James K. MacAlister

From Cohen, Snyder, Eisenberg, & Katzenberg, P.A., where he focused on Claimant Workers’ Compensation claims. A graduate from the University of Baltimore School of Law, Mr. MacAlister has been practicing since 1984. Mr. MacAlister is also admitted to practice in Federal Courts and has handled appeals in all of Maryland’s Appellate Courts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Notably, Mr. MacAlister has published numerous Articles in the Maryland Association for Justice dealing with workers’ Compensation issues. Mr. MacAlister has also previously received the Robert Zarbin Maryland Association for Justice Award for Outstanding Legislative Work Trial Lawyer of the Year – Maryland Association for Justice Leadership in the Law.

            Stephane Romano

From Antezana & Antezana, LLC, where she focuses on Claimant Workers’ Compensation claims. A 2015 graduate from the University of Maryland School of Law, Ms. Romano is admitted to practice in both Maryland and Virginia. Ms. Romano is a member of the Hispanic National Bar Association and Maryland State Bar Association. She is also fluent in Spanish and Portuguese and has served the community as an intern and volunteer for Catholic Charities helping immigrants with their DACA, TPS, and Applications for Naturalization. Ms. Romano was selected to Super Lawyers Rising Stars list from 2019 – 2020, and 2022 – 2025.

Kenrick Roberts

A proud resident of Prince George’s County and originally from St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, Commissioner Roberts brings a wealth of experience and dedication to serving Maryland’s workforce.

Before joining the Commission, he spent nearly a decade at Berman, Sobin, Gross, LLP, advocating for injured workers before the Commission and in Maryland’s appellate courts. His impressive career includes service as a judicial law clerk in Wicomico County, work in higher education, and recognition as a Rising Star by Super Lawyers since 2020. He has also earned distinctions such as National Black Lawyers Top 40 Under 40 and Top Attorneys in America.

Commissioner Roberts holds a Juris Doctor (cum laude) from UDC’s David A. Clarke School of Law, a Master of Science from Nova Southeastern University, and a Bachelor of Arts from Saint Leo University.

            AWW Cap

            $1,537.00 (up from $1,493.00)

PPD Rates

            <75wks.

                        $257.00 (up from $250.00)

75-249wks.

$513.00 (up from $498.00)

                        >250wks.

                                    $1,153.00 (up from $1,120.00)

            TPD Rate

                        $769.00 (up from $747.00)

Mileage Reimbursement Rate

                        72.5¢ per mile (up from 70¢)

            COLA Increase

                        Increase of 2.95% (down from 2025’s 3.11% increase)

Report on Workers’ Compensation Insurance

2025 Maryland Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 830): alters the entities to which and the information of which a claimant is required to authorize the release in a claim application filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission.

2025 Maryland Laws Ch. 198 (H.B. 15 / S.B. 144): authorizes the formation of limited worker cooperative associations; and establishes rules and procedures for the formation, governance, conversion, and dissolution of limited worker cooperative associations. A provision under the law, which the Insurance Commissioner is charged with enforcing, requires an insurer that provides workers’ compensation insurance to members of a limited worker cooperative association to calculate premiums for members who are covered employees: (1) in accordance with Title 11, Subtitle 3 and Title 19, Subtitle 4 of the Insurance Article; and (2) based on the covered employee’s actual payroll value.

Both found here.

The Maryland Legislature 2025 Session Yields Four Pieces of Legislation That Will Impact Employers/Insurers in the State

HB193/SB219 [went] into effect on July 1, 2025 and amends Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl., § 9-1007 by increasing the assessment on Awards against Employers/Insurers by up to an additional 1.5% if the Board determines that the reserves of the Fund are inadequate. The bill also requires the Workers’ Compensation Commission to designate a special monitor to assess the financial condition of the Uninsured Employers’ Fund. The bill amends § 9-1011 to increase the amount of the Fund from $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 as the threshold for suspending assessments by the employers and insurers and provides that payment of assessments would be resumed if the amount of the Fund becomes less than $8,000,000 or is expected to become less than $8,000,000 during the next 3 months. If assessments are suspended, the Fund must notify each self-insured employer and insurer to advise when assessments are to be resumed.

