State News

In a recent decision, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reaffirmed an important limitation on workers’ compensation benefits for scheduled-member injuries: an employee cannot avoid the statutory schedule simply by proving that the injury has resulted in substantial vocational disability.

In Harris v. Lineage Logistics, 2026 WL 2207386 (Ala. Civ. App. July 31, 2026), Roderick Harris sustained severe cold exposure at work that resulted in the partial amputation of his right index and middle fingers and his left index finger. The trial court found that Harris was permanently and totally disabled but nevertheless limited his compensation to the benefits provided under Alabama’s schedule for injuries to the fingers.

Harris appealed, arguing that because he was permanently and totally disabled, he should receive benefits based on his vocational disability rather than being restricted to the scheduled-member benefits under Ala. Code § 25-5-57(a)(3).

In rejecting Harris’ position, the Court of Civil Appeals emphasized that it was bound by Alabama Supreme Court precedent. Under Leach Manufacturing Co. v. Puckett and Ex parte Drummond Co., when an injury is confined to a scheduled member and does not extend to or interfere with other parts of the body, the statutory schedule controls compensation.

Importantly, the schedule applies without consideration of vocational disability when the injury does not extend beyond the scheduled member. As Puckett explained, the scheduled amount is intended to fully compensate the employee for the injury, including any resulting loss of earning capacity or inability to obtain employment.

The court also relied on Advantage Sales of Alabama, Inc. v. Clemons, which had previously rejected essentially the same argument Harris presented.

One particularly interesting aspect of Harris is how narrowly the issue was presented to the appellate court.

Although Harris's history included allegations of a cervical-spine injury, the Court noted that he ultimately pursued only the argument that his permanent total disability should permit him to recover outside the schedule. The appellate court therefore did not have before it an argument that the finger injuries extended to and interfered with other parts of the body, nor did Harris rely on the recognized pain exception.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

The Exclusivity Doctrine is alive and well in Alabama that to the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Duke v. Walmart, Inc., 2026 WL 785243 (Ala. Mar. 20, 2026), wherein it affirmed summary judgment in favor of Walmart and its employee, Qeon Gray, after an employee attempted to pursue tort claims arising from an accident for which he had already received workers’ compensation benefits.

Phillip Duke was employed by Walmart and was struck by a Walmart tractor-trailer driven by co-employee Qeon Gray in the parking lot of Walmart's distribution center.  Duke claimed that he was “off duty” and jogging in the parking lot when the accident occurred.

Duke received workers’ compensation benefits, including medical and temporary-total-disability benefits.  He nevertheless filed a civil lawsuit against Walmart and Gray asserting negligence, wantonness, negligent hiring and supervision, and other tort theories.

Walmart moved for summary judgment based on the exclusive-remedy provisions of Alabama's Workers’ Compensation Act, Ala. Code §§ 25-5-52 and 25-5-53.  The trial court granted summary judgment, and Duke appealed.

On appeal, Duke argued that workers’ compensation exclusivity did not apply because he was off duty and was not performing work for Walmart when he was injured.  The Supreme Court rejected that argument because, regardless of whether Duke was technically “off duty,” he had accepted workers’ compensation benefits for the injury.

The Court explained that Alabama law has consistently held that acceptance of workers’ compensation payments constitutes an election that prevents an employee from pursuing another remedy for the same injury.  In short, an employee cannot accept workers’ compensation benefits and then attempt to characterize the same injury as outside the Workers’ Compensation Act in order to pursue tort damages against the employer.

The Court also noted that Walmart established through its records that Duke had received medical, temporary-total-disability, and other workers’ compensation benefits.  That shifted the burden to Duke, who failed to present substantial evidence demonstrating that the Act did not apply.

The Court separately addressed Duke's claims against Gray.

Under Ala. Code § 25-5-11, an employee may pursue a claim against a co-employee in certain circumstances involving willful conduct.  The statute imposes a significantly higher standard than ordinary negligence.

The Court found no evidence that Gray intended to injure Duke or that a reasonable person in Gray's position would have known that injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct.  Although Duke alleged that Gray may have been under the influence of illegal drugs, he failed to present substantial evidence supporting his claim of willful conduct at the summary-judgment stage.  As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

On July 1, 2026, the maximum weekly workers' compensation benefit became $1,219.00 per week, and the minimum weekly compensation rose to $335.00 per week.

