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By: Kisa P. Sthankiya
The Illinois Supreme Court issued in Bitner v. City of Pekin 2025 IL 131039 on September 18, 2025 finding that the
Illinois Public Employee Disability Act (PEDA), does not prohibit a city from
withholding employment taxes from PEDA benefits.
The plaintiffs in the case were both police officers working
for the City of Pekin and injured in the line of duty in separate accidents.
Both employees received PEDA benefits pursuant to Section 1(b) of PEDA. Section 1(b) provides:
Whenever an eligible employee suffers
any injury in the line of duty which causes him to be unable to perform his
duties, he shall continue to be paid by the employing public entity on the same
basis as he was paid before the injury, with no deduction from his sick
leave credits, compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation, or
service credits in a public employee pension fund during the time he is unable
to perform his duties due to the result of the injury, but not longer than one
year in relation to the same injury. (5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2018)
During the time that the
plaintiffs received PEDA benefits, the City continued to pay the plaintiffs in
the same manner as they were paid prior to their injury and withheld employment
taxes (Federal, State, Social Security and Medicare). The plaintiffs filed a suit in circuit court
of Tazewell County alleging that by withholding the employment taxes, the City
violated the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS
115/1 et seq. (West 2018).
Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment were filed. The circuit court ruled in favor the plaintiff and entered
a judgment to recoup the withheld taxes from the City. The ruling was appealed
to the appellate court. The appellate court determined that based on the plain
language of Section 1(b) did not prohibit the City from withholding
unemployment taxes. They did not reach a conclusion on whether the only remedy
was to seek a refund of the improperly withheld taxes from the IRS. The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case.
The Supreme Court allowed leave
to appeal. There were multiple issues decided at the circuit court and
appellate level. However, the only issue before the Illinois Supreme Court in
the case was whether the Appellate Court erred in its interpretation of Section
1(b).
Relying on language from prior
appellate decisions, including Gibbs v. Madison County Sheriff’s Department,
326 Ill. App. 3d 473 (2001), the plaintiffs argued that section 1(b) provides
for the “continuation of full pay” and that “full pay” should be interpreted to
mean gross pay without employment tax deductions. The Court noted, however,
that the phrase “full pay” appears nowhere in Section 1(b). The proper starting
point for statutory interpretation, it emphasized, is the plain language of the
statute itself. Section 1(b) expressly provides that an eligible employee,
“shall continue to be paid by the employing public entity on the same basis as
he was paid before the injury, with no deduction from his sick leave credits,
compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation.” 5 ILCS 345/1(b).
The Court concluded that the
phrase “on the same basis” was unambiguous and required disability payments be
processed in the same manner as the employee’s pre-injury wages. Thus, if the
employer routinely withheld employment taxes before the injury, those same
deductions must continue post-injury in order to comply with section 1(b).
The statutory language in section
1(b) also lists specific items that cannot be deducted—sick leave, compensatory
time, and vacation credits—but does not mention employment taxes. Applying the interpretive
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court held that the
legislature’s express inclusion of certain prohibited deductions impliedly
excludes others. Accordingly, the omission of employment tax withholding from the
list indicates that such withholdings are permissible.
Plaintiffs argued that this
reading produced an absurd or unjust result because, in their view, PEDA
benefits are exempt from federal income tax, and therefore the withholding of
employment taxes unlawfully reduces the benefit. The Court was unpersuaded by
their argument. It observed that plaintiffs had provided no authority—no IRS
ruling, federal statute, or regulation—establishing that section 1(b) payments
are tax-exempt. Even if such payments were ultimately non-taxable, the Court
reasoned, any excess withholding would not deprive the employee of funds owed
under the Act. Rather, the proper remedy would be for the employee to claim a
tax refund from the IRS or adjust his W-4 withholding status.
Additionally, the Court
underscored the administrative practicality of its interpretation. They noted
that public employers often face operational challenges in administering pay
for police officers and firefighters who move in and out of PEDA status,
sometimes for short periods. Requiring employers to continually assess
taxability and alter withholding practices would create unnecessary complexity
and potential compliance issues. Section 1(b), by directing that pay continue
“on the same basis” as before the injury, actually simplifies administration
and ensures uniformity. The Court noted that other jurisdictions, such as
Massachusetts and North Carolina, have adopted similar frameworks requiring
payment of “in the same manner” as regular compensation for disability
payments.
The Court held that nothing in
section 1(b) prohibits public employers from withholding employment taxes from
disability payments. The employer, therefore, did not violate the statute by
continuing to process payroll in the same manner as pre-injury compensation.
The appellate court’s judgment reversing the circuit court was affirmed.
This decision reinforces that
PEDA does not create an enhanced or tax-exempt benefit beyond continuation of
ordinary salary. Payments should be issued from the regular payroll system and
subject to the same withholdings as the employee’s pre-injury compensation.
The decision also reiterates that
questions regarding whether disability payments are taxable, or whether
withholdings were appropriate, are matters between the employee and the
Internal Revenue Service. Per the decision, ff an employee believes the
payments are exempt from taxation, the appropriate recourse is to adjust tax
withholding by submitting a new W-4 form or to seek a refund directly from the
IRS. This clarification protects municipalities from unwarranted demands for
reimbursement and reinforces that PEDA’s purpose is to ensure income
continuity, not to provide a tax-exempt benefit.