Senate Bill 227 [went] into effect on July 1, 2025 and amends Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl., §9-610.1 by providing the Commission with the authority to allow a credit for benefits previously paid by the Uninsured Employer’s Fund that were also paid by the Employer. The bill also changes § 9-1002 and alters the process by which the Fund is notified by a claim and required to pay compensation. Once enacted, the Commission must provide the Fund with notice of a claim, must send notice to the covered employee or their dependents that any documentation required by the Fund shall be completed, and the uninsured employer must be given notice of the claim before action is taken against them. The Fund will also be required to pay benefits or contest the claim within 21 days of receiving notice of the claim and can implead other employers and insurers to the claim. The bill also establishes requirements for uninsured employers, including depositing security that is sufficient to cover a claim by a covered employee and requires the payment of compensation ordered within 30 days of the date of the award. Lastly, if the Fund pays an award while an appeal is pending, the Fund would remain entitled to full reimbursement from the uninsured employer.

Senate Bill 695 [went] into effect on October 1, 2025, and alters the makeup of the Uninsured Employers’ Fund board. The Board will now consist of:

Two members with substantial experience as officers or employees of a property and casualty insurance company;
One member with substantial experience in the field of accounting or finance;
One member as a policy holder of workers’ compensation insurance in the State; and
One member representing the general public.

Senate Bill 830 [went] into effect on October 1, 2025 and alters Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl. § 9-709, § 9-710(b), and § 9-711 to include an authorization on the employee’s claim form, including work injury, occupational disease, and death claims for release of medical and financial information, including information related to additional claims filed by the employee and information in the custody of the Commission. This will eliminate the need for parties to issue subpoenas to the Workers’ Compensation Commission to obtain information on prior claims.

 
Readers of The Compendium may recall DWC’s launching two years ago of CompCourses. These free webinars are designed to benefit workers’ compensation professionals, including adjusters, employers, and healthcare staff, by providing essential education on the workers’ compensation system, delivered in free 1-hour webinars. Not only are participants able to stay informed on current trends and improve their professional skills, they are also able to earn free Continuing Education (CE) credits by watching the webinars and completing a short quiz.
 
DWC announced last month that its CompCourses webinars will now be available in an on-demand, self-study format, allowing participants to learn and earn CE credit whenever it fits their schedule by watching previously recorded CompCourses webinars and completing the short quiz to earn 1 hour of TDI self-study CE credit.
 
Earning on-demand credit could not be easier! Simply visit the CompCourses webpage here and select the course you wish to take. You will fill out a Microsoft form, watch the 1-hour webinar on YouTube, and take the quiz to test your knowledge.
 
Voila…..
 
DWC has announced that it will continue to offer live CompCourses in 2026, affording participants the opportunity to engage directly with subject-matter experts and earn CE credit.
 
CompCourses webinars for 2026 are planned as follows:

• Navigating the Top 10 Workers’ Compensation Disputes – Spring 2026.
• Texas Workers’ Compensation Income Benefits 101 – Summer 2026.
• Medical Fee Dispute Resolution – Fall 2026.
• Return to Work – Winter 2026.

Copyright 2026, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP 

DWC is considering amending 28 Texas Administrative Code Chapter 152 concerning attorney fees and sought comments through last month on whether changes to the current hourly rate for attorney fees are necessary.
 
We note that when the Act was implemented in 1991, the approved hourly rate for attorney fees was $150. That rate remained in place for 26 years, until 2017, when it was increased to $200.
 
Per the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, $200 in January, 2017, has the same buying power as $266.89 in December, 2025. Further, $200 in December, 2025, has the same buying power as did $149.88 in January, 2017. In other words, due to inflation, it’s as if the rate was never increased.

By comparison, the maximum weekly temporary income benefit in 1991 was $428, and the minimum was $64. By 2016, the maximum weekly benefit had risen to $895, and the minimum to $134. Today, the maximum weekly benefit is $1,271, and the minimum is $191. So, benefit levels have nearly tripled since 1991, while the attorney hourly rate has increased only once and remains at $200 nearly a decade later.  Meanwhile, that rate must cover the overhead required to operate and maintain an effective law practice which has increased in ways that were inconceivable in 1991.
 
Workers’ compensation now has the second lowest average hourly rate of any practice area at an average of $180, second only to juvenile law at $146, while the average hourly rate for all practice areas is $367. Hourly Rates in Texas. 
 
The overarching concern is that if the rate cap is not raised, the workers’ compensation bar will continue to shrink, as it is doing now, as older, experienced attorneys retire and new attorneys choose other practice areas over workers’ compensation law because it is more difficult to make the numbers work.  At that point, employees, employers, and carriers will no longer be able to obtain effective legal representation in this highly complex area of the law.