It is important to remember that these updated rates apply only to Alabama claims where injuries occurred on or after July 1, 2026. Claims arising from injuries before this date remain governed by the Average Weekly Wage (AWW) in effect at the time of injury.

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

Here is one for the workers’ compensation time capsule.

Maine resident Donald Nadeau suffered a job-related injury on April 28, 1985. He lived another 35 years, dying in September 2020 from complications tied to that injury.  By then, however, much had changed.  Nadeau and Carol Brewster divorced in 1997, and she remarried in 2011.  She received no alimony and was not financially dependent on him when he died, yet she sought workers’ compensation death benefits.

That led to a Maine Supreme Judicial Court decision on August 6, 2026 - more than 41 years after the accident.

Brewster’s position was simple: look at the statute.

The Maine law governing the 1985 accident measured dependency “at the time of his injury.”

According to Verrill Dana, LLP attorney, Elizabeth Connellan Smith, “when this provision was originally included, it was designed to address young widows of woods workers, who in rural Maine, often would be left with no resources if the worker was killed in a logging accident, or widows of workers who were exposed to asbestos and developed asbestosis years later. That rarely happens anymore.”

In 1985, Brewster was unquestionably Nadeau’s dependent wife: they lived together, she worked part time, and they shared finances.

The employer argued she had to be dependent both when Nadeau was injured and when he died. By 2020, she was not: they had been divorced 23 years, she had remarried nine years earlier, and she conceded no economic loss from his death.

Brewster responded that the Legislature chose the date of injury as the dependency date, and courts could not add a second requirement simply because the result seemed counterintuitive.

On August 6, 2026, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the award.

The Court held the statute unambiguous: dependency is determined at injury, not again at death. Because the Legislature expressly used the date of death elsewhere, adding that requirement to § 58 would insert language the Legislature omitted.

WWAD

What would Alabama do?  I am pleased to report that, in Alabama, the interesting dependency issue that occupied the Maine courts would have ended much sooner.

Alabama Code § 25-5-62 focuses on dependency status at the time of death.  So, the fact that they were blissfully married at the time of the accident would not be relevant when considering eligibility for death benefits.  In fact, they could still be married at the time of death and, unless the widow can prove that she was financially dependent on the decedent at the time of death and a reasonable amount of time prior to same, she would not be eligible to receive benefits. 

About the Author:

This article was prepared by Mike Fish, an attorney with Fish Nelson & Holden, LLC, a law firm dedicated to representing self-insured employers, insurance carriers and funds, and third-party administrators in all matters related to workers’ compensation. Fish Nelson & Holden is a member of the National Workers’ Compensation Defense Network. If you have any questions about this article or Alabama workers’ compensation in general, please contact Fish by e-mailing him at mfish@fishnelson.com or by calling him directly at 205-332-1448.

Background

The facts are as follows: Pharmacy filed the Application with the Bureau, and Insurer replied that the prescriptions were the product of a prohibited self-referral, and the Applications were assigned to Hearing Officer. Claimant’s treating physician wrote or supervised the prescriptions for the medications at issue, and acknowledged they have a financial interest in Pharmacy. Pharmacy’s founder, Phillip Shin, testified he owns and serves as managing member of an employee leasing company called Induction Works, which employs the pharmacists who work at Pharmacy, and a management company called Medicine Works. The Hearing Officer found as fact that the business of Shin’s enterprises were commingled. Ultimately, the Hearing Officer concluded the Insurer met its burden of proving a prohibited self-referral because the physician who wrote the prescriptions had an admitted financial interest in Pharmacy. He explained that though pharmacists and pharmaceutical supplies are not specifically mentioned in the anti-referral provision, “goods and services” captures prescriptions for medications.

700 Pharm. v. Bur of WC (State Workers' Ins. Fund) - No. 100 MAP 2024

Summary

Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii) of Act 44 amending the Workers’ Compensation Act, commonly referred to as the Anti-Referral Provision, states that it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The consolidated appeals have presented to the Court the issue of whether the Anti-Referral Provision’s prohibition on self-referrals is limited to the eight enumerated categories of services of if the phrase “good or services” acts as a catch-all category. The Supreme Court held self-referrals were limited to the enumerated list, therefore reversing the holding of the Commonwealth Court.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the Commonwealth Court adopted its prior determination that the Anti-referral Provision could be read as “it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for . . . goods or services.” However, this interpretation only appears reasonable if the phrase “good and services” is read in isolation, but the Supreme Court interprets statutory language in reference to the context which it appears. The proper reading of the Anti-Referral Provision’s plain language is that the phrase “goods or services” modifies the enumerated medical services such that it is necessary to read “good or services” after each enumerated service. For example, “it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for physical therapy… good or services pursuant to this section.” The Court found this was the only interpretation that gives effect to the entirety of the Anti-Referral Provision, and plain language of the statute makes clear the General Assembly did not intend for “good or services” to be a catchall category.

