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On April 19, 2013, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released its opinion in McAbee Construction, Inc. v. Elvin Allday. At trial, the employee presented evidence that he had worked as a boilermaker since 1986. During that time, he had sustained multiple work related injuries to his back and shoulders. However, the evidence revealed that the employee had fully recovered from those injuries and was working without restriction. During a temporary shutdown of the mill operated by his regular employer, the employee took a job with McAbee Construction and claimed a work accident resulting in injury after only 5 days with his new employer. Initially, the employee claimed only arm and shoulder problems but, a few days later, also claimed back pain. Eventually, the employee underwent a two-level lumbar fusion and a decompressive laminectomy. At trial, the judge considered medical testimony stating that the employee could have experienced the same problems even without a new accident based on his medical history. There was also evidence that the FCE was rendered invalid by symptom magnification. Ultimately, the judge determined that the back injury was compensable and awarded permanent and total benefits for the lifetime of the employee.
On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that there existed substantial evidence to support the permanent and total verdict and, therefore, affirmed that aspect of the judgment. In doing so, it addressed a few issues of interest.
On appeal, the employer asserted that the employee did not provide proper notice of his back injury. The Court of Civil Appeals noted that only notice of the accident is required and that notice of the exact nature of the injury that flows from the accident is not required.
the employer also asserted that the judge improperly related the employee’s claims of depression to the accident because the employee had failed to allege depression in his complaint. The Court of Civil Appeals noted that, while the judge’s order made reference to the testimony of a psychologist, it was for the purpose of explaining the symptom magnification referenced in the FCE. Specifically, it was the opinion of the psychologist that depression can cause or contribute to symptom magnification.
At trial, the employee testified that he chose to work only 40 weeks a year in order to spend more time with his family. As a result, the judge elected not to use one of the three predesignated methods set forth in the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act for computing AWW. Rather, the judge took the amount earned by the employee in the one week he worked for his employer, multiplied it times 40 weeks, and then divided it by 52 weeks. The Court of Civil Appeals agreed that judge’s method was equitable to both parties and was an acceptable deviation from the standard three methods.
The employer asserted and the employee conceded that it was improper for the order to state that benefits were owed for the employee’s lifetime. Therefore, the case was remanded to the judge to revise the order to state that benefits were only owed for the duration of the employee’s permanent disability.
About the Author
This article was written by Michael I. Fish, Esq. of Fish Nelson LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing employers, self-insured employers and insurance carriers in workers’ compensation matters. Fish Nelson is a member of The National Workers’ Compensation Network (NWCDN). If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation issues in general, please feel free to contact the author firstname.lastname@example.org or any firm member at 205-332-3430.