Copyright 2026, Stone Loughlin & Swanson, LLP 

by: Kisa P. Sthankiya

Stephanie Ringbloom, Esq.:

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an unpublished opinion in the case of Yoder v. McCarthy Construction, Inc., et. al., No. 43 EAP 2024, 2025 WL 2981889 (Pa. Oct. 23, 2025). In this decision, the Court confirmed the applicability of the McDonald test for coverage of a subcontractor. The Court noted that “Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), as  interpreted  by  this  Court  for decades, a general contractor that hires a subcontractor to perform work on a jobsite is deemed  an  “employer”  that  is  secondarily  liable  to  the  injured  employee  of  the subcontractor  for  the  payment  of  compensation  under  the  Act, provided  that  the subcontractor—the  one primarily  liable—fails  to  make  payment.” They cited to Section  302(b)  of  the Act, 77 P.S. § 462. A general contractor can thereby avail itself of the same tort immunity afforded to the subcontractor by way of this secondary liability.

There are five elements that must be met under the McDonald test for a general contractor to qualify as a statutory employer: (1) the existence of a contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner; (2) occupancy and/or control of the premises upon which the work is being performed; (3) the existence of a subcontract with the general contractor; (4) entrustment of part of the general contractor’s regular business to the subcontractor; and (5) the claimant is an employee of that subcontractor. The Supreme Court determined that McCarthy Construction had demonstrated all five elements in the claim filed by Yoder, thereby granting it statutory immunity for the civil claim that the injured worker had tried to file against McCarthy.

    On December 3, 2025, an Arkansas Court of Appeals issued an opinion that further bolstered the supreme reign of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (more commonly referred to as the “Full Commission”) as the deferential trier of fact and arbiter of credibility. One of the most noteworthy quirks of Arkansas workers’ compensation law is that Arkansas appellate courts and the Arkansas Supreme Court afford near-complete deference to the Full Commission’s credibility assessment of witnesses while completely disregarding the credibility determinations rendered by Administrative Law Judges that have had the opportunity to personally observe witnesses and their demeanor while testifying on the stand. The Full Commission is tasked with reviewing the decisions rendered by ALJs along with the evidentiary record of a claim once an ALJ’s decision has been appealed, but their review of the record is limited to transcripts of testimony, evidentiary exhibits, and briefs submitted by legal counsel for both parties. However, despite never getting to personally observe witnesses and their demeanor as they testify, it is well settled in Arkansas workers’ compensation law that the reviewing Court of Appeals or Arkansas Supreme Court will “give no weight to the ALJ’s findings whatsoever” and will instead defer to the credibility assessments and findings of facts rendered by the Full Commission even though it is the ALJ that presides over a claim for months (potentially even years), makes rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and personally observes claimants and other witnesses as they testify under direct and cross-examination. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. v. Ewton, 2025 Ark. App. 575, at 7, 728 S.W.3d 401, 405 (citing Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979)). 

    In the case in point, Claimant Andrea Ewton was employed as a substitute custodian for Dardanelle Intermediate School and was on the clock when she walked from the school’s office to her car and injured her knee and ankle when she stepped down from a curb in the parking lot. At issue was whether she was performing employment services when she went to her car or whether she had gone to her car for a personal errand (specifically to retrieve her water bottle). Mere hours after Ewton’s fall, she spoke on the phone with a claim supervisor and reported that she had gone to her car that morning to retrieve a water bottle when she slipped off a curb injuring her knee and ankle. In the recorded transcript of that call, Ewton was specifically asked if she had gone to her car for any purpose other than retrieving her water bottle, and she responded, “No ma’am”. The school nurse that iced Claimant’s injuries immediately after the accident also testified that Ewton told her she had been walking to her car to get a drink when she slipped off the curb. These reports made by Claimant immediately after her accident are noteworthy because she eventually changed her story and testified at the hearing in front of the ALJ that she had gone to her car to retrieve a set of keys that she needed to open school buildings. Ewton had also testified during her deposition that she went to her car to retrieve a set of keys; however, during her deposition, she testified that the school nurse had given her the wrong set of keys earlier that morning. In contrast, she testified in front of the ALJ that the school’s secretary had given her the wrong set of keys that morning (perhaps after she and her attorney realized that the school nurse only had keys that could open the nurse’s office rather than the various school buildings that Ewton needed to access that day). 