The Court further found that if the General Assembly intended “goods and services” to be included in the list of the eight enumerated services, it would have place an “or” between “diagnostic imaging” and “good and services” to create a list of nine alternative categories of prohibited self-referrals. The Court rejected the notion, as found in Justice McCaffery’s dissent, that the Provision was not ambiguous. The Court noted that only when the plain language of the statute is not explicit may they consider other matters to ascertain the legislature’s intent, such as the mischief to be remedied.

Finally, other provisions of Section 306(f.1)(3) support the Court’s interpretation that self-referrals for prescription drugs and professional pharmaceutical services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s ban. The omission of language regarding prescription drugs and professional pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision while including such language in the provision addressing reimbursement is significant in showing the General Assembly did not intend to include prescription drugs and professional pharmaceutical services in the prohibition. Under the circumstances, omitting those services from the Provision supports the Court’s conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Dissent

Justice Wecht: Justice Wetch finds that a statute cannot be unambiguous if a “proper reading” requires ignoring part of it and that the Majority’s interpretation is plausible only if one ignores the provision’s punctuation. Justice Wetch specifically contends that the last two items on the list (“goods and services”) should not be treated as a single qualifying phrase that modifies the preceding list items, and that “goods” and “services” are the last two list items. He further conceded that the legislature did not need to include the first eight example of prohibited self-referrals as the last two are broad enough to encompass the first eight. Though odd, it is not unheard of for the General Assembly to engage in surplusage. 

Justice McCaffery: Justice McCaffery contends that under a plain reading of the provision, “goods and services” is a catchall phrase, which includes prescription drugs (goods) and pharmaceutical services (services). He further contends the interpretation of the Majority undermines the undisputed intent of the Anti-Referral Provision, which is “to contain costs by preventing physicians from acting in their own self-interest.” Thus, in his view, “goods and services” unambiguously refers to all goods and services in which the provider has a financial interest. Justice McCaffery notes the “mischief to be remedied” by the Anti-referral Provision was to prevent “physicians from acting in their own self-interest” which favors a broad reading of “goods and services.” He further contends that if the General Assembly intended to prohibit self-referrals for drugs and pharmaceutical services, as the Majority asserts, it could have explicitly done so in Section 306(f.1)(3)(vi) which addresses reimbursements for prescription drugs and pharmaceutical service.

Comparison with the Commonwealth Court

700 Pharmacy (Pharmacy) and State Workers’ Insurance Fund (Insurer) cross-petition for review of the decision denying and dismissing five fee review applications Pharmacy brought in connection with prescriptions it filled for a Claimant. Insurer argued the Hearing Officer erred in concluding Pharmacy, staffed by a pharmacist by an employee leasing agency, amounted to a provider as defined by Section 109 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, with standing to bring a fee review application under Section 306(f.1)(5). Pharmacy argued the Hearing Officer erred in concluding the prescriptions forming the basis of the Applications were the product of an unlawful self-referral under Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii). After review, the Court affirmed.

Insurer argued that because Pharmacist is employed by Induction Works and because employee leasing companies are not providers, Pharmacy is therefore not a provider. Pharmacy uses the employee leasing agreements which provides that Pharmacy directed the employees leased by Induction works, and that Pharmacist was acting on behalf of Pharmacy when he dispensed medications.

Both the Commonwealth Court and Supreme Court agree Pharmacy is considered a provider under the Workers’ Compensation Act and could therefore file a fee review application. The key disagreement between the Courts is the meaning of “goods and services” in relation to

In regard to the Anti-Referral provision, Pharmacy argues that because Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii) does not specifically list pharmacies and pharmaceuticals, the anti-referral provision does not encompass them. Furthermore, Pharmacy cited Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., which states that “where the legislature includes specific language in one section of a statute and excludes it from another section, the language may not be implied where excluded.” The Commonwealth Court found that statutory language could be read as, “it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for . . . goods or services.” As such, the language suggests the General Assembly did not intent to restrict the ant-referral provision’s sweep only to the specific items enumerated but as broad language. The Court further reasoned that drugs are “goods” for purposes of the Anti-Referral provision, and ultimately that “goods and services” is sufficiently broad to cover drugs and pharmaceutical services.

