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February 12, 2013
ISSUE 1:
SUPREME COURT SAYS FUENTES “A”
ISSUE 2:
WILKINSON DEAD
FUENTES
Until May 3, 2007, the question of how to compute the value of an award after apportionment under L.C. 4663 / 4664 had been answered / unanswered since April 19, 2004.
The first major landmark in this area was an en banc decision in the Escobedo case rendered April 19, 2005 (petition for Writ of Review later denied). A couple of months later, another en banc decision issued in Nabors on June 9, 2005. This decision would later be overturned by a 1st District Court of Appeal (DCA) decision one year later, June 8, 2006.
In between the 2 decisions in Nabors, the 5th DCA rendered its decision in Dykes on December 20, 2005. In short, the Dykes formula for computing the value of an award after apportionment was the polar opposite of the en banc decision in Nabors. The DCA opinion in Nabors agreed with Dykes.
On August 30, 2006, another panel of justices in the 1st DCA, different from the Nabors panel, issued an opinion inBrodie, basically agreeing with Nabors and Dykes in principle, but changing the formula a little.
A day later, the 3rd DCA weighed in with a 44 page opinion in 4 consolidated cases, referred to as Welcher. This opinion, in no uncertain terms, disagreed with Dykes and Nabors, and found that the original majority opinion in the Nabors en banc set forth the correct formula.
Given this great disparity in the interpretation of the new apportionment law, the Supreme Court granted review inWelcher and companion cases on November 15, 2006.
In related matters, the 3rd DCA, in a published opinion in Kopping dated 9-11-06, had confirmed that the L.C. 4664(b) presumption is indeed a conclusive presumption. The injured worker may not even offer evidence of medical rehabilitation following the prior award. However, the court also clarified that the burden is on the CA to prove overlap. Prior cases (Strong, Sanchez) had burdened the injured worker with disproving overlap.
On May 3, 2007, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Welcher/Brodie et al. Given the circumstances in the several cases before it, the Court addressed calculation of the level of permanent disability after apportionment under L.C. 4664 and also after apportionment under L.C. 4663.
In short, the Court retained what had become known as Fuentes Formula A, which in workers' compensation parlance became "subtracting percentages, not money". That is to say, if the current overall level of disability is 71%, and the employee had a prior award of 63%, the "new" disability would be 8% (71-63). Or, if the overall level of disability is 50%, but only 70% of the causation of disability is industrial and 30% of the causation is non-industrial, the disability is 35% (.7 x 50).
WILKINSON
When L.C. 4750 was repealed 4-19-04, the “(Bauer) Wilkinson Doctrine” – which held that when a worker sustains two or more injuries to the same part of the body [while employed by the same employer], and the condition resulting from the several injuries becomes permanent and stationary at the same time, the worker would be entitled to one over-all level of permanent disability without apportionment – became ancient history.
L.C. 4750 had allowed apportionment for “pre-existing” disability. L.C. 4663 requires apportionment of permanent disability based on CAUSATION. One of the apportioned CAUSES of current disability may be a prior injury which had not yet resulted in a definable disability which “pre-existed” the subject injury.
So concluded the WCAB (en banc) in Benson v. WCAB 72 CCC 1620, a decision affirmed by First DCA 74 CCC 113. On April 29, 2009, the Supreme Court denied review.