    After observing the demeanor of Ewton, the school nurse and the secretary while they testified, in addition to reviewing the Claimant’s deposition transcript and the transcript of her recorded statement made on the same day of her accident, the ALJ ruled that Ewton had failed to prove she suffered a compensable injury to her knee and ankle because she was not performing employment services at the time of her fall. In his opinion, the ALJ specifically found that Ewton did not provide credible testimony when she testified that she had gone to her car that morning to retrieve a set of keys to one of the school’s buildings. His credibility determination was based on Ewton’s inconsistent narratives regarding why she went to her car that morning as well as other instances of doubtful credibility in the record such as her testimony at the hearing that she hadn’t worked since her accident which was contradicted by Claimant’s unemployment application wherein she reported working for a nursing and rehabilitation facility for a period of four months after her accident at the school. 

    In spite of the ALJ’s personal observations of the witnesses throughout their testimony as well as his thorough opinion which cited to numerous inconsistencies in the evidentiary record in support of his credibility assessments, the Full Commission reversed his denial of the claim and found that Ewton had met her burden of proof in establishing that she was performing employment services at the time of her fall. The Full Commission noted in its decision that it specifically found Ewton’s testimony to be credible when she testified at the hearing that she had gone to her car to retrieve a set of keys rather than only going to her car for a bottle of water. Respondents appealed the Full Commission’s decision to the Court of Appeals arguing that Claimant had failed to prove she sustained a compensable injury within the scope of her employment because she provided inconsistent statements regarding her purpose for going to her car. However, the Court of Appeals abided by long-standing precedent in deferring to the Full Commission’s credibility determination and stating that Arkansas courts will affirm the Commission’s decisions when the issue on appeal comes down to the Commission’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses.  

    Given that the Court of Appeals is bound by the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act and decades of case law which designate the Commission as the ultimate factfinder, the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the Full Commission is certainly not surprising to those who are familiar with workers’ compensation law in the natural state. Ultimately, it is up to the Arkansas legislature to amend the law if they believe that the ALJs who have the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of witnesses and to comb through extensive evidence should be given deference when making credibility determinations and other valuable findings of fact over the administrative and judicial bodies who are charged with reviewing the evidentiary record from transcripts and records alone. 

The burial benefit under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act will increase to $12,200.00 effective July 1, 2026. This benefit applies upon the death of an employee, resulting through personal injuries as defined in NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151.

By: Jigar S. Desai

In a February 26, 2026, opinion, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division, addressed a question of first impression under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Compensation Act), 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq.: whether a claimant who sustains a single injury to one body part may receive concurrent awards under both the scheduled loss provisions of §8(e) and the person-as-a-whole provisions of §8(d)(2). Azcon Metals v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, 2026 IL App (5th) 250301WC. The court held that a claimant must elect one remedy or the other for the same injury, and that an employer who made a voluntary payment under §8(e) is entitled to a credit against a subsequent award under §8(d)(2).

The court affirmed the Commission’s award of permanent partial disability benefits under §8(d)(2) but reversed the Commission’s denial of credit to the employer for benefits previously paid under §8(e).

The decision provides important guidance on the interplay between §§8(e) and 8(d)(2), the election-of-remedies doctrine in workers’ compensation, and the credit principles that apply when employers make prompt voluntary payments under the Compensation Act.

Factual Background

Tom Snyder sustained an injury to his right foot and leg while working for Azcon Metals on March 19, 2020. His right foot was crushed between two rail cars. Snyder initially underwent surgery that resulted in the amputation of four toes on his right foot. However, the following day, he underwent a second surgery that resulted in the amputation of his right leg at the mid-tibia, below the knee.

Following the surgeries, Snyder was fitted for a transtibial prosthetic and participated in physical therapy, work hardening, and a functional capacity evaluation. The evaluation indicated that he could perform work at the heavy physical demand level but had decreased tolerance for prolonged standing and walking on uneven surfaces. Snyder participated in vocational rehabilitation and expressed his intent to pursue employment in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning or in the construction industry, acknowledging that those fields may require traversing uneven ground but believing he could manage the slower pace of such work.

Following the work injury, the employer promptly paid Snyder $97,010.30 in permanent partial disability benefits for the scheduled loss of his right foot pursuant to §8(e)(11) of the Compensation Act. The payment was made in two installments: $60,716.19 on April 20, 2020, and $36,294.11 on April 28, 2022, calculated at 167 weeks using a stipulated minimum statutory amputation rate of $580.90.