As mentioned, the Supreme Court held that “goods and services” does not create a catchall category but instead modifies the eight enumerated categories specifically mentioned in the statute. Since pharmacies and prescriptions drugs are not explicitly mentioned in the statute, the Anti-Referral provision is not triggered the present case.

The Courts further disagreed on the statutory interpretation of the statute. The Commonwealth Court looked towards the dictionary definition of “goods,” leading them to find that drugs are “goods” for purposes of the Anti-Referral provision. The Court further found that the enumerated items were wide-ranging topics across medical disciplines, and that drugs and pharmaceutical services fell within the “same general nature or class of those enumerated.”  Where the Commonwealth Court looked towards dictionary definitions, the Supreme Court focused more heavily on the grammatical structure of the provision as well as the context in which the phrase in contention appeared. The Court further looked to the statute’s plain language when interpreting the provision, and considered the general intent of the General Assembly in enacting the Anti-Referral Provision which was to prevent physicians from acting in their own self-interest. However, the Court concluded general intent does not alter the plain language. As such, the interpretation fails to bar referrals for 

Effective July 1, 2026, the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court has increased the mileage reimbursement rate to 76.0 cents per mile for eligible travel related to workers’ compensation claims.

This updated rate applies to travel for:

• Medical treatment related to a compensable workers’ compensation injury.
• Participation in an approved vocational rehabilitation plan.

The increase reflects the Court's annual adjustment to the mileage reimbursement rate and is important for injured workers, employers, insurers, and claims professionals when calculating reimbursable travel expenses.

What This Means

If an injured employee travels for authorized medical care or vocational rehabilitation on or after July 1, 2026, mileage should be reimbursed at $0.76 per mile.

Parties handling Nebraska workers’ compensation claims should ensure reimbursement practices and internal systems are updated to reflect the new rate.

Need Assistance?

At Caswell, Plager & Westerhold, LLC, we help employers, insurers, and third-party administrators navigate Nebraska workers’ compensation requirements and stay current with changes affecting claims administration.

If you have questions regarding mileage reimbursement or any other workers’ compensation issue, our team is here to help.

Simon Anderson Law P.C.

701 Market Street, Suite 340, St. Louis, MO  63101

314-621-2828

MISSOURI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CASE LAW UPDATE

April 2026 – June 2026

Claim Denied as Claimant’s Fall While Cleaning Coffee Off Shoe Using Sink Counter Not in Course and Scope of Employment

Markovic v. Watlow Electric Manufacturing, Injury No. 22-023333

FACTS: Before a meeting, the Claimant went to the breakfast area to get coffee and spilled coffee on her shoe. She believed this was problematic due to the strong smell of coffee and would be disrespectful to others, which made her uncomfortable. Therefore, she went to the bathroom and attempted to clean the top portion of her shoe and while doing so, she brought her foot up to the sink counter, lost her balance, and fell, striking her left shoulder on the floor. She was taken to Mercy South and Dr. Fisher performed an ORIF of the distal radius and then a carpal tunnel release. The employer denied the case, alleging the injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of the employment, and the Judge agreed, finding that falling while placing a foot on a vanity to clean a coffee-stained shoe was unrelated to employment and equally present in non-employment life, making the injury non-compensable. The Judge compared it to Johme, where the claimant fell in an office kitchen after making a cup of coffee. In that instance, the claimant was injured while turning and twisting her ankle. In that case, the Court held that she was equally exposed to the cause of her injury turning and twisting her ankle or falling off her shoe while in her workplace making coffee than she would have been when she was outside of her workplace in her normal non-employment life.

The Judge went on to note that there was no evidence to refute the proposition that the claimant could encounter a spill, odor, or dim lighting at home or in a public restroom and chose to clean a shoe in a similar manner, facing the same risk of losing her balance.

The Judge went on to note that the claimant’s act of placing her foot on a bathroom vanity to clean her shoe after spilling coffee on it is a risk which she was equally exposed to in her normal non-employment life and therefore the injury was not compensable. The claimant appealed and the Commission confirmed. 

