NWCDN Members regularly post articles and summary judgements in workers’ compensations law in your state.
Select a state from the dropdown menu below to scroll through the state specific archives for updates and opinions on various workers’ compensation laws in your state.
Contact information for NWCDN members is also located on the state specific links in the event you have additional questions or your company is seeking a workers’ compensation lawyer in your state.
By: Kisa P. Sthankiya
In Panda Express, Inc. v.
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2025 IL App (4th) 240771WC-U, the Workers’ Compensation Division
of the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of
Boone County and reinstated the decision of the Commission.
The claimant on September 25,
2018 was training new workers on how to properly transfer hot oil from the
fryer to the disposal area. The hot oil
spilled onto the claimant’s feet, primarily onto his left foot and ankle. It also splashed onto his right foot.
The claimant was treated for his
burns which were assessed to be at the third degree. The claimant was hospitalized through October
9, 2018. At discharge, his final
diagnoses were a third degree burn of multiple sites of the left ankle and
foot, second degree burn of multiple sites of the right ankle and foot and
cellulitis of the left lower limb.
The claimant treated through May 8,
2019 when he was released to return back to work full duty.
At the time of trial, claimant
was no longer working a second job transporting gutters to local building
sites. The claimant admitted that the
right foot burns were less severe and had “kind of disappeared.” However, the burns to his left foot were
primarily on the top and side of the left foot.
The size of the skin graft was approximately 8” x 4” in size. The skin graft area was markedly different
from the surrounding skin with shiny appearance and no hair growth. The right foot also exhibited circular burn
areas on the top of the foot and ankle.
The burn areas on the feet and left leg were shown to the arbitrator and
counsel. Photographs were also submitted
into evidence of the burns.
The arbitrator found that
claimant had sustained disfiguring injuries to both of his feet and his left
leg, and awarded 58 weeks of disfigurement benefits pursuant to Section 8(c) of
the Act. Specifically, the arbitrator
awarded 10 weeks of disfigurement of the left leg, 3 weeks of disfigurement of
the right foot and 45 weeks of disfigurement of the left foot. The five factors under Section 8.1(b) were
not addressed as the arbitrator noted he was not awarding any permanency under
that provision. The Commission affirmed
and adopted the arbitrator’s decision in its entirety.
The employer appealed the
Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court of Boone County who held that the
claimant was not entitled to benefits for disfigurement under Section 8(c) of
the Act because that section does not authorize benefits for disfiguring
injuries to the feet. The Circuit Court
held that the foot was not covered under the list of body parts under Section
8(c). Relying on the medical dictionary
definition of leg, the Circuit Court could not conclude that the foot would be
considered as part of the leg below the knee.
The Circuit Court instead awarded PPD benefits under Section 8(d)(2) of
the Act.
On appeal to the Appellate Court,
the employer challenged the Commission award for benefits for disfigurement to
the claimant’s feet under Section 8(c) because disfigurement of the foot was
not listed as a compensable injury under the section. The employer further argued that benefits
under Section 8(d)(2) only applied if the claimant had sustained serious and
permanent injury “not covered by either Section 8(c) or 8(e).” The employer further argued that the claimant
failed to present evidence of impairment of his foot which would have entitled
him to benefits under Section 8(e).
The key issue presented to the
court was whether the foot is included within the definition of “leg below the
knee” under Section 8(c) of the statute.
The court had to ascertain and give affect to the intent of the
legislature. The best indicator of the
legislature’s intent was the plain language of the statute itself which would
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
The court reviewed the definition
of the leg under multiple sources including website citations to RxList, Health
Line, Meriam Webster online dictionary, Britannica and Wikipedia. They noted that all of these sources included
the foot as part of the leg. The court rejected
the employer’s argument that the medical textbook definition should be followed
which defines the leg as a part of the body extending from below the knee to
only the ankle. The court noted that words in legislative enactment should be
given their commonly understood meaning as used by the public as opposed to the
meaning ascribed to the word by medical specialists. The various sources that the court had cited
explicitly distinguished the common understanding of the word from the
specialized medical terminology and included the foot as part of the leg.
The court addressed the
employer’s argument that Section 8(e) of the Act showed that the legislature
did not intend to define the foot as part of the leg because it listed them as
separate body parts under that section.
The court distinguished 8(e) from 8(c) as 8(e) covered impairment and
not disfigurement. They noted that
impairment differs according to the body part that is injured. Whereas disfigurement could be equally
harmful wherever it occurs.
The court reversed the judgment
of the Circuit of Boone County and reinstated the Commission’s decision
awarding benefits for disfigurement of the left foot, right leg and left leg
under Section 8(c) of the Act.