Procedural History

On April 17, 2020, Snyder filed an application for adjustment of claim. The matter proceeded to an arbitration hearing on January 27, 2023. At the outset of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the employer had paid, and was entitled to credit for, $17,438.31 in temporary total disability benefits and $42,822.94 in maintenance benefits. The parties further stipulated that the employer had paid $97,010.30 in permanent partial disability benefits for the scheduled loss of Snyder’s right foot under §8(e)(11), but they disagreed as to whether the employer was entitled to a credit for that payment against any additional permanent partial disability award.

Snyder waived his right to a wage differential award under §8(d)(1). The arbitrator awarded all requested medical expenses and, after considering the factors set forth in §8.1b(b)(v) of the Compensation Act, found that Snyder sustained permanent partial disability to the extent of 65 percent loss of use of the person as a whole under §8(d)(2). The arbitrator denied the employer’s request for a credit for the §8(e)(11) payment against the §8(d)(2) award.

On review, the Commission unanimously reduced the §8(d)(2) award from 65 percent to 45 percent loss of use of the person as a whole, finding that Snyder was young and remained capable of physically demanding work. The Commission, however, agreed with the arbitrator that the employer was not entitled to a credit. The Commission characterized the credit issue as one of first impression, concluded that §8(d)(2) did not permit an offset for previously paid amputation benefits, and noted that the employer had paid benefits under the incorrect section — §8(e)(11) (loss of foot, 167 weeks) rather than §8(e)(12) (amputation below the knee, compensated as loss of a leg at 215 weeks).

The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision in its entirety. The employer appealed to the appellate court.

The Appellate Court’s Analysis

Framing the Issue

As a threshold matter, the appellate court corrected the framing of the employer’s first argument on appeal. The employer had argued that the Commission erred by awarding benefits under both §§8(e) and 8(d)(2). The court clarified that the Commission did not “award” benefits under §8(e); rather, the employer had made a voluntary payment under that section prior to arbitration. The Commission only awarded benefits under §8(d)(2) and separately considered whether the employer was entitled to a credit. Accordingly, the court reframed the central issue as whether the Commission erred by denying the employer a credit for its voluntary §8(e) payment against the §8(d)(2) award.

Standard of Review

The court noted that while the Commission’s determination of whether an employer is entitled to a credit is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion, the Commission in this case interpreted statutory provisions and concluded that §8(d)(2) did not permit an offset. Because the dispute involved statutory interpretation, the court applied de novo review.

Election of Remedies: Section 8(e) Versus Section 8(d)(2) for a Single Injury

The core of the court’s analysis addressed the interplay between §§8(e) and 8(d)(2). The court acknowledged the tension between the two provisions. Section 8(e) provides that a claimant who receives a scheduled loss “shall not receive any compensation under any other provisions of this Act.” 820 ILCS 305/8(e). Section 8(d)(2), on the other hand, states that compensation awarded under that subsection “shall not take into consideration injuries covered under paragraphs (c) and (e)” and that such compensation “shall not affect the employee’s right to compensation payable under paragraphs (b), (c) and (e) . . . for the disabilities therein covered.” 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2).

The Commission had relied on the language of §8(d)(2) to conclude that recovery under §8(e) should have no effect on an award under §8(d)(2), and vice versa, effectively permitting concurrent awards and denying the employer any credit. The circuit court agreed, adding that any ambiguity should be resolved in the claimant’s favor under the principle of liberal construction.

The appellate court disagreed. In its view, the language of §8(e) clearly precluded a claimant from recovering under both sections for the same injury to one body part. The court interpreted the language of §8(d)(2) as permitting an election — not a concurrent award — for a single injury. Specifically, the court concluded that §8(d)(2) permits a claimant to elect an award under either §8(e) or §8(d)(2) for an injury to a single body part, while also permitting recovery under both sections when a claimant sustains injuries to multiple, separate body parts in the same work accident.

Consistency with Prior Caselaw

The court grounded its conclusion in several lines of precedent. First, the court analogized to established caselaw holding that a claimant who sustains a scheduled loss may elect between a scheduled loss award under §8(e) and a wage differential award under §8(d)(1), but may not receive both. Citing Payetta v. Industrial Commission, 339 Ill.App.3d 718, 791 N.E.2d 682, 274 Ill.Dec. 590 (2d Dist. 2003), and General Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 89 Ill.2d 432, 433 N.E.2d 671, 60 Ill.Dec. 629 (1982), the court noted that this election principle reflects the understanding that an injured party will choose the award most likely to approximate the earnings loss the Compensation Act is designed to compensate. The Commission had distinguished those cases on the basis that §8(d)(1) contains an explicit exclusion for §8(e) claims, whereas §8(d)(2) does not. The appellate court acknowledged the difference in statutory language but concluded that the exclusionary language in §8(e) itself — prohibiting compensation under “any other provisions of this Act” (820 ILCS 305/8(e)) — resolved the issue.