Claimant Entitled to TTD as Termination Due to Violation of Attendance Policy Not Misconduct

Salazar v. Unilever USA, Injury Number 24-097376

FACTS: The claimant sustained an injury to his right ankle on December 13, 2024. The claimant did have preexisting diabetes and obtained a note from his doctor recommending that the claimant be given one to three days off at a time to allow him rest, which he presented to the Employer and he was given an accommodation of allowing one to three days a month as excused absences. The claimant testified that the employer took away his accommodation on February 13, 2025 and did not tell him why, but the HR manager testified that he had exceeded his allotted days off in January. The HR manager testified that on February 3, 2025, she received a new accommodation form from the claimant’s doctor, who recommended three days or more of leave per month if needed and after review, the employer’s legal team determined that this accommodation was no longer reasonable because the prior accommodation had been abused and the current accommodation was too vague. The employer provided a new accommodation allowing for breaks and the claimant accepted the same.

The claimant’s supervisor testified that he had not heard from the claimant about his injury since three days after the injury until March 4, 2025. The injury was reported to the insurance company and treatment was authorized with Dr. Kuhlmann. The doctor’s restrictions were accommodated and the claimant was offered an office job, but he noted the light duty work seemed petty and was retaliatory and he insisted he was not trained for office work. The claimant also alleged his medication made him unable to drive and the employer provided transportation. The claimant was terminated on March 27, 2025 after he incurred ten points in violation of the attendance policy. His supervisor testified extensively about his disciplinary issues and process for termination. He was ultimately terminated for attendance problems, but he had other disciplinary write-ups for conduct or behavior issues. The claimant’s attorney obtained a report of Dr. Zimmerman, who believed the claimant needed additional treatment. Dr. Patel testified on the employer’s behalf and he did not believe the claimant needed any additional treatment and placed him at MMI. At the Hardship Hearing the claimant demanded back pay for wrongful termination, referral to a specialist and TTD benefits until he is released from treatment.

The Judge determined that the claimant was not entitled to additional treatment, as she found Dr. Patel’s opinion more persuasive. The employer alleged that the claimant was terminated for post-injury misconduct and the Judge did not agree. The Judge noted that the termination letter provided to the claimant outlined ten attendance points the claimant accrued; seven of those were related to attendance violations prior to the date of injury and noted that the one unexcused absence after his work injury did not equate to post-injury misconduct. The Judge did believe the claimant was entitled to TTD, from the date he was terminated through the date he was placed at MMI. The Judge also assessed 5% PPD.

The claimant appealed, alleging that the Hardship Hearing was to obtain TTD and medical treatment and did not put PPD as an issue. It was noted on the record at the Hearing that the employer was requesting a Final Award in the event that the Judge did not believe the claimant was entitled to additional medical treatment and therefore PPD was an issue. However, the Commission noted the ALJ lacked authority to resolve the issue of PPD because that issue was not raised in the employee’s Application for Hardship Hearing and the employee’s attorney did not agree to PPD as a disputed issue at the Gearing. The Commission vacated the ALJ’s findings on the issue of PPD and remanded the case to the Division to allow both the claimant and the employer to produce evidence on all issues in dispute and to issue a Final Award.

LDC (Line of Duty Compensation) Claim Not Timely Filed

Williams v. City of Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department, Case No. WD88291 (Mo. App. 2026)

FACTS: The employee, who is deceased, served as a firefighter for 38 years. Due to his exposure to carcinogens, he developed metastatic neuroendocrine carcinoma and multiple myeloma. He passed away on February 23, 2018. The employee’s widow, herein “claimant”, filed her LDC claim on September 25, 2023. The LDC benefit provides a cash benefit to certain public safety officers including firefighters who are killed in the line of duty. The Division denied the claim as it was not timely filed as per the statute it has to be filed within one year from the date of death. The claimant appealed and requested a hearing before an ALJ and the ALJ confirmed the denial. The claimant appealed to the Commission, who affirmed the decision of the ALJ.

The claimant had also filed a workers’ compensation claim and the case went to a hearing and the ALJ issued an Award of Benefits. It was after receiving the workers’ compensation Award that the claimant filed the LDC claim. The claimant appealed the Commission’s denial.

HOLDING: The Claimant essentially argued that the time limit to file an LDC claim is somehow on hold until the work comp case is resolved, and the Court was not persuaded. The Court determined that the LDC and workers’ compensation claims are two separate proceedings and two separate matters. Therefore, the LDC claim was not timely filed and the Commission’s decision was affirmed.

