STILES, TAYLOR k GRACE     PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW   MARY ANN STILES RAYFORD H. TAYLOR * ROBERT J. GRACE, JR. JOHN S. (JAKE) SMITH TAMELA IVEY PERDUE FELICE D. RIVERS STEPHEN B. WILSON HEATHER M. BYRER GARY G. CARPENTER ANNEMARIE CRAFT NICHOLAS P. DARENEAU HEATHER S. DENKER ARLENE FRANCONERO JOHN E. HANKAL       Reply To:   P.O. BOX 191148 ATLANTA, GA 31119-1148 404-287-2390 FAX: 404-287-2371         JOAQUIN JIRON CAROL C. KAMEL TIMOTHY L. NEWHALL MARK A. OLIVERA KIRK A. PERROW LEESA L. POWELL SUSAN STEAKLEY-GARCIA JACK A. WEISS   Paralegals GLENDA STILES LUCONTRO BRENDA L. SHOUPE   *    Member of Georgia Bar   RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA WORKERS COMPENSATION   By Rayford H. Taylor   SMART DOCUMENTS SOLUTIONS, LLC. v. HALL,___S.E.2d___, 2008 WL 756149 (Ga. App. March 24, 2008)   Smart Documents Solutions (“SDS”) filed suit against the Georgia State Board of Workers Compensation (the “Board”) regarding the Board’s rule regarding the fees chargeable for medical photocopy services.  SDA asserted the Health Records Act (“HRA”) established a fee schedule for medical record photocopying.  However, the Board adopted a photocopy fee schedule which was lower than the fees set by that Act.   The trial court dismissed the SDS complaint and SDS appealed.  The appeals court concluded the Board had the authority to set service fees in workers’ compensation cases, and the HRA could be interpreted to permit a fee schedule lower than the statute in various situations, so the Board’s rule was upheld.     MCLEOD v. BLASE, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2008 WL 710101 (Ga. App.March 18, 2008)   Mr. McLeod was a professional basketball player with the Atlanta Hawks who filed a professional malpractice action against Mr. Blasé, an athletic trainer who treated him and who was also employed by the Hawks.    Mr. McLeod alleged he could avoid the exclusive remedy of the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act because of a judicially created exception for injuries based upon professional negligence.  Mr. McLeod alleged his injuries arose from the negligence of Mr. Blasé, so Mr. Blasé did not have the immunity that would ordinarily exist for a co-worker.  Mr. Blasé sought summary judgment based on his immunity as a co-employee, and the trial court granted Mr. Blase workers’ compensation immunity from suit.  Mr. McLeod appealed.   The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that a co-employee does have workers’ compensation immunity.  In so ruling, the court held that the professional negligence exception only applied to only in situations where a company physician was being sued for medical malpractice.  The court declined to expand the exception to apply to all co-employees who also happened to be a professional licensed by a regulatory or licensing board.           COKER v. GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE CO, ___ S.E.2d ___ (Ga. App. Feb.19,             2008)   Mr. Coker sustained injuries while working for the Mayo Company (“Mayo”).  He filed suit against various defendants, one of which was the Great American Insurance Company (“American”).  American sought summary judgment and dismissal of the claim against it based on tort immunity under Section 34-9-11(a) O.C.G.A.  American asserted it provided benefits to Mayo through a wholly owned subsidiary, American National Fire Insurance Company (“American National”).  Consequently, it contended it was entitled to workers’ compensation immunity.   The trial judge granted American’s summary judgment motion and Mr. Coker appealed.  The appeals court affirmed the ruling by virtue of the fact that in Georgia a parent corporation of a wholly owned subsidiary that is entitled to workers’ compensation immunity is also entitled to share in that immunity.

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