Second, the court observed that both wage differential awards under §8(d)(1) and person-as-a-whole awards under §8(d)(2) serve to compensate injured workers for reduced earning capacity under certain circumstances. Given this functional similarity, the court concluded that the rationale prohibiting dual recovery under §§8(e) and 8(d)(1) applies equally to §§8(e) and 8(d)(2) when a single injury to one body part is at issue.

Third, the court distinguished its prior decisions in Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 233 Ill.2d 364, 909 N.E.2d 818, 330 Ill.Dec. 796 (2009), and American Coal Co. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2024 IL App (5th) 230815WC, 248 N.E.3d 493, 478 Ill.Dec. 868. In those cases, the claimants had sustained injuries to multiple body parts during a single work accident, warranting additional compensation under the Compensation Act. In Beelman Trucking, the supreme court permitted concurrent awards under §§8(e)(18) (loss of legs) and 8(e)(10) (loss of arm), reasoning that denying compensation beyond two members would leave additional losses uncompensated. In American Coal, this court extended that reasoning to permit concurrent awards under §§8(e)(18) and 8(d)(2) for nonscheduled injuries sustained in addition to the scheduled losses. The appellate court found those decisions consistent with its holding in Azcon Metals, noting that the present case involved only a single injury to one body part, and that allowing concurrent awards would result in impermissible double recovery.

Employer Entitled to Credit for Voluntary Payment

Having concluded that the claimant was entitled to compensation under only one statutory provision for his single injury, the court turned to the credit issue. The court held that the Commission erred by denying the employer’s credit request. The employer had promptly and voluntarily paid benefits under §8(e) following the work accident, providing the claimant with immediate financial relief. When the claimant subsequently elected to receive benefits under §8(d)(2), the Commission should have credited the employer for its prior voluntary payments.

The court cited World Color Press v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 125 Ill.App.3d 469, 466 N.E.2d 270, 80 Ill.Dec. 818 (5th Dist. 1984), for the proposition that an employer may receive credit for overpayments absent a statutory bar, and Salisbury v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2017 IL App (3d) 160138WC, 78 N.E.3d 979, 413 Ill.Dec. 703, for the policy principle that encouraging prompt and voluntary payments of benefits furthers the purpose of the Compensation Act. The court emphasized that denying credit for good-faith payments would encourage administrative delays as employers attempt to resolve every ambiguity before paying benefits — a result inconsistent with the Compensation Act’s primary purpose of providing employees with prompt and definite compensation.

Practical Implications

This decision establishes several important principles for practitioners on both sides of the bar.

For employers and carriers, the decision confirms that when a single injury to one body part is involved, a claimant must elect between a scheduled loss award under §8(e) and a person-as-a-whole award under §8(d)(2). The employer who promptly and voluntarily pays benefits under §8(e) will be entitled to a credit against a subsequent §8(d)(2) award. This holding should encourage prompt payment of scheduled benefits, as employers need not fear that early payments will go uncredited if the claimant later elects a different form of permanent disability compensation. Practitioners should carefully document voluntary payments, including the statutory section under which they are made, the calculation methodology, and the dates of payment.

For claimants, the decision preserves the right to elect the more favorable remedy — but it forecloses the possibility of receiving both a scheduled loss award and a person-as-a-whole award for the same injury. Claimants and their counsel should carefully evaluate which remedy produces the greater benefit before making an election, particularly in cases involving amputations or other injuries that may qualify under both sections. The decision also reaffirms that concurrent awards remain permissible when a claimant sustains injuries to multiple, separate body parts in a single work accident, consistent with the rationale of Beelman Trucking, supra, and American Coal, supra.

Finally, the employer’s miscalculation of the scheduled loss payment in this case — paying 167 weeks for loss of a foot under §8(e)(11) when the below-knee amputation should have been compensated as a loss of a leg at 215 weeks under §8(e)(12) — serves as a reminder that correct classification of the injury under the appropriate subsection of §8(e) is critical. An incorrect classification may result in an underpayment that could affect the credit calculation or expose the employer to additional proceedings.