LINCOLN, Neb. - Access to some information on wokers' compensation injury reports for certain parties will change due to confidentiality requirements that become effective July 18, 2026.

Legislative Bill 455 revises NEB. REV. STAT.§ 48-144.01, which requires confidentiality for certain information in an employee's injury report, known as the First Report of Alleged Occupational Injury or Illness (FRO/). Except as provided in § 48-144.01(2), the employee's name, address, phone number, and email address are confidential for 60 days from the report submission date unless the employee waives confidentiality.

The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court has developed forms to verify whether requests for injury report information have been mae new confidentiality requirements.

For more information about workers' compensation in Nebraska, refer to the court's website

{https://www.newcc.gov/) or call our Information Line at 402-471-6468 or 800-599-5155.

On June 12, 2026, Governor Patrick Morrissey appointed Erin Hunter to serve as the new Insurance Commissioner to lead the West Virginia Offices of the Insurance Commissioner, effective July 1, 2026. She will succeed Commissioner Allan L. McVey who is retiring June 30, after he served as Commissioner for a combined total of over 8 years across two separate tenures. 

"Erin Hunter has spent more than a decade serving West Virginians through the Offices of the Insurance Commissioner and has earned a reputation as a knowledgeable and effective leader," said Governor Morrisey. "I am confident she will build on the agency's strong foundation, and I thank Allan McVey for his years of dedicated service to the people of West Virginia."

Hunter served as Deputy Insurance Commissioner from April 29, 2019, until December 2025, when she entered private industry. She also served as General Counsel for the West Virginia Offices of the Insurance Commissioner from March 31, 2018. From January 25, 2019 through March 3, 2019, she also served in the role of Acting Insurance Commissioner.

Hunter was initially hired into the Insurance Commissioner’s Regulatory Compliance and Enforcement Division in 2012 as an associate attorney. In that role, she handled insurance-related investigations and administrative proceedings, including consumer complaints, tax assessment disputes, financial solvency actions, company licensing actions, market conduct actions, and insurance agent/producer licensing actions. As General Counsel, Hunter provided legal advice to the agency and was charged with managing all legal issues affecting the agency, including general regulatory policy, outside litigation, administrative actions, public inquiries and outreach, state-administered workers’ compensation fund claims, workers’ compensation employer compliance and enforcement, legislative developments and rules implementation, staffing for various boards and councils, Freedom of Information Act inquiries, and other agency personnel, administrative and contractual issues.

Hunter attended West Virginia University where she graduated with Bachelor of Arts degrees in English Literature and Political Science. She received her Juris Doctorate degree from West Virginia University College of Law. Hunter obtained her designation as a Professional, Academy of Healthcare Management (PAHM) through America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) and received a certificate in Insurance Regulation through The Institutes.

Dill Battle

Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC

hdbattle@spilmanlaw.com

304-340-3823

            James K. MacAlister

From Cohen, Snyder, Eisenberg, & Katzenberg, P.A., where he focused on Claimant Workers’ Compensation claims. A graduate from the University of Baltimore School of Law, Mr. MacAlister has been practicing since 1984. Mr. MacAlister is also admitted to practice in Federal Courts and has handled appeals in all of Maryland’s Appellate Courts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Notably, Mr. MacAlister has published numerous Articles in the Maryland Association for Justice dealing with workers’ Compensation issues. Mr. MacAlister has also previously received the Robert Zarbin Maryland Association for Justice Award for Outstanding Legislative Work Trial Lawyer of the Year – Maryland Association for Justice Leadership in the Law.

            Stephane Romano

From Antezana & Antezana, LLC, where she focuses on Claimant Workers’ Compensation claims. A 2015 graduate from the University of Maryland School of Law, Ms. Romano is admitted to practice in both Maryland and Virginia. Ms. Romano is a member of the Hispanic National Bar Association and Maryland State Bar Association. She is also fluent in Spanish and Portuguese and has served the community as an intern and volunteer for Catholic Charities helping immigrants with their DACA, TPS, and Applications for Naturalization. Ms. Romano was selected to Super Lawyers Rising Stars list from 2019 – 2020, and 2022 – 2025.

Kenrick Roberts

A proud resident of Prince George’s County and originally from St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, Commissioner Roberts brings a wealth of experience and dedication to serving Maryland’s workforce.

