moad was a resident of South Dakota. He was employed as a truck driver by a South Dakota trucking company, Dakota Truck Underwriters (DTU). Pursuant to South Dakota law, DTU voluntarily paid workers’ compensation benefits to Moad arising out of a work-related traffic accident occurring in Iowa. Douglas Moad accepted the workers’ compensation benefits paid by DTU. Douglas deceased several months after the traffic accident. Sharon sought workers’ compensation benefits in Iowa. She also filed this civil suit against the motorist causing the traffic accident. DTU intervened in this case, asserting a workers’ compensation subrogation lien for the benefits paid to Douglas. Ultimately, Sharon settled this case with the underinsured and uninsured motorist insurance carriers and moved to strike the subrogation lien on the settlement proceeds. The parties agreed that DTU had a right to reimbursement if South Dakota law controlled the subrogation question and no right to reimbursement if Iowa law controlled the subrogation question.

The district court held Iowa law applied and granted Sharon’s motion to extinguish DTU’s lien. DTU appealed. In the first appeal, the supreme court concluded the district court and this court incorrectly analyzed the conflict of laws issue. The supreme court remanded the case “to the district court to consider the extent to which section 185 of the Restatement (Second) applies in this case.” The district court concluded Restatement (Second) section 185 applied to this case, concluded that South Dakota law controlled the subrogation question, and held that DTU had a valid lien against the settlement proceeds under South Dakota law for compensation benefits already paid to Moad.

Sharon timely appealed the district court’s order. Sharon first contends the district court erred in concluding Restatement (Second) section 185 was applicable to this case. Section 185 provides as follows:

"The local law of the state under whose workmen’s compensation statute an employee has received an award for an injury determines what interest the person who paid the award has in any recovery for tort or wrongful death that the employee may obtain against a third person on account of the same injury."

Sharon contends an “award” can only be paid following an adjudicative determination of entitlement to benefits, and as DTU voluntarily paid workers’ compensation benefits, section 185 is inapplicable. The Court of Appeals disagrees, finding that Sharon’s interpretation of section 185 is too narrow. Sound policy reasons actually militate against Sharon’s interpretation of section 185; it is at odds with workers’ compensation schema, generally, to adopt a rule that incents employers and insurance carriers to contest claims for no reason other than to preserve subrogation rights.

Sharon also argues that South Dakota law should not determine the subrogation issue because she filed in Iowa a workers’ compensation claim for benefits related to Douglas’s death. The Court of Appeals disagrees, stating that the fact that Sharon sought additional benefits in Iowa is not at all relevant to whether DTU has subrogation rights for benefits already paid pursuant to another state’s law.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals finds the district court did not err in applying section 185 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike the lien. The case is remanded to determine the amount of the lien.

Heritage Care and Rehabilitation and Midwest Employer’s Insurance Company v. Debra True, Court of Appeals of Iowa, No. 14-0579 

Claimant, Debra True, began working in 2007 as a dietary aide for the employer. She injured her right shoulder while taking out the trash in 2010. Medical treatment was provided for a short time. Claimant did not miss any days of work due to the injury, so no weekly workers’ compensation benefits were paid. On March 1, 2011, Claimant filed a petition with the workers’ compensation commissioner seeking medical benefits under Iowa Code section 85.27 (2011) for the injury. The case was set for a hearing on February 24, 2012.

Prior to that hearing on January 20, 2012, Claimant filed a motion to amend her petition to include a claim for temporary and permanent disability benefits. Claimant also submitted, and the commission accepted, a $100.00 filing fee. The case proceeded to hearing on February 24, 2012, where it was brought to the deputy’s attention that the $100.00 filing fee was paid and accepted with the motion to amend. Because the fee was accepted, the deputy concluded the agency had deemed the motion to amend to be a petition in arbitration, that filing had occurred prior to the running of the statute of limitations, and therefore, Claimant should be permitted to make a claim for weekly benefits.

After the hearing, the deputy issued a decision awarding a thirty-percent industrial disability to Claimant. The employer appealed to the commissioner, who summarily affirmed the award of benefits and also affirmed the deputy’s decision regarding the motion to amend. The employer filed a judicial review petition with the district court challenging the agency’s ruling on the statute of limitations issue and the award of benefits. The district court affirmed the agency’s decision, and the employer now appeals.

The Court of Appeals concludes the agency’s decision to permit the amendment is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. The employer asserts this ruling was in error because Claimant was required to file an original notice and petition for permanency benefits prior to the statute of limitations running, not just a motion to amend. However, there is no statutory or administrative rule requiring Claimant to file a separate petition for each type of workers’ compensation benefit she seeks from the employer arising out of the same injury. The commissioner concluded a motion to amend was the proper procedural course to take when a petition alleging the same injury for the same date against the same employer is already on file, and the Court of Appeals agrees.

The Court of Appeals also concludes substantial evidence supports the factual findings of the agency and the agency’s award of thirty percent industrial disability is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. The deputy commission assigned a thirty percent industrial disability after  concluding Claimant has clearly lost earning capacity as she is now restricted from overhead and heavy work activities. The deputy noted Claimant’s age and the fact that she had to give up her part-time work. The deputy also stated that the restrictions imposed would preclude Claimant from some food server and food preparation jobs that were in her prior work experience. The Court of Appeals therefore affirms the district court's judicial review decision affirming the agency's award of workers' compensation benefits.