Before joining the Commission, he spent nearly a decade at Berman, Sobin, Gross, LLP, advocating for injured workers before the Commission and in Maryland’s appellate courts. His impressive career includes service as a judicial law clerk in Wicomico County, work in higher education, and recognition as a Rising Star by Super Lawyers since 2020. He has also earned distinctions such as National Black Lawyers Top 40 Under 40 and Top Attorneys in America.

Commissioner Roberts holds a Juris Doctor (cum laude) from UDC’s David A. Clarke School of Law, a Master of Science from Nova Southeastern University, and a Bachelor of Arts from Saint Leo University.

            AWW Cap

            $1,537.00 (up from $1,493.00)

PPD Rates

            <75wks.

                        $257.00 (up from $250.00)

75-249wks.

$513.00 (up from $498.00)

                        >250wks.

                                    $1,153.00 (up from $1,120.00)

            TPD Rate

                        $769.00 (up from $747.00)

Mileage Reimbursement Rate

                        72.5¢ per mile (up from 70¢)

            COLA Increase

                        Increase of 2.95% (down from 2025’s 3.11% increase)

Report on Workers’ Compensation Insurance

2025 Maryland Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 830): alters the entities to which and the information of which a claimant is required to authorize the release in a claim application filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission.

2025 Maryland Laws Ch. 198 (H.B. 15 / S.B. 144): authorizes the formation of limited worker cooperative associations; and establishes rules and procedures for the formation, governance, conversion, and dissolution of limited worker cooperative associations. A provision under the law, which the Insurance Commissioner is charged with enforcing, requires an insurer that provides workers’ compensation insurance to members of a limited worker cooperative association to calculate premiums for members who are covered employees: (1) in accordance with Title 11, Subtitle 3 and Title 19, Subtitle 4 of the Insurance Article; and (2) based on the covered employee’s actual payroll value.

Both found here.

The Maryland Legislature 2025 Session Yields Four Pieces of Legislation That Will Impact Employers/Insurers in the State

HB193/SB219 [went] into effect on July 1, 2025 and amends Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl., § 9-1007 by increasing the assessment on Awards against Employers/Insurers by up to an additional 1.5% if the Board determines that the reserves of the Fund are inadequate. The bill also requires the Workers’ Compensation Commission to designate a special monitor to assess the financial condition of the Uninsured Employers’ Fund. The bill amends § 9-1011 to increase the amount of the Fund from $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 as the threshold for suspending assessments by the employers and insurers and provides that payment of assessments would be resumed if the amount of the Fund becomes less than $8,000,000 or is expected to become less than $8,000,000 during the next 3 months. If assessments are suspended, the Fund must notify each self-insured employer and insurer to advise when assessments are to be resumed.

Senate Bill 227 [went] into effect on July 1, 2025 and amends Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl., §9-610.1 by providing the Commission with the authority to allow a credit for benefits previously paid by the Uninsured Employer’s Fund that were also paid by the Employer. The bill also changes § 9-1002 and alters the process by which the Fund is notified by a claim and required to pay compensation. Once enacted, the Commission must provide the Fund with notice of a claim, must send notice to the covered employee or their dependents that any documentation required by the Fund shall be completed, and the uninsured employer must be given notice of the claim before action is taken against them. The Fund will also be required to pay benefits or contest the claim within 21 days of receiving notice of the claim and can implead other employers and insurers to the claim. The bill also establishes requirements for uninsured employers, including depositing security that is sufficient to cover a claim by a covered employee and requires the payment of compensation ordered within 30 days of the date of the award. Lastly, if the Fund pays an award while an appeal is pending, the Fund would remain entitled to full reimbursement from the uninsured employer.

Senate Bill 695 [went] into effect on October 1, 2025, and alters the makeup of the Uninsured Employers’ Fund board. The Board will now consist of:

Two members with substantial experience as officers or employees of a property and casualty insurance company;
One member with substantial experience in the field of accounting or finance;
One member as a policy holder of workers’ compensation insurance in the State; and
One member representing the general public.

Senate Bill 830 [went] into effect on October 1, 2025 and alters Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl. § 9-709, § 9-710(b), and § 9-711 to include an authorization on the employee’s claim form, including work injury, occupational disease, and death claims for release of medical and financial information, including information related to additional claims filed by the employee and information in the custody of the Commission. This will eliminate the need for parties to issue subpoenas to the Workers’ Compensation Commission to obtain